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GENERAL ABSTRACT 
Estimating eyewitness memory accuracy is crucial in forensic settings, given the need 
for efficient investigations and the negative consequences of erroneous testimony. In this 
thesis, the overarching goal of the research was to test the utility of metamemory assessments 
as postdictors of eyewitness performance. Metamemory research is essential for a 
comprehensive understanding of how people use and perceive their own memory, but it has 
not yet been thoroughly explored in eyewitness settings. In the initial experiments 
(Experiments 1 and 2), the relationship between self-reports of memory ability and 
eyewitness identification performance was examined. Specifically, we tested how self-ratings 
of memory ability and strategies endorsement relate to eyewitness identification accuracy, 
confidence and over/underconfidence. These experiments provided initial evidence that some 
metamemory factors are important indicators of eyewitness identification accuracy and 
confidence, although only assessments of global memory self-efficacy were adopted. Aiming 
to improve metamemory assessments in eyewitness contexts, a measure tailored specifically 
to eyewitness testimony settings was developed and tested in Experiment 3) In Experiment 
4, the predictive value of general and eyewitness-specific metamemory assessments (EMS) 
on identification performance for biased and unbiased lineups was investigated. We were 
specifically interested in possible differential effects between biased and unbiased lineups 
because other postdictors of identification performance have less diagnostic value in biased 
lineups. The results of Experiment 4 showed that eyewitness-specific metamemory factors 
are predictive of identification accuracy for both biased and unbiased lineups. In Experiment 
5 an innovative repeated-trials eyewitness identification paradigm was used to examine the 
relation between metamemory assessments and identification performance, obtaining further 
evidence for a relation between eyewitness-specific metamemory factors and identification 
 
 
performance. In the final experiment (Experiment 6), the focus is shifted from identification 
paradigms to an eyewitness free recall paradigm, aiming to elucidate the relation between 
metamemory and disclosure of information. We summarize the main findings of this novel 
line of research in the General Discussion, presenting the challenges and prospects facing 
future eyewitness metamemory research. 
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CHAPTER 1 
General Introduction: 
Examining The Intersection Between Metamemory And Eyewitness 
Testimony Research 
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Eyewitnesses are crucial in the criminal justice system, providing evidence that may 
be used to guide investigations and to identify perpetrators. Since the initial formulation of 
eyewitness testimony research (Munsterberg, 1908), this maturing field has established that 
eyewitness memory is not a permanent record of perceived events and may be tainted by a 
number of different factors. Witnesses' recollections of important facts not only deteriorate 
over time but can also be negatively distorted by new information introduced after the 
original experience. Alarmingly, decades of research confirms that individuals may be led to 
believe that they experienced events that never actually took place, such as getting lost on a 
mall (Loftus & Pickrell, 1995), spilling punch at a wedding (Hyman & Billings, 1998), or 
even of committing a crime (Kassin, 2008; Kassin & Kiechel, 1996). In less extreme 
circumstances, eyewitnesses may incorporate false information into their accounts after 
communicating with other witnesses (Ito et al., 2018), or in response to suggestive 
interviewing practices (Eisen, Quas, & Goodman, 2001). Such malleability of memory does 
not imply that eyewitness evidence is inherently unreliable, but it emphasizes how eyewitness 
accounts can be contaminated (Wixted, Mickes, & Fisher, 2018). 
Similarly, the processes by which we monitor our memory performance are also not 
perfectly objective. In forensic settings, eyewitness confidence in identification procedures 
can be inflated by external influences, such as confirmatory feedback given by legal officers 
(Douglass & Steblay, 2006; Wells & Bradfield, 1998), or by the use of biased lineups 
(Charman, Wells, & Joy, 2011). Even in the absence of external influences, confidence 
judgements may be undermined when eyewitnesses have a lack of insight into their own 
memory capacity (Perfect, 2004). Such failures in recollections and memory monitoring 
processes can have severe consequences in the legal justice system. Namely, confidence 
statements may be less diagnostic of accuracy if eyewitnesses are not realistic about their 
self-perceived memory ability (Olsson & Juslin, 1999), or eyewitnesses may underreport 
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critical aspects of what they remember due to self-distrust in memory ability (Goldsmith, 
Pansky, & Koriat, 2014; Weber & Brewer, 2008). Surprisingly, some of the potential issues 
concerning self-assessments of memory capacity and eyewitness testimony have not been 
thoroughly investigated.  
The goal of the programme of research conducted for this thesis was to address this 
gap and investigate the relation between memory self-assessments and different aspects of 
eyewitness testimony performance. Specifically, I explored three overarching research goals  
in detail across this programme of work. The first goal was to determine the relationship 
between self-reported metamemory and objective memory accuracy in different eyewitness 
paradigms. The second goal was to examine the relation between metamemory and 
expressions of confidence in eyewitness settings. Finally, the third goal was to investigate the 
relation between metamemory and the confidence-accuracy relationship in eyewitness 
performance. The experiments designed to achieve these goals were formalized using 
theoretical frameworks derived from metamemory research. This chapter presents a 
definition and general overview of metamemory as a psychological construct and introduces 
the many potential implications of metamemory frameworks when planning and conducting 
empirical studies on eyewitness testimony. 
 
Theoretical Frameworks of Metamemory 
We all need to make judgements about the likely accuracy of our memories from time 
to time. An interviewer relying on his or her notes must make this judgement, as must a 
patient reporting their medical history, as must an eyewitness sworn to tell the truth in Court. 
The ability to examine one’s own memory performance is a critical feature of normal 
metacognitive functioning. Metamemory, an aspect of metacognition, is a latent construct 
that was formulated from the early developmental psychology literature to describe the 
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knowledge, perceptions, and beliefs individuals have about their own memory and the 
memory system in more general terms (Hultsch, Hertzog, Dixon, & Davidson, 1988). These 
beliefs and judgments greatly influence behaviour because they are used to monitor and 
control how we deploy cognitive resources (Koriat, Ma’ayan, & Nussinson, 2006). For 
example, if a student believes some important material was not properly learned, she or he 
may spend more time studying that material or employ strategies to better memorize its 
content. Thus, metamnemonic judgments indicate how well target items are either available 
or accessible in memory. For instance, an individual may be able to retrieve an online-
password now, but metamnemonic judgments assess whether the same password will be 
retrievable at some future date. Similarly, at test, an individual may decide that even though 
she or he may not know the password now, she or he has a high ‘feeling of knowing’ for the 
item, so the individual chooses to spend more time trying to retrieve the password.  
Both memory monitoring and control play an important role in a variety of everyday 
life situations. For instance, depending on monitoring results, not-mastered materials can be 
further studied, a more effective learning strategy can be adopted, or external cues can be 
used to improve remembering. The efficacy of this metacognitive system requires a feedback 
system between monitoring and control mechanisms, which is provided by metamemory 
judgements. Several types of metamemory judgements have been investigated including 
reality and source monitoring (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993), retrospective 
confidence judgments (Brewer & Sampaio, 2012), "don't know" judgments (Tobias & 
Everson, 2009), hindsight judgments (Koriat & Bjork, 2005), and judgments of subjective 
experience (Koriat et al., 2006; Schwartz, Benjamin, & Bjork, 1997).  
Following Nelson and Narens (1990), metamemory judgments can be divided into 
those made during acquisition of knowledge (judgments of learning; JOL) and judgments 
made at the time of retrieval (feelings of knowing; FOK). Judgments of learning can be 
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defined as prospective confidence judgments of encoding efficiency made after exposure to 
an item but prior to a recall test. In forensic settings, judgements of learning can be observed 
when eyewitnesses of a crime are asked whether they would be able to recognize the 
perpetrator or produce a facial composite. In this scenario, the eyewitness needs to reflect on 
their memory ability, their internal state, and on the encoding conditions when deciding 
whether a recognition would be possible. In contrast, feeling of knowing can be defined as a 
retrospective confidence judgement of encoding efficiency made during the time of retrieval. 
After making a lineup identification, for example, eyewitnesses may express how confident 
they are in their decision. Confidence judgments are one commonly used method for 
determining an individual’s belief that the information retrieved from memory is accurate.  
There have been some attempts to develop general theories of memory confidence, 
such as direct access theories (Schwartz, 1994), familiarity based theories (Metcalfe, 1996; 
Metcalfe, 2000), and accessibility theories (Dunlosky, 2004). A common assumption across 
those theories is that the processes underlying confidence judgements fall into two broad 
categories: target-based sources and cue-based sources. That is, confidence judgments are 
based on many different characteristics of memory retrieval processes, such as memory 
vividness and completeness (Talarico & Rubin, 2003), response latency (Brewer, Caon, 
Todd, & Weber, 2006), and the quantity and intensity of retrieved information (Koriat, 1993). 
Target-based sources include the ease of stimuli processing, the amount of information 
encoded, or interference from distractors. In direct-access theories, for example, there is an 
emphasis on target-based information so that people monitor the specific memory 
representation of an item when making metamnemonic judgments (Schwartz, 1994). Cue 
based sources include information that is not intrinsic to the target, such as familiarity with 
the stimuli, domain knowledge, and social desirability (Metcalfe, 1996; Metcalfe, 2000). 
Cued-based sources play an important role in familiarity based-theories and accessibility 
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theories, positing that people draw on information other than the specific representation to 
form a confidence judgment.  
One influential theoretical framework proposed by (Koriat, 2000) extends on the 
processes leading to metacognitive judgements just outlined. In this framework, 
metacognitive judgements can be based on information (or theory-based) and experience (or 
affect-based). That is, monitoring memory processes can be based on an explicitly inferential 
process, or on a sheer subjective feeling. Consider, for example, an eyewitness who fails to 
recall a specific fact of a crime or a characteristic of the perpetrator. The witness may still be 
able to make an educated guess about the plausibility that the solicited information will be 
subsequently recalled or recognized. Such judgment may be based on domain-specific 
memories and beliefs (Nelson, Gerler, & Narens, 1984), and can take the form “there is little 
chance that I would know the answer’’ or ‘‘I ought to know the answer” (Costermans, Lories, 
& Ansay, 1992). 
Judgments of Confidence and Memory Self-Efficacy 
The degree of confidence that an individual expresses in a memory plays a critical 
role in how an outsider evaluates the verity of that memory (Wells, Olson, & Charman, 
2002). In addition, in many applied areas such as jury decisions and medical diagnosis, 
confidence in one’s judgements determines the likelihood of translating these judgements to 
action. But the functional value of confidence depends on whether people are generally 
accurate in monitoring their memories or knowledge. Results of many studies have 
demonstrated positive correlations across items between subjective confidence and objective 
accuracy in knowledge tests, suggesting that people have good insights into the relative 
accuracy of their knowledge. This has been found to be the case across a variety of 
metacognitive judgments. Judgments of learning made about different items during study are 
moderately predictive of the relative future recall or recognition of these items (Narens, 
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Nelson, & Scheck, 2008). Similarly, feeling of knowing judgments following a recall failure 
are predictive of the likelihood of recalling the target at some later time (Koriat, 1995). 
Finally, confidence judgments in general knowledge answers are generally diagnostic of the 
answers correctness (Koriat, 2008). Nevertheless, disconnection between subjective and 
objective indexes of knowing have been observed in some situations to the extent that 
metacognitive judgments were not diagnostic of actual memory performance (Benjamin, 
Bjork, & Schwartz, 1998; Besken & Mulligan, 2013). 
A specific dimension of metamemory that is relevant to everyday memory 
functioning is memory self-efficacy (MSE), defined as the self-evaluation of one’s general 
competence and ability across many different memory domains and tasks (Berry, 1999; 
Hertzog & Dixon, 1994). Hertzog and Dixon (1994) propose a hierarchical structure for this 
construct including global beliefs about memory ability (e.g., “I have a good memory”) and 
situational beliefs (“I can remember this address, so I will go there without looking it up”). 
Unlike situational beliefs, global MSE beliefs are enduring and have been constructed on the 
basis of previous experiences and implicit theories and schemas about memory (e.g., 
perceived effects of ageing on memory, perceived memory stability across domains; 
(Cavanaugh & Green, 1990; Hertzog, McGuire, & Lineweaver, 1998). Global MSE beliefs 
may also be defined in relation to an individual’s appraisal of his or her ability in a specific 
memory domain such as semantic memory, memory for faces, or episodic memory (Hertzog 
& Dixon, 1994; Hertzog, Park, Morrell, & Martin, 2000). Some evidence points to a positive 
relation between memory self-efficacy and memory performance in different tasks (Seeman, 
McAvay, Merrill, Albert, & Rodin, 1996; Valentijn et al., 2006). In the face matching 
literature, some results show moderate to large correlations between self-reported face 
perception ability and performance in face matching tests (Gray, Bird, & Cook, 2017; 
Ventura, Livingston, & Shah, 2018). However, the outcome of studies focusing specifically 
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on face recognition show that individuals have limited insight into their ability to recognize 
unfamiliar faces (Bindemann, Attard, & Johnston, 2014; Bobak, Mileva, & Hancock, 2018). 
Despite an emerging literature on the relation between memory self-efficacy and 
objective memory performance, very little of this research has focused on eyewitness 
testimony settings. One of the goals of the current programme of work was to address this 
gap. Across all experiments in the current thesis we examine the relation between memory 
self-efficacy and eyewitness testimony performance. Specifically, we aimed to examine the 
utility of memory self-efficacy as a predictor of accuracy, confidence and confidence-
accuracy relation in eyewitness identification and free recall tasks. From a theoretical 
perspective, we aimed to elucidate how insightful individuals are about their own memory 
performance in forensic contexts. From a practical perspective, we examined whether 
assessments of memory-efficacy may be used to better distinguish accurate from inaccurate 
eyewitness identifications or accounts.  
 
Metamemory in Eyewitness Testimony Contexts 
Metamemory processes are implicated at various stages of memory formation, and 
those operating during remembering are particularly crucial in determining memory accuracy 
and error. These processes have several functions that are notably relevant in eyewitness 
testimony contexts, such as: specifying the origin of mental experience (Mitchell & Johnson, 
2000), avoiding suggestibility effects and memory contamination by attributing them to their 
proper source (Mitchell, Johnson, & Mather, 2003), adopting appropriate strategies to 
enhance memory for the task at hand (Bjorklund, Dukes, & Brown, 2008), formulating a 
comprehensive and informative account of a past event (Koriat, 1999), monitoring the 
accuracy of remembered information (Kelemen, 2000), and regulating the reporting of 
information according to the incentive for accuracy (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). Despite a 
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clear overlap between metamemory processes and eyewitness testimony settings, there is still 
a considerable gap in the literature concerning the intersections between metamemory and 
eyewitness performance. Across this programme of research, the thesis I aim to advance is 
that in order to improve or better estimate memory accuracy, it is crucial to understand how 
people monitor and evaluate their own memory cognitive processes.  
Metacognitive monitoring has been studied in many different contexts, such as 
education, language learning, problem-solving, and teaching, offering an integrated 
theoretical framework to explain how people evaluate and judge their own memories 
(Hacker, Dunlosky, & Graesser, 2009). Trace access theory, for example, postulates that both 
confidence and accuracy are dependent on memory trace strength. Stronger memory traces, 
or information with a higher number of associated stimuli, is more likely to be remembered 
and receive higher confidence ratings (Burke, MacKay, Worthley, & Wade, 1991; Busey, 
Tunnicliff, Loftus, & Loftus, 2000; Clark, 1997). Findings regarding the optimality 
hypothesis reported by Deffenbacher (1980) are consistent with trace access theory, so that 
witnesses with better encoding conditions are more capable of making correct identifications 
and accurate judgments about their performance. However, studies focusing on understanding 
why optimal conditions increase the confidence-accuracy (CA) relationship seems sparse. 
Better viewing conditions provide witnesses with better memory traces, leading to higher 
accuracy rates. But why do optimal conditions lead to higher CA relationship is a more 
challenging question. Leippe and Eisenstadt (2014) argue that better access to memory 
evaluation may allow witnesses to correctly reduce their confidence when they are 
inaccurate. They also propose that witnesses with an overall weak memory would have 
weaker memory traces despite optimal conditions and would use other sources of information 
- including their weak memory traces - to make confidence judgements. In both cases 
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inaccurate information would be more likely to be followed by low confidence decisions, 
increasing the CA relationship. 
Despite its contribution, trace access theory ignores many important aspects of 
memory confidence judgements. Information derived from a memory trace is just one of 
many sources of information that influence witnesses metamemory and beliefs. Witnesses 
making a self-evaluation to gauge confidence can take into account many intrinsic, heuristic 
and self-credibility cues, especially when the memory trace is weak (Leippe & Eisenstadt, 
2014). Intrinsic cues include self-reflections on memory processes, from which people 
identify information that they learned to associate with accurate or inaccurate memory.  For 
example, Kebbell, Wagstaff and Covey (1996), found that witnesses showed less confidence 
in their correct answers to hard questions when compared to their correct answers to easy 
questions, possibly because questions difficulty is used as a heuristic to judge confidence. 
Furthermore, witnesses usually rely on recognition speed to make inferences about their 
confidence, showing greater confidence when they are able to make rapid judgements 
(Robinson, Johnson, & Herndon, 1997).  
Heuristic cues comprise one's beliefs about external factors that can help or impair 
memory encoding and retrieval. It may be the case, for example, that witnesses feel more 
confident when they put more effort on recall tasks, even when this does not lead to changes 
in accuracy (Shaw & Zerr, 2003). People also usually believe that their memory will be 
stronger with prolonged exposure duration, consequently showing higher confidence for 
stimuli they have been exposed to longer (Memon, Hope, & Bull, 2003). Finally, self-
credibility cues derive from people’s self-evaluation of their overall memory performance. 
Some could overestimate their ability to recall events, being overconfident on identification 
and recall tasks; others may underestimate their memory ability and show underconfidence 
(Leippe, Eisenstadt, Rauch, & Stambush, 2006; Olsson & Juslin, 1999). One central goal in 
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the programme of work comprising this thesis was to examine whether self-ratings of 
memory performance relate to eyewitness performance. If confidence statements and 
memory traces are partially based on heuristic cues, it can be expected that self-ratings of 
memory capacity are predictive of performance in eyewitness memory tasks. That is, 
individual’s self-evaluations of their own memory performance may be related to their 
accuracy, confidence and over/underconfidence in identification and free recall settings, 
although this hypothesis has not yet been thoroughly explored. 
 
Eyewitness Confidence-Accuracy Relationship 
Criminal justice systems usually rely on eyewitnesses’ confidence when evaluating 
the likely guilty of a defendant or a suspect. The U.S. Supreme Court, for instance, endorses 
eyewitnesses’ confidence as one criterion for assessing their accuracy (Neil v. Biggers, 
1972). Literature also shows that eyewitnesses’ confidence influences decisions made by 
police officers, lawyers and jurors (e.g., Bradfield & Wells, 2000). For example, jurors are 
more likely to believe testimony when it is provided by a confident, rather than uncertain, 
witness (Brewer & Burke, 2002). So, although confidence measures can be central to 
criminal investigations, they may lead to undesirable consequences for justice if eyewitnesses 
are overconfident or underconfident. Overconfident witnesses may lead investigators to 
follow incorrect leads, or - more severely - incriminate an innocent person (The Innocence 
Project, 2019. Underconfident witnesses may withhold relevant information, or be 
insufficiently confident even when a perpetrator is correctly identified. 
Results from most of the earliest studies on witness confidence-accuracy relationship 
(CA) showed that confidence and accuracy were often poorly correlated (e.g., Cutler & 
Penrod, 1989; Deffenbacher, 1980; Leippe, 1980). A few years later Bothwell and 
Deffenbacher (1987) conducted a meta-analysis of 35 staged-event studies, revealing an 
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estimated effect size of r = 0.25 (d = .52) with a 95% CI[.08 to .042], wherein 52% of the 
variation in r was attributed to sampling errors, still recommending caution when using 
confidence to predict identification accuracy in actual cases. At the turn of the millennium, 
the majority of experts in eyewitness memory interviewed by Kassin, Tubb, Hosch, and 
Memon (2001) agreed that confidence is not a good marker of accuracy. However, new 
approaches to statistical inference in the field of  eyewitness testimony revealed two 
important aspects that challenged the previously negative conclusions about CA relationship: 
the role of calibration approaches and likely impact of moderator variables. 
Calibration approaches draw on the principle that there are multiple ways of 
calculating the relationship between confidence and accuracy. The most conventional 
method, for example, simply compares the accuracy of individuals who differ in confidence. 
This calculation is basically a point-biserial correlation between confidence and accuracy 
across the witnesses, usually used in studies where many witnesses testify about a single 
event. This approach is suitable for answering the question of whether a more confident 
witness is also likely to be a more accurate witness, or vice versa. However, some researchers 
(e.g., Juslin, Olsson, & Winman, 1996; Olsson, 2000; Weber & Brewer, 2003) have argued 
that the point-biserial correlation is not the most informative measure of the CA relationship, 
because it does not express the extent to which confidence corresponds to actual probability 
of accuracy. An alternative approach is the use of calibration, which aims to verify if a 
witness is more accurate about the information for which they show the greatest confidence. 
In this approach the confidence-accuracy relationship is computed across every level of 
confidence, typically in 10% increments (e.g., a scale that ranges from 0% - “not at all 
certain”, to 100% - “totally certain”). A perfect calibration occurs when the group's 
confidence level equals the percentage of accurate answers for that group (e.g., 90% of 
accurate witnesses in the group with 90% confidence). The calibration levels can be 
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expressed visually plotting accuracy rates as a function of confidence grouping, in this case a 
diagonal line would represent perfect calibration on all confidence groups (see Figure 1). 
Usually, a confidence index (CI) is computed, comprising the average squared discrepancy 
for each witness in a given confidence level and actual proportion of witnesses who were 
correct in the same confidence group. Value of CI near 0 indicate a stronger confidence-
accuracy relation. Another related statistic is over/underconfidence (O/U), which is computed 
by subtracting the mean accuracy from mean confidence for the entire witness sample, with 
scores that range from -1 (underconfidence) to +1 (overconfidence). 
Research adopting calibration techniques show that good calibration might exist for 
eyewitness confidence-accuracy in identification tasks even if the data yield low correlations 
(r) values. Olsson (2000), for example, investigated the r, CI, and O/U values of seven 
experiments and found that correlations ranged from .35 to .49 (M = .42), while the CI and 
O/U values ranged from .05 and .08 and .02 to .04, respectively (values near 0 indicate better 
calibration). Therefore, although the correlations were small to moderate, the calibration 
indices were found to be more valid indicators of accuracy. Also, Brewer et al. (2002) 
conducted a study using a videotaped theft and found good calibration indices for eyewitness 
identifications (CI = .05 and O/U = -.058), even though the r for this same experiment was 
only .14. These and other findings repeatedly show that the CA relationship is stronger when 
expressed in terms of calibration computations, than when expressed using conventional r 
indices (Brewer & Wells, 2006; Nils Olsson, 2000; Sauer, Brewer, Zweck, & Weber, 2010; 
Weber & Brewer, 2004). The practical implication of this discussion is that, at first sight, 
calibration measures may have more substantial forensic application, because they are often 
better predictors of identification accuracy. 
Leippe and Eisenstadt (2014) identify five reasons to be cautious when evaluating the 
usefulness of calibration methods, even though this approach seems to show a higher level of 
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a CA relationship correspondence than r. The first is that the small literature on CA 
calibration comprises studies that have not found good calibration in identification tasks (e.g., 
Cutler & Penrod, 1989; Granhag, 1997). Second, CI values present the same diagnosticity 
problem that modest CA r values do. A CI of .05, for example, means that a witness 
subjective probability of accuracy differed by a percentage of .22  (the square root of .05) on 
average, from the accuracy rate of their confidence group. In other words, the interpretation 
of a witness CI score is dependant on multiple-assessments comparisons. Of course, the 
comparison of multiple assessments is not likely to be present in real cases where single-
assessments of witness confidence for identification of a single target predominate. The third 
one is that percentage scales, commonly used in experiments to assess confidence are not 
used by practitioners, raising doubts about comparisons between calibration and the open-
ended questions adopted by police (i.e., question: “How confident are you?” answer: “Very 
confident”). However it is worth noting that this third limitation is of an applied practice 
nature, and it is not related to a problem with calibration itself. Fourth, subjective 
probabilities such as CI values might not be useful in actual cases, where the parties want to 
know for sure if a witness is correct or not. Finally, confidence and accuracy are highly 
malleable. This means that any type of CA relationships might still present imperfections 
given other social and cognitive factors that influence either confidence or accuracy. 
A more complete picture of the usefulness of confidence measures can only be 
achieved when considering the necessary conditions for a CA relation to be stronger. In other 
words, CA effects are not fixed, but vary depending on many other variables that can reduce 
or increase the CA relationship (see Perfect, 2002; Wixted & Wells, 2017). The first studies 
on the role of moderator variables showed that eyewitnesses with optimal viewing conditions 
often show higher CA relationships (Bothwell & Deffenbacher, 1987; Deffenbacher, 1980), 
which was later confirmed by further studies on exposure duration (Lindsay, Read, & 
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Sharma, 1998; Memon et al., 2003). Lindsay, Nilsen, and Read (2000) for example, showed 
that CA correlations changed substantially across studies that used different encoding and 
testing conditions. Characteristics of the identification target such as attractiveness and 
distinctiveness also affect the CA relation (Brigham, 1990; Cutler & Penrod, 1989). 
Eyewitnesses that take longer intervals to give a testimony are often more overconfident than 
those that give accounts or identifications shortly after the event, an effect possibly associated 
with memory contamination (Odinot & Wolters, 2006; Palmer, Brewer, Weber, & Nagesh, 
2013; Sauer et al., 2010). A meta-analytic review by Sporer, Penrod, Read, and Cutler (1995) 
on target-present and target-absent line-ups also showed that the CA relationship was 
dependent on choice, with choosers (positive identifications) often having a higher CA 
relation than non-choosers. 
Another moderator of the CA relation deserves a further scrutiny given its role in the 
current thesis: the differences between identification and recall tasks. Despite the extensive 
eyewitness literature, the vast majority of CA relation research has focused on culprit 
identification (e.g., line-up or photospread tasks), rather than exploring descriptions of 
persons and events (e.g., free recall or cued-recall tasks; Sporer, 1996). The focus on 
identification is understandable, considering that it might ultimately be the most conclusive 
information provided by a witness. However, witnesses’ own freely recalled memories are 
also highly relevant in forensic contexts, since most of the information provided by 
eyewitnesses comprise descriptions of the perpetrator and the event (Van Koppen & Lochun, 
1997). The small literature using eyewitness recall paradigms shows a somewhat higher CA 
correlation when compared to identification studies (Bornstein & Zickafoose, 1999; Odinot & 
Wolters, 2006; Perfect, Watson, & Wagstaff, 1993; Robinson & Johnson, 1996). In fact, 
recognition questions give rise to a lower CA relationship when compared to free recall 
memory questions that do not provide answer alternatives (Robinson et al., 1997; Robinson, 
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Johnson, & Robertson, 2000; Robinson & Johnson, 1996). Also, Allwood, Ask, and Granhag 
(2005) found good calibration and very little overconfidence using an interview recall 
procedure, compared to a study using the same design but with a recognition task (Granhag, 
Jonsson, & Allwood, 2004). Such differences between recall and recognition tasks may be 
accounted for by the ‘free’ or ‘self-generated’ component of recall tasks, because in such 
procedures witnesses tend to choose which information to provide based on their confidence, 
consequently increasing metamemory realism (Allwood et al., 2005). In fact, models of 
strategic memory reporting suggests that individuals balance the demands for informativeness 
and accuracy in their recalls, withholding details that fall below a preset criterion of probable 
accuracy (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996; Sauer & Hope, 2016). 
 In the current programme of work, we provide an extensive examination of the 
relation between metamemory and the CA relation in eyewitness identification and free recall 
settings. We were particularly interested in whether eyewitnesses’ expressions of confidence 
are influenced by individual differences related to memory self-efficacy and endorsement of 
memory strategies. It was posited that if confidence judgements are partly based on 
individual differences and intrinsic cues (Leippe & Eisenstadt, 2014), then witnesses could 
tend to be underconfident or overconfident depending on their metamemory traits (Olsson & 
Juslin, 1999). By testing these predictions, we aimed to elucidate whether metamemory 
assessments could be useful to distinguish overconfident from underconfident witnesses. 
Importantly, this line of research also contributes to our understanding of how confidence 
assessments are generated in forensic relevant contexts. 
 
Outline of the Current Thesis 
This introductory chapter briefly summarizes the many implications of metamemory 
in eyewitness testimony research. Despite the numerous potential contributions of 
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metamemory frameworks to eyewitness memory research, much of this overlap has been 
overlooked. In the next chapters we present a line of research examining the relation between 
metamemory and eyewitness testimony performance. Specifically, there were three key 
research questions emerging from this goals. First, I examined whether there is a relation 
between self-reported metamemory and objective memory accuracy in different eyewitness 
paradigms. Our second question was whether there is a relation between metamemory and 
expressions of confidence in eyewitness settings. Finally, the third question focused on what 
is the relation between metamemory and the confidence-accuracy relationship in eyewitness 
performance.  
In the next chapter (Chapter 2), we present our first set of experiments examining the 
relation between self-reports of memory ability and eyewitness identification performance, 
reporting how self-ratings of memory ability and strategies endorsement relate to eyewitness 
identification accuracy, confidence and over/underconfidence (Experiments 1 and 2). These 
experiments provide initial evidence that some metamemory factors are important indicators 
of eyewitness identification accuracy and confidence, although only assessments of global 
memory self-efficacy were adopted. In the subsequent experiments comprising this 
programme of work we aimed to improve our metamemory assessment by developing a 
measure tailored specifically to eyewitness testimony settings. In Chapter 3 we present the 
development and initial tests of validation of the Eyewitness Metamemory Scale (EMS), a 
self-report instrument developed specifically to assess face recognition and person 
identification ability (Experiment 3). In Chapter 4, we describe an experiment designed to  
investigate the relation between general and eyewitness-specific metamemory assessments 
(EMS) on identification performance for biased and unbiased lineups (Experiment 4). We 
were specifically interested in possible differential effects between biased and unbiased 
lineups because other postdictors of identification performance (e.g., eyewitness confidence, 
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decision time) have less diagnostic value in biased lineups. The results of Experiment 4 
suggest that some eyewitness-specific metamemory factors (as measured by the EMS) are 
predictive of identification accuracy for both biased and unbiased lineups. In Chapter 5, we 
adopt an innovative repeated-trials eyewitness identification paradigm to examine the relation 
between metamemory assessments and identification performance (Experiment 5). In 
Chapter 6, the focus is shifted from identification paradigms to an eyewitness free recall 
paradigm, aiming to elucidate the relation between metamemory and disclosure of 
information (Experiment 6). We summarize the main findings of this novel line of research in 
the General Discussion, presenting the challenges and prospects facing future eyewitness 
metamemory research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Estimating eyewitness identification performance using metamemory 
measures and memory tests 
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Saraiva, R. B., Hope, L., Horselenberg, R., Ost, J., Sauer, J., & Van Koppen, P (under 
review). Estimating eyewitness identification performance using metamemory measures and 
memory tests. 
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Abstract 
Discriminating accurate from inaccurate eyewitnesses is crucial in forensic settings, 
given the negative consequences of misidentifications. In some cases, confidence can be a 
reliable indicator of performance, but eyewitnesses can also be prone to over/under-
confidence (O/U). In two experiments, we examined whether different metamemory 
measures and memory tests provide informative estimates of eyewitness identification 
accuracy, confidence, and O/U. In Experiment 1 (N = 388), participants first completed the 
Multifactorial Memory Questionnaire, the Squire Subjective Memory Questionnaire, and 
questions on cognitive skills. Later, in a standard eyewitness identification paradigm, 
participants attempted to identify a perpetrator they had seen committing a crime and 
provided confidence ratings. Participants then took part in one of three unrelated memory 
tests (cued-recall; face recognition; or general knowledge). Experiment 2 (N = 479) aimed to 
replicate the findings of Experiment 1 with more diverse stimuli. We observed three 
consistent findings across both experiments. First, higher contentment with general memory 
ability is indicative of correct identifications among choosers. Second, confidence in different 
memory tests are associated to confidence in eyewitness identifications, although accuracy in 
memory tests did not relate to identification accuracy. Third, most metamemory factors were 
unrelated to O/U. The results suggest that some metamemory factors are related to witness’s 
identification accuracy, but metamemory assessments have little value in improving the 
diagnostic value of identification confidence. Additionally, expressions of confidence in 
eyewitness identification seem to be stable across other similar domains (i.e., face recognition 
tests). 
Keywords: eyewitness memory, eyewitness identification, metamemory, memory, 
confidence, face recognition 
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Discriminating accurate from inaccurate eyewitness identifications is critical in the 
criminal justice system. Accurate identifications are compelling evidence for prosecuting a 
perpetrator, but inaccurate identifications contribute to the conviction of innocent suspects. 
Psychological research has identified some factors that are related to the likelihood that a 
culprit was correctly identified, including early statements of confidence (Brewer & Wells, 
2006; Palmer, Brewer, Weber, & Nagesh, 2013; Sauer, Brewer, Zweck, & Weber, 2010; 
Wixted & Wells (2017), decision time during the identification (Sauer, Brewer, & Wells, 
2008; Sauerland & Sporer, 2009; Weber, Brewer, Wells, Semmler, & Keast, 2004), and self-
reported decision process (Dunning & Stern, 1994). However, the predictive value of these 
factors can vary due to a number of situational variables, and distinguishing correct from 
incorrect identifications is an issue far from resolved. Confidence assessments can be valid 
indicators of identification accuracy, but in many cases eyewitnesses are prone to be 
overconfident (or sometimes underconfident), making confidence measures less reliable 
estimates of accuracy. Evidence suggests, for example, that eyewitnesses are likely to have a 
weaker confidence-accuracy relationship when witnessing conditions are bad (Bothwell, 
Deffenbacher, & Brigham, 1987; Palmer et al., 2013), when they do not choose someone 
from a lineup (Sporer, Penrod, Read, & Cutler, 1995), and when biased lineups or biased 
instructions are used (Brewer & Wells, 2006; Leippe, Eisenstadt, & Rauch, 2009; Wixted & 
Wells, 2017). 
From a practical perspective, a major challenge when adopting confidence as an 
indicator of accuracy is that different factors that can inflate or deflate confidence might be 
present, even though some of them can be controlled (e.g., unbiased line-up instructions; 
Brewer & Wells, 2006). Moreover, although the confidence-accuracy relation can be strong 
at the aggregate level, there are still limits about its diagnostic value for individual decisions 
(Sauer, Palmer, & Brewer, in press). This highlights the need for additional estimates of 
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accuracy, as well as the investigation of measures that can be used to discriminate 
dispositionally overconfident or underconfident witnesses from witnesses who might be 
described as ‘realistic’ in terms of the relationship between their confidence and accuracy. In 
this research, we tested the use of metamemory self-assessments and memory tests to predict 
part of the variance in eyewitness identification accuracy. Additionally, we examined 
whether metamemory self-assessments might be used to increase the diagnostic value of 
confidence in identification tasks, by discriminating overconfident/underconfident and 
realistic eyewitness identifications. Our rationale for testing these metamemory self-
assessments and objective memory tests is that the accuracy of a specific witness – and the 
diagnostic value of their confidence ratings – may depend partly on individual differences 
factors, including those related to broader metacognitive processes. 
 
Metamemory assessments and eyewitness identification performance 
Research on Individual differences in cognitive, social and personality domains are 
extensive, but few studies have investigated how these differences may affect eyewitness 
identification performance. Most of the research in this area has focused on free recall and 
misinformation paradigms, showing that eyewitness susceptibility to misinformation depends 
on many personality and cognitive factors, such as self-efficacy, fear of negative evaluation, 
reward dependence, attention span, working memory and memory for faces (Andersen, 
Carlson, Carlson, & Gronlund, 2014; Bindemann, Brown, Koyas, & Russ, 2012; Bruck & 
Melnyk, 2004; Liebman et al., 2002; Morgan et al., 2007; Zhu et al., 2010). With respect to 
eyewitness identification, Searcy, Bartlett, and Memon (2000) found that individual 
differences in belief in a just world, memory self-efficacy, and perseverative errors (i.e., 
inability to change strategies during problem-solving) were positively related to likelihood of 
false identifications. However, only a small number of studies have investigated how self-
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reported memory capacity might be related to eyewitness identification performance, 
especially focusing on metamemory components (Olsson & Juslin, 1999; Searcy, Bartlett, & 
Memon, 2000). 
Metamemory refers to the knowledge and awareness that an individual has about his 
or her own memory capabilities (Dunlosky & Bjork, 2008). This introspective knowledge is 
often used to monitor and control one’s own memory performance, including for example 
decisions about strategies employed to encode information (Dunlosky & Hertzog, 2000), and 
one’s confidence that a retrieved memory is accurate (Chua, Schacter, Rand-Giovannetti, & 
Sperling, 2006). Metamemory judgments may be based on a variety of characteristics of 
memory retrieval processes, such as memory vividness and completeness (Brewer, Sampaio, 
& Barlow, 2005), response latency (Weber & Brewer, 2006), and the quantity and intensity 
of retrieved information (Koriat, 1993). Metacognitive monitoring has been studied in many 
different contexts, such as education, language learning, problem-solving, teaching, and 
eyewitness recall memory, offering an integrated theoretical framework to explain how 
people evaluate and judge their own memories (Goldsmith, Koriat, & Weinberg-Eliezer, 
2002; Hacker, Dunlosky, & Graesser, 2009; Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996) 
In trace access theory, for example, it is postulated that both confidence and accuracy 
are dependent on memory trace strength. Stronger memory traces are more likely to be 
remembered and receive higher confidence ratings (Busey, Tunnicliff, Loftus, & Loftus, 
2000; Clark, 1997). In the eyewitness domain, trace access theory is consistent by 
Deffenbacher’s (1980) findings regarding the optimality hypothesis. That is, witnesses with 
better encoding conditions are more capable of making correct identifications and accurate 
judgments about their performance (Bothwell, Deffenbacher, & Brigham, 1987; Smith, 
Wilford, Quigley-McBride, & Wells, 2019). However, many important aspects of memory 
confidence judgements are ignored in trace access theory. Information derived from a 
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memory trace is just one of many sources of information that influence witnesses 
metamemory and beliefs. Witnesses making a self-evaluation to gauge confidence can take 
into account many intrinsic, heuristic and self-credibility cues, especially when the memory 
trace is weak (Koriat, 1997; Leippe & Eisenstadt, 2014). Intrinsic cues include self-
reflections on memory processes, from which people identify information that they learned to 
associate with accurate or inaccurate memory. Kebbell, Wagstaff, and Covey (1996), for 
example, found that witnesses showed less confidence for correct answers to hard questions 
when compared to correct answers to easy questions, possibly because questions difficulty is 
used as a heuristic to judge confidence (Wheatcroft, Wagstaff, & Manarin, 2015). 
Furthermore, witness’s recognition speed is often related to eyewitness confidence, showing 
greater confidence when they are able to make rapid judgements (Robinson, Johnson, & 
Herndon, 1997). Heuristic cues comprise one's beliefs about external factors that can help or 
impair memory encoding and retrieval. It may be the case that witnesses feel more confident 
when they put more effort into recall tasks, even when this does not lead to changes in 
accuracy (Shaw & Zerr, 2003). People also usually believe that their memory will be stronger 
with prolonged exposure duration, consequently showing higher confidence for stimuli they 
have been exposed to longer (Memon, Hope, & Bull, 2003). Finally, self-credibility cues 
derive from people’s self-evaluation of their overall memory performance. Some could 
overestimate their ability to recall events, being overconfident on identification and recall 
tasks; others may underestimate their memory ability and show underconfidence. 
Studies of the relation between self-reported assessments of memory capacity and 
eyewitness identification accuracy are scarce. Olsson and Juslin (1999), for example, 
investigated whether eyewitness identification performance could be diagnosed by self-
assessments of facial recognition skill, general memory skill, and encoding strategy. 
Witnesses who reported that they were better-than-average face recognizers displayed greater 
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accuracy in an identification task than those reporting poorer face recognition skills. 
Moreover, the confidence-accuracy relationship was stronger for participants who rated 
themselves to be good face recognizers. From a theoretical perspective, the findings by 
Olsson and Juslin suggest that people can, at least to some extent, correctly assess their 
overall memory abilities using cognitive self-assessments. Consequently, such assessments 
might be informative when attempting to diagnose the accuracy of a given identification. 
However, Olsson and Juslin (1999) investigated single items that were not tested for 
reliability and validity, and the memory self-assessment was obtained after the recognition 
test, which might have influenced witnesses’ evaluations of their memory abilities. We aimed 
to further investigate this issue using valid and reliable metamemory instruments that have 
demonstrated appropriate psychometric properties in a number of studies (e.g., Troyer & 
Rich, 2002; Van Bergen, Brands, & Jelicic, 2010; Squire, Wetzel, & Slater, 1979; Van der 
Werf & Vos, 2011). 
 
Memory tests and eyewitness identification performance 
In addition to the lack of studies on how self-reported assessments of memory ability 
relates to identification accuracy, little is known about how performance in more general 
memory tests relate to eyewitness identification accuracy. Although self-reports might be 
important predictors of eyewitness accuracy, due to the relationship between metacognitive 
assessments and identification performance, it might be argued that performance in memory 
tests would be more informative of eyewitnesses’ identification accuracy. Research has 
shown that eyewitnesses who perform better across several intelligence and working memory 
tests are less susceptible to misinformation (Jaschinski & Wentura, 2002; Liebman et al., 
2002; Zhu et al., 2010). Furthermore, some evidence suggests that performance in 
standardized face recognition tests is positively related to eyewitness identification accuracy 
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(e.g., Bindemann et al., 2012; Morgan et al., 2007). Thus, it might also be the case that be 
that individual differences in face processing and memory capacity are related to eyewitness 
accuracy such that unrelated memory tests can be used to estimate witness identification 
performance in a specific case. 
However, to the best of our knowledge, there has been no research on the relation 
between eyewitness identification performance and performance in unrelated memory tests, 
such as general knowledge, cued recall, or free recall tasks. On the one hand, there is some 
evidence that different memory systems and memory processes are discrete, as exemplified 
by studies that show no effect of working memory training on improvement of other 
cognitive skills (Melby-Lervåg, Redick, & Hulme, 2016; Simons et al., 2016). On the other 
hand, it might be argued that accuracy in different memory tasks should relate to eyewitness 
identification accuracy, due to the stability in individual differences related to cognitive 
factors (Jaschinski & Wentura, 2002; Zhu et al., 2010). Some findings suggest that 
individuals express their confidence in similar ways across different memory tests (Bornstein 
& Zickafoose, 1999; Buratti, Allwood, & Johansson, 2014), which is evidence that 
performance in a known domain may also be related to confidence in an eyewitness context 
(Buratti et al., 2014). It might also be expected that performance in some tests may be more 
predictive of eyewitness identification accuracy than others, based on models that propose 
that memory is comprised of relatively independent domains (Cabeza & Moscovitch, 2013; 
Repovs & Baddeley, 2006). Performance on face recognition tests, for example, might be 
more predictive of eyewitness identification accuracy than cued recall or general knowledge 
tests, because the former is more closely related to an identification task (e.g., Bindemann et 
al., 2012; Morgan et al., 2007). In the absence of conclusive research on this topic, we sought 
to examine the relationship between eyewitness identification performance and performance 
on three different types of memory task (i.e., general knowledge, cued recall and face 
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recognition). A further rationale for different types of tasks is that, in practice, a face 
recognition task may interfere with eyewitnesses’ memory of the perpetrator, so using a non-
face recognition task may have greater utility when estimating eyewitness identification 
performance. 
Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1, we tested the utility of metamemory measures and memory tests to 
estimate witnesses’ accuracy, confidence, and confidence-accuracy relation in identification 
tasks. We hypothesized that metamemory self-assessments of memory ability and capacity 
would be predictive of eyewitnesses’ identification accuracy (Hypothesis 1). This prediction 
draws on some initial evidence that self-assessments of memory ability are related to 
identification accuracy (Searcy et al., 2000; Searcy, Bartlett, Memon, & Swanson, 2001; 
Olsson & 1999). We also expected that metamemory self-assessments would be predictive of 
eyewitness confidence in identification tasks (Hypothesis 2). Attempts to estimate eyewitness 
confidence might seem unusual, but this relates to an important theoretical question. The idea 
that confidence measures are affected not only by the availability of memory traces, but also 
by different intrinsic, heuristic and self-credibility is critical to the understanding and 
practical use of memory confidence in forensic contexts (Leippe & Eisenstadt, 2014). There 
may be important individual differences that contribute to confidence ratings over and 
beyond the memory trace strength, adding noise to the confidence accuracy relationship in 
identification tasks. Additionally, as observed by Olsson and Juslin (1999), it was expected 
that choosers with higher rates on metamemory scores would have higher confidence-
accuracy realism in identification tasks as opposed to over/underconfidence (Hypothesis 3). If 
this prediction is supported, it would be evidence that metamemory assessments might be 
informative of the likelihood that an eyewitness is being overconfident, underconfident, or 
realistic about their confidence in an identification decision. It was also expected that 
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eyewitness identification performance would be positively related to accuracy and confidence 
in general knowledge tests, cued recall tests, and face recognition tests (Hypothesis 4). 
Finally, it was expected that identification performance would be more closely related to the 
face recognition test, followed by the cued recall and general knowledge test (Hypothesis 5) 
on the grounds that both the identification task and face recognition task are related to face 
stimuli, and evidence suggests that face perception and recognition is based on domain-
specific mechanisms (Kanwisher, 2000). 
 
Method 
Design. A 2 (Identification Task Target Presence: target-present vs target-absent) x 3 
(Memory Test: general knowledge, cued-recall, and face recognition) between-subjects 
design was used. The memory tests were allocated between subjects in order to prevent 
contamination and fatigue effects across the different memory tests. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the three memory test conditions, and to one of the lineup type 
conditions. The main dependant variables were accuracy and confidence in an eyewitness 
identification task and in the different memory tests. 
Participants. A total of 407 participants completed the study, but seven participants 
were excluded for failing to pass at least two out of the four attention checks, and 22 other 
participants were excluded because technical issues were reported (e.g., stimuli not loading 
properly). The final sample (N = 388) comprised of 81% female participants and had a mean 
age of M = 21.40, ranging from 18 to 74 years (SD = 4.08). The required sample size was 
estimated using power analysis for logistic regressions using metamemory measures as 
predictors of identification accuracy. We assumed that the event rate under H0 is p1 = 0.5 and 
that the event rate under H1 is p2 = 0.65 for X = 1. The odds ratio is then OR = 
(0.65/0.35)/(0.5/0.5) = 1.85, and R2 =0.4. With alpha = .05 and power = 0.95, the projected 
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sample size needed was approximately N = 217. Our final sample size (N = 388) is larger 
than the minimal sample size required because data collection continued during an optimal 
period for recruitment. Participants either received course credits or a chance to enter a prize 
draw to win a £100 Amazon Voucher. The study was advertised on social media, and within 
a university in the United Kingdom and a university in the Netherlands. 
Target event and lineups. The target event was a short film (30sec long) depicting a 
theft (Colloff, Wade, & Strange, 2016). In that mock crime film, a white male culprit breaks 
into an office, explores the room, steals a laptop, and then leaves the room. Two different 
line-ups with six photos were created for this stimulus, using materials generated by Colloff 
et al. (2016). The target-present lineup consisted of five foils and the culprit, while the target-
absent lineup consisted of six foils. A pool of 40 foils was used to randomly generate the 
lineups for each participant, and all foils resembled the culprit. The lineups were found to be 
fair and unbiased in a previous study (Colloff et al., 2016). 
Multifactorial Metamemory Questionnaire (MMQ, Troyer & Rich, 2002). The 
MMQ is an instrument with 57 items comprising three distinct factors: Contentment (i.e., 
affect related to memory abilities, α = 0.91), Ability (i.e., frequency of memory problems in 
different situations, α = 0.88), and Strategy (i.e., use of memory strategies in everyday life, α 
= 0.83). The factor Contentment consists of 18 items (e.g., ‘my memory is worse than most 
other people my age’) rated on a scale from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree), with 
higher scores indicating higher memory contentment. The factor Ability has 20 items which 
requires respondents to indicate how often they experienced memory mistakes over the last 
two weeks (e.g., ‘how often do you forget an appointment?’), on a scale ranging from 1 (all 
the time) to 5 (never). Higher scores in Ability indicate fewer (self-reported) memory 
problems in daily situations. The factor Strategy has 19 items related to the use of different 
memory strategies (e.g., ‘how often do you create a story to link together information you 
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want to remember?’) and respondents indicate the frequency with which each strategy was 
used in the previous two weeks using a scale that ranges from 1 (never) to 5 (all the time). 
Higher scores in Strategy indicate a more frequent use of memory strategies. 
Squire Subjective Memory Questionnaire (SSMQ; Van Bergen et al., 2010; 
Squire et al., 1979). The SSMQ is an instrument that assesses development of subjective 
memory functioning and consists of one single factor reflecting people’s beliefs about their 
own memory functioning (α = 0.90). The instrument includes 18 items (e.g., ‘My ability to 
reach back in my memory and recall what happened a few minutes ago is’), rated on nine-
point scales that range from -4 (worse than ever before) to +4 (better than ever before). 
Higher scores in SSMQ indicate a higher improvement in self-perceived memory 
functioning. 
Facial recognition and general memory skill assessment (Olsson & Juslin, 1999). 
The self-rating measures developed by Olsson and Juslin (1999) include two items that assess 
self-reported general memory skill (e.g., ‘give an estimate of your general memory ability, 
compared to other people’s general memory ability’) and two items for self-reported facial 
recognition skill (e.g., ‘give an estimate of your ability to remember faces as compared to 
other people’s ability to remember faces’). Participants indicate their ability in comparison to 
the normal population on a 11-point scale that ranges from -5 (much worse) to 5 (much 
better). 
Cued-recall test. For the cued-recall test, participants watched a short video 
(2:40min) depicting a cleaning routine in a house and then completed a questionnaire 
containing 17 cued-recall questions about the video (e.g., what did the woman do in the TV 
room? See Appendix 1). Each question was followed by a confidence scale from 0% (not at 
all certain) to 100% (totally certain). 
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Face recognition test. Forty-five adult male faces with no unusual identifying 
features were selected from the FEI face database (Thomaz & Giraldi, 2010). Faces were 
standardized in size, resolution, and background colour. During the training phase, 30 faces 
were randomly displayed to participants on a computer screen. Each face was presented for 
three seconds, with a three second inter-stimulus interval. In the testing phase, participants 
viewed a second set of 30 faces which included 15 faces from the training phase and 15 new 
faces. Each face was shown individually participants were instructed to indicate whether or 
not the face had been seen before and give a confidence judgement using a scale that goes 
from 0% (not at all certain) to 100% (totally certain). Participants had unlimited time to 
make their decision and proceed to the next face. 
General knowledge test. A pool of 38 general knowledge questions (e.g., ‘What 
country is known as the Land of Rising Sun?’) was generated and pilot tested. Eight 
questions were considered too easy or too difficult and were removed from the final pool. 
Participants were asked to answer each one of the 30 questions (see Appendix 2) and rate 
their confidence in a scale that ranges from 0% (not at all certain) to 100% (totally certain). 
Procedure. The experiment took place over two test sessions. In the first session, 
participants completed an online survey containing the metamemory measures (i.e., MMQ, 
SSMQ, and self-assessment questions of cognitive skills), and a basic socio-demographic 
questionnaire (i.e., age, gender, education). After 24 hours, participants received an online 
link to the second session. In this session, participants were informed that they would watch a 
short video and that they would be asked some questions later. After watching the mock 
crime film, they took part in a filler task for five minutes. Participants then viewed a 
simultaneous lineup and were asked to try to identify the perpetrator. Participants were 
instructed that the perpetrator may or may not be in the lineup. The photos were presented 
simultaneously in a 3 by 2 configuration, and the position of the culprit was determined 
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randomly for each subject. Participants were instructed to make a single identification or 
choose a ‘not present’ option, rating their confidence in a scale that ranged from 0% (not at 
all certain) and then 10, 20, 30, … to 100% (totally certain). After completing the 
identification task, participants were assigned to one of the three possible memory test 
conditions described previously.  
 
Results 
Logistic regressions were conducted to test whether metamemory measures are 
predictive of eyewitness identification accuracy. We tested a model including confidence and 
all the metamemory components as predictors of identification accuracy. Two out of six 
diagnostic tests pointed to the presence of multicollinearity in the model, but inspection of 
variance inflation factor, tolerance, Farrar-Glauber F-tests, and partial correlations revealed 
negligible multicollinearity, so we proceeded without adopting remedial measures. 
Confidence was positively associated to accuracy for both choosers (OR = 1.03, p < .001) and 
nonchoosers (OR = 1.02, p = .02). Choosers were also more likely to be accurate if they were 
more content with their general memory (MMQ-Contentment; OR = 2.13, p = .03), but this 
effect was not observed for nonchoosers. None of the other metamemory factors were 
significant predictors of identification accuracy (see Table 2.1). Next, we fitted Bayesian 
logistic regression models to examine the probability that the effects of the non-significant 
metamemory variables are null. Models were fitted using the rstanarm R package, adopting 
standard priors that are weakly informative. Inferences were based on credible intervals, 
which describe the likely range of the model parameters in probabilistic terms. The results 
revealed that the relation between eyewitness identification accuracy and the MMQ-Ability, 
MMQ-Strategies, SSMQ, and facial and memory skill assessment are likely to be zero (see 
Figure 2.1).  
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Table 2.1 
Logistic Regressions Testing Metamemory Measures as Predictors of Eyewitness Identification Accuracy (Experiment 1) 
Choosers Nonchoosers 
Predictor β SE  β p OR [95% CI] Predictor β SE  β p OR [95% CI] 
Confidence 0.03 0.01 <.001*** 1.03 [1.02, 1.05] Confidence 0.02 0.01 .02* 1.02 [1.00, 1.03] 
MMQ – Contentment 0.75 0.34 .03* 2.13 [1.10, 4.26] MMQ – Contentment 0.35 0.43 .81 1.42 [0.60, 3.35] 
MMQ – Ability -0.56 0.37 .12 0.57 [0.27, 1.16] MMQ – Ability -0.34 0.52 .51 0.79 [0.25, 1.99] 
MMQ – Strategy 0.32 0.32 .31 1.38 [0.74, 2.61] MMQ – Strategy -0.22 0.39 .56 0.79 [0.36, 1.73] 
SSMQ 0.06 .21 .46 1.06 [0.71, 1.61] SSMQ 0.04 0.30 .87 1.04 [0.57, 1.91] 
General Memory 0.04 .11 .70 1.04 [0.82, 1.31] General Memory -0.21 0.17 .23 0.81 [0.57, 1.14] 
Face Memory -0.07 0.11 0.46 0.92 [0.74, 1.13] Face Memory 0.14 0.13 .29 1.15 [0.88, 1.50] 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Posterior distributions of coefficients of metamemory factors as predictors of identification 
accuracy in Experiment 1 for Choosers (A) and Nonchoosers (B). The shaded area in the distributions 
represent 95% credible intervals. 
 
We then conducted multiple regressions to test whether the metamemory measures 
are predictive of eyewitness identification confidence. We tested a model including accuracy 
and all metamemory components as predictors of identification confidence. Identification 
accuracy was included as a proxy for memory strength, in order to test if the metamemory 
measures contribute to confidence judgements beyond cues related to memory strength. As 
shown in Table 2.2, only identification accuracy was predictive of eyewitness identification 
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Table 2.2 
Multiple Regressions Testing Metamemory Measures as Predictors of Eyewitness Confidence (Experiment 1) 
Choosers Nonchoosers 
Predictor B (SE) β t p Predictor B (SE) β t p 
Identification Accuracy (0 = Inaccurate) 17.88 (2.83) 0.38 6.30 <.001*** Identification Accuracy (0 = Inaccurate) 9.75 (4.14) 0.19 2.35 .02* 
MMQ – Contentment -3.41 (3.21) -0.09 -1.06 .29 MMQ – Contentment 0.53 (3.94) 0.01 0.14 .89 
MMQ – Ability 2.29 (3.46) 0.06 0.66 .51 MMQ – Ability 4.47 (4.62) 0.09 0.96 0.33 
MMQ – Strategy -4.97 (2.97) -0.11 -1.67 .09 MMQ – Strategy 3.22 (3.48) 0.08 0.92 0.35 
SSMQ 0.19 (1.96) 0.01 0.10 .92 SSMQ 1.16 (2.69) 0.05 0.43 .66 
General Memory 0.08 (1.09) 0.01 0.07 .94 General Memory 0.42 (1.57) 0.03 0.27 .78 
Face Memory 1.54 (1.00) 0.11 1.53 .13 Face Memory -0.03 (1.21) -0.01 -0.02 .98 
confidence for choosers (β = 0.38, p < .001) and nonchoosers (β = 0.19, p = .02). Results 
from a Bayesian regression model revealed that all metamemory factors are most probably 
unrelated to expressions of confidence in the identification task (see Figure 2.2). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Posterior distributions of coefficients of metamemory factors as predictors of identification 
confidence in Experiment 1 for Choosers (A) and Nonchoosers (B). The shaded area in the distributions 
represent 95% credible intervals. 
 
Calibration analyses. One of our primary aims was to investigate whether 
metamemory assessments were related to eyewitness confidence-accuracy calibration. In this 
analysis we focus specifically on choosers because it has been documented that postdictors of 
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identification performance have different associations for choosers vs nonchoosers (e.g., 
Sauerland & Sporer, 2007, 2009), and because triers of fact are more specifically concerned 
with eyewitnesses who choose someone from a lineup, rather than eyewitnesses who reject a 
lineup (Mickes, 2015). In calibration curves, the diagonal line represents perfect calibration, 
such that each level of confidence is equivalent to the level of accuracy for decisions made 
with that level of confidence (see Figure 2.3). Observations above this line indicate 
underconfidence, and observations below this line indicate overconfidence. We have also 
computed three commonly used calibration statistics: calibration index, over/underconfidence 
and resolution. Calibration (C) represents how far a given calibration curve is from a perfect 
calibration. It ranges from 0 (perfect calibration) to 1, and lower values indicate better 
calibration. Over/underconfidence (O/U) indicates if a curve strays more above or below the 
perfect calibration line, with values ranging from -1 (very underconfident) to 1 (very 
overconfidence). The Adjusted Normalized Resolution Index (ANRI) represents how well 
confidence discriminates accurate from inaccurate identifications, with higher values 
indicating better discrimination (see Brewer and Wells, 2006 for a detailed description and 
calculation of these statistics).  
Following a procedure similar to the one used by Olsson and Juslin (1999), 
individuals above the 66th percentile were selected as high scorers and individuals below the 
33th percentile were selected as low scorers. Calibration statistics and calibration curves were 
produced for low scorers and high scorers for each of the metamemory components. 
Inspection of the calibration curves showed that individuals with higher MMQ-Strategies 
(i.e., endorsement of memory strategies) were better calibrated than lower scorers at higher 
levels of confidence (see Figure 2.3). All other metamemory factors did not show any clear 
distinctive pattern. Following Palmer et al. (2013), we used a jackknife procedure to compute 
standard errors for each calibration statistic, which were then converted to 95% inferential 
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confidence intervals (Tryon, 2001). If the confidence intervals do not overlap, that indicates a 
significant difference. This analysis revealed that there are no differences in calibration 
between higher and lower scorers on the metamemory factors (see Figure 2.4). 
 
Figure 2.3. Calibration curve for Choosers identification performance by higher and low 
scorers in MMQ-Strategy (Experiment 1). The diagonal dotted grey line represents perfect 
calibration. 
Figure 2.4. Inferential confidence intervals of calibration statistics for high and low scorers in each 
metamemory measure in Experiment 1. 
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Table 2.3. 
 
Logistic and Multiple Regression Analyses Examining Performance in Memory Tests as Predictors of Eyewitness Identification Accuracy and 
Confidence (Experiment 1) 
Accuracy Confidence 
Predictor B (SE) p OR [95% CI] Predictor B (SE) β t p 
Model 1 – General Knowledge 0.67 (1.13) .55 1.95 [0.21, 18.78] Model 1 – General Knowledge 0.25 (0.11) .19 2.27 .02 
Model 2 – Cued Recall 0.43 (1.46) .76 1.54 [.08, 27.57] Model 2 – Cued Recall 0.31 (0.11) 0.25 2.80 .005 
Model 3 – Face Recognition 0.86 (1.53) .57 2.36 [0.11, 50.20] Model 3 – Face Recognition 0.57 (0.11) 0.40 5.01 <.001 
Performance in identification task and memory tests. The next step in data 
analysis was to test whether performance in different objective memory tests predicted 
performance in an eyewitness identification task. We first tested three separate logistic 
regression models, with each model including accuracy in one of the memory tests (i.e., cued-
recall, face recognition and general knowledge) as predictors of identification accuracy (see 
Table 2.3). The results showed that eyewitness identification accuracy was not predicted by 
performance in any of the different memory tests. Next, we used simple linear regressions to 
test whether confidence in the identification can be predicted by confidence in the different 
memory tests (see Table 2.3). The results showed that confidence in the memory tests did 
predict confidence in the identification task, with larger coefficients for the face recognition 
test (β = 0.40), followed by cued recall (β = 0.25) and general knowledge (β = 0.19). 
 
 
 
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 1 revealed four key findings. First, individuals who were 
more content with their own general memory were more likely to be accurate if they chose 
someone from a lineup than those that were less content with their general memory. Second, 
metamemory factors related to memory self-efficacy and endorsement of memory strategies 
were unrelated to expressions of confidence in identification tasks. Third, irrespective of how 
that confidence related to accuracy, the confidence-accuracy relationship in identification 
tasks was not related to intrinsic cues of memory self-efficacy and memory strategies. Fourth, 
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confidence expressed in the identification was somewhat stable across different memory 
tests, although accuracy in the identification test was unrelated to accuracy in different 
memory tests.  
One limitation of Experiment 1 is that only one stimulus was presented during 
encoding, limiting the generalizability of these results to other stimuli and targets. In 
Experiment 2 we aimed to address this limitation by using four different mock-crime stimuli 
with distinct targets. This way, Experiment 2 served as a replication test for the findings 
obtained in Experiment 1, while also addressing issues related to stimulus sampling. 
 
Experiment 2 
Method 
Participants. A total of 588 workers from Amazon Mechanical Turk completed the 
study online for U$3.00. Of these, 29 participants were excluded for not passing at least two 
out of the four attention checks, 16 other participants were excluded because technical issues 
were reported (e.g., films not loading properly), and 64 other responses were excluded 
removed due to suspicious bot activity (i.e., Prims & Motyl, 2018). The final sample (N = 
479) comprised of 58% male participants and had a mean age of M = 34.01, ranging from 19 
to 70 years (SD = 10.7). 
Materials and procedure. All experimental protocols were the same as in 
Experiment 1, except that in Experiment 2 four different target events were used. All target 
events were short films (30sec long) depicting different nonviolent crimes (see Colloff et al., 
2016, for a more complete description of each crime). All identification procedures were the 
same as in Experiment 1, and each participant saw only one of the four different target 
events, and completed only one identification task. 
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Table 2.4 
Logistic Regressions Testing Metamemory Measures as Predictors of Eyewitness Identification Accuracy (Experiment 2) 
Choosers Nonchoosers 
Predictor β SE  β p OR [95% CI] Predictor β SE  β p OR [95% CI] 
Confidence 0.03 0.01 <.001 1.04 [1.03, 1.05] Confidence 0.02 0.01 .01 1.03 [1.01, 1.05] 
MMQ – Contentment 0.86 0.17 <.001 2.37 [1.70, 3.36] MMQ – Contentment 0.65 0.53 .22 1.92 [0.68, 5.76] 
MMQ – Ability -0.15 0.13 .24 0.85 [0.66, 1.11] MMQ – Ability -0.27 0.36 .45 0.76 [0.35, 1.48] 
MMQ – Strategy -0.04 0.14 .78 0.96 [0.72, 1.28] MMQ – Strategy 0.07 0.54 .84 1.07 [0.49, 2.39] 
SSMQ -0.03 0.08 .62 0.96 [0.82, 1.12] SSMQ 0.01 0.21 .95 1.01 [0.66, 1.55] 
General Memory -0.07 0.07 .37 0.93 [0.79, 1.08] General Memory 0.04 0.22 .84 1.04 [0.69, 1.63] 
Face Memory 0.08 0.08 .32 1.08 [1.29, 0.33] Face Memory 0.06 0.22 .79 1.06 [0.70, 1.71] 
 
Table 2.5 
Multiple Regressions Testing Metamemory Measures as Predictors of Eyewitness Confidence (Experiment 2) 
Choosers Nonchoosers 
Predictor B (SE) β t p Predictor B (SE) β t p 
Identification Accuracy (0 = Inaccurate) 20.83 (2.71) 0.40 7.68 <.001 Identification Accuracy (0 = Inaccurate) 13.97 (5.32) 0.20 2.62 .009 
MMQ – Contentment -0.24 (2.71) -0.01 -1.12 .90 MMQ – Contentment -1.89 (3.32) -0.05 -0.57 .56 
MMQ – Ability 0.67 (1.55) 0.02 0.43 .66 MMQ – Ability 0.82 (2.09) 0.04 0.39 .69 
MMQ – Strategy 1.18 (1.71) 0.03 0.68 .49 MMQ – Strategy 0.22 (2.42) 0.01 0.09 .92 
SSMQ 2.81 (0.89) 0.19 3.13 .002 SSMQ 0.99 (1.30) 0.07 0.76 .44 
General Memory -.58 (0.90) -0.09 -0.64 .52 General Memory 2.08 (1.21) 0.18 1.71 .09 
Face Memory 1.56 (1.01) -0.04 -1.54 .12 Face Memory -2.94 (1.44) -0.21 -2.04 .04 
Results and Discussion 
Our analysis plan for Experiment 2 followed the same steps as in Experiment 1. 
Logistic regressions revealed that Confidence was positively associated to accuracy for both 
choosers (OR = 1.04, p < .001) and nonchoosers (OR = 1.03, p = .01). Choosers were also 
more likely to be accurate if they were more content with their general memory (MMQ-
Contentment; OR = 2.37, p < .001), but this effect was not observed for nonchoosers. None 
of the other metamemory factors were significant predictors of identification accuracy (see 
Table 2.4 and Figure 2.5). Results from multiple linear regressions revealed that 
identification confidence was predicted by identification accuracy, both for choosers (β = 
0.40, p <.001) and nonchoosers (β = 0.20, p = .009). Higher self-perceived memory 
functioning (SSMQ) was indicative of higher confidence in the identification task (β = 0.19, p 
= .002; see Table 5). Results from a Bayesian regression model revealed that all other 
metamemory factors are most probably unrelated to expressions of confidence in the 
identification task (see Figure 2.6). 
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Figure 2.5. Posterior distributions of coefficients of metamemory factors as predictors of identification 
accuracy in Experiment 2 for Choosers (A) and Nonchoosers (B). The shaded area in the distributions 
represent 95% credible intervals. 
 
Figure 2.6. Posterior distributions of coefficients of metamemory factors as predictors of identification 
confidence in Experiment 2 for Choosers (A) and Nonchoosers (B). The shaded area in the distributions 
represent 95% credible intervals. 
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Calibration analyses. Inspection of the calibration curves showed that the pattern of 
stronger calibration for individuals with high MMQ-Strategy observed in Experiment 1 was 
not replicated (see Figure 2.7). Confidence-intervals computed via a jack-knife procedure 
confirmed these results and showed that all other metamemory factors presented no 
differences in their calibration (See Figure 2.8). 
 
 
Figure 2.7. Calibration curve for Choosers identification performance by higher and low 
scorers in MMQ-Strategy (Experiment 2). The diagonal dotted grey line represents perfect 
calibration. 
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Figure 2.8. Inferential confidence intervals of calibration statistics for high and low scorers in each 
metamemory measure in Experiment 2. 
 
Performance in identification task and memory tests. Results from simple 
regression models showed that eyewitness identification accuracy was not predicted by 
performance in any of the different memory tests. A separate set of regression models 
showed that confidence in memory tests did predict confidence in the identification task, with 
larger coefficients for the face recognition test (β = 0.64), followed by cued recall (β = 0.30) 
and general knowledge (β = 0.32). 
 
General Discussion 
In this pair of experiments, we tested the utility of metamemory measures and 
memory tests as estimators of eyewitness identification accuracy, confidence, and 
confidence-accuracy calibration. We observed three key findings that were consistent across 
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. First, higher contentment with general memory capacity 
(MMQ-Contentment) was associated with more correct identifications among choosers. 
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Second, accuracy performance in different memory tests (i.e., general knowledge, cued recall 
and face recognition) was unrelated to eyewitness identification accuracy. Third, confidence 
in different memory tests was predictive of eyewitness identification confidence, with 
stronger relations for face recognition tests, followed by cued recall and general knowledge 
tests. Additionally, in Experiment 1 we find that individuals with higher endorsement of 
memory strategies (MMQ-Strategies) were better calibrated than individuals with less 
endorsement of memory strategies, although this finding was not replicated in Experiment 2. 
 
Metamemory Assessments as Predictors of Eyewitness Identification Performance  
Regarding our first main finding, we observed that contentment with one’s own 
general memory ability (MMQ-Contentment) was predictive of identification accuracy 
among choosers. This result is in line with previous studies demonstrating a link between 
general ratings of memory self-efficacy and objective memory performance (Olsson & Juslin, 
1999; Seeman, McAvay, Merrill, Albert, & Rodin, 1996; White, & McNeill, 2010). Valentijn 
et al. (2006), for example, found that memory self-efficacy was predictive of objective 
memory performance after an interval of 6 years, as measured by a visual verbal learning 
task. In the eyewitness identification literature, some initial evidence has been found showing 
a small to moderate relation between self-ratings of face recognition ability and eyewitness 
identification accuracy (Olsson & Juslin, 1999). In contrast, other evidence suggests that 
people have limited insight into their own memory ability, so that they are often unable to 
predict their performance in different memory tasks (Bindemann, Attard, & Johnston, 2014; 
Besken & Mulligan, 2013; Bobak, Mileva, & Hancock, 2018; Bobak, Pampoulov, & Bate, 
2016). The current manuscript extends on this discussion by showing initial evidence that 
contentment with one’s general memory ability (MMQ-Contentment) is related to 
identification accuracy among choosers. Importantly, we observe that MMQ-Contentment 
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and identification confidence are independent predictors of identification accuracy. That is, 
adopting memory self-efficacy assessments may improve estimation of identification 
accuracy compared to estimations that only consider identification confidence. This 
additional diagnostic value of memory self-efficacy might be attributed to dispositional 
aspects of memory performance that are not present in identification confidence. That is, 
confidence judgements expressed by witnesses are greatly influenced by memory trace 
strength (Bothwell et al., 1987; Smith, et al., 2019), while memory self-efficacy encompasses 
more distal experiences with previous memory performance (Hertzog & Dixon, 1994; Koriat, 
1997). Therefore, assessments of memory self-efficacy may predict identification accuracy 
among choosers because it differentiates individuals with a more or less successful history of 
memory performance. 
It is important to note that only MMQ-Contentment was a significant predictor of 
identification accuracy among choosers, while no relationship was observed for other 
metamemory factors related to endorsement of memory strategies, self-reported general 
memory and face memory ability, and memory development (SSMQ). One possible 
explanation that might account for our findings is that the metamemory instruments adopted 
are not closely related to eyewitness situations. Most of the measures used in this study focus 
on aspects related to general memory ability or impairment (e.g., ‘I worry that others will 
notice that my memory is not very good’), and in eyewitness contexts other aspects such as 
memory for faces are more relevant. Olsson and Juslin (1999), for example, found no 
evidence that general memory self-ratings were related to identification accuracy, while face 
memory self-ratings were somewhat related to overall accuracy. However, our analyses using 
the same measures adopted by Olsson and Juslin (1999) failed to replicate this finding, so that 
neither general nor face memory assessments were predictive of identification accuracy. As 
Olsson and Justlin (1999) observed, the measures they used were a combination of single 
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items of unknown validity and reliability. Further research on the relation between 
metamemory assessments and eyewitness accuracy might benefit from developing, validating 
and testing eyewitness-specific metamemory instruments. 
A second explanation for the absence of a relationship between some metamemory 
assessments and identification accuracy is that people may have a limited ability to correctly 
evaluate their own memory performance. Perfect (2004), for example, noted that self-ratings 
in eyewitness memory ability were not predictive of eyewitness memory in a cued recall test. 
Other studies have shown that general metamnemonic self-assessments are often unrelated to 
actual memory ability, including difficulties in predicting the recognition of unfamiliar faces 
(Bindemann et al., 2014; Bobak et al., 2018). Moreover, metacognitive judgements are 
malleable, and can change in the presence of social influence (Semmler & Brewer, 2006). 
Bang et al. (2017), for example, have found that during group discussions, individuals tend to 
express confidence levels that match the confidence expressed by others in the group. The 
malleability of metamemory judgements and the dissociation between self-assessments and 
actual accuracy might help explain why eyewitness identification errors occur in experiments 
and real-life incidents. In such contexts, eyewitness can avoid identification errors by 
rejecting lineups or making ‘don’t know’ responses, but false identifications are common 
even when those options are available (Weber & Perfect, 2012). Failures to correctly assess 
and control for an individual’s own memory processes may well be a central underlying 
mechanism behind eyewitness errors, and a possible explanation of why eyewitnesses can 
sometimes make very confident and yet inaccurate identifications. 
Another important aim of this paper was to test whether metamemory assessments 
might be used to estimate eyewitness identification confidence. That question was motivated 
by the assumption that witnesses providing confidence judgements take into account not only 
the strength of their memories, but also many intrinsic, heuristic and self-credibility cues 
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(Koriat, 1997; Leippe & Eisenstadt, 2014). We found that higher self-perceived memory 
functioning (SSMQ) was indicative of higher confidence in Experiment 2, but this relation 
was not observed in Experiment 1. Importantly, none of the other metamemory measures 
related to memory contentment, endorsement of memory strategies, self-reported general 
memory and face memory ability were significant predictors of identification confidence. 
Taken together, these findings seem to suggest that confidence judgements in identification 
tasks are not influenced by intrinsic metamemory cues related to memory self-efficacy. 
Therefore, we find no support for the hypothesis that individuals’ insights about their own 
memory performance serve as a heuristic by which individuals might anchor their confidence 
judgements.  
Some results on the link between metamemory and eyewitness confidence-accuracy 
relationship were inconsistent across our pair of experiments. In Experiment 1, we found that 
choosers with higher MMQ-Strategy scores were better calibrated compared to choosers with 
lower scores in this component, but this result was not replicated in Experiment 2. In 
Experiment 2, we recruited a larger and more diverse sample, while also employing more 
diverse target stimuli. This seems to indicate that the distinct calibration pattern found for the 
MMQ-Strategy component in Experiment 1 may have emerged due to methodological 
artefacts in this experiment. Overall, across both experiments we find that eyewitness 
confidence-accuracy calibration did not differ substantially between high and low scorers in 
each of the metamemory components examined. In other words, assessments of memory self-
efficacy seem to have little value in improving the diagnostic value of confidence as a 
postdictor of eyewitness identification accuracy. Although confidence can be inflated by a 
number of external factors (e.g., biased lineup instructions, Brewer & Wells, 2006), our 
findings indicate that over/underconfidence may not be attributed to self-ratings of general 
memory ability. 
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Objective Memory Tests as Predictors of Identification Performance 
Finally, we tested whether eyewitness identification accuracy and confidence could be 
predicted by performance in different objective memory tests, expecting stronger effects for 
tests that were more similar to eyewitness situations. We have found no evidence that 
performance on general knowledge, cued recall, and face recognition tests are good 
predictors of accuracy in an identification task. This finding is consistent with contemporary 
memory models, which often considers that memory is comprised of relatively independent 
domains (Repovs & Baddeley, 2006). The absence of a relationship between performance in 
the face recognition test and eyewitness identification is more surprising. Previous studies 
have found that performance in standardized face recognition tests are positively related to 
eyewitness identification accuracy (Bindemann et al., 2012; Morgan et al., 2007), but we did 
not replicate that observation in the current study. It is conceivable that other types of test 
reveal stronger associations between face recognition ability and eyewitness identification 
performance. Bindemann et al. (2012), for example, used a test more analogue to lineup 
identifications, comprising the selection of one single previously studied face among a 
number of options, instead of testing the recognition of multiple faces. Notwithstanding, we 
found that confidence presented in general knowledge, cued recall, and face recognition tests 
are significant predictors of eyewitness confidence in an identification task, with a larger 
effect for face recognition tests. This finding supports the assumption that confidence reports 
depend not only on memory vividness and trace strength, but also on internal heuristics that 
can be stable across different contexts. These intrinsic cues include beliefs about external 
factors that can help or impair memory encoding and retrieval, as well as self-reflections on 
memory processes, from which people identify information that they learned to associate 
with accurate or inaccurate memory (Koriat, 1997; Leippe & Eisenstadt, 2014). 
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There are a number of limitations associated with the current research. For example, 
the self-reports were obtained 24 hours prior to the identification task. In determining the 
sequence of task administration, we reasoned that exposure to the identification test before 
the completion of the metamemory measures might have affected witnesses’ self-assessments 
of their memory abilities to a greater degree than completing the measures would affect 
eyewitness performance. While this was perhaps appropriate for an initial test of relationships 
between the tasks, future studies should examine the impact of collecting metamemory 
measures after the identification task as, in real case scenarios, such assessments would most 
likely be obtained after an identification procedure. We also tested metamemory measures 
that focus on global aspects of memory processes and experiences which are quite removed 
from the memorial demands placed on witnesses in forensic situations. The measures used 
focused mostly on aspects related to general memory ability or impairment, and more specific 
assessments concerning memory for faces were not thoroughly explored. Future studies 
might benefit from developing and testing metamemory measures that are specifically 
tailored to eyewitness contexts. Finally, we tested a lineup identification procedure that 
follows most of the recommendations for reducing eyewitnesses biased decisions. It has been 
argued that the confidence-accuracy relation can be weaker under biased lineup procedures 
(Wixted & Wells, 2017), but some studies have found only small differences in the 
confidence-accuracy relation for biased and unbiased identification conditions (Brewer & 
Wells, 2006). Therefore, it remains to be determined whether the current findings would 
replicate or differ when assessing witness performance on biased lineups. 
 
Conclusion 
Eyewitness evidence often provides the primary leads in criminal investigations and is 
of great importance during trials, especially when other evidence against a defendant is 
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limited or absent. However, errors committed by eyewitnesses can have severe consequences 
in the justice system, and discriminating between accurate from inaccurate eyewitness 
identifications is still one of the main challenges in this field. The confidence-accuracy 
relationship can be weakened due to various system and estimator factors (Bradfield, Wells, 
& Olson, 2002; Leippe & Eisenstadt, 2014). Individual differences measures might help 
discriminate individuals who are likely to have better or worse CA calibration in cases where 
such factors can no longer be controlled, such as after an identification was made. We found 
that metamemory assessments focused on contentment with general memory ability can be 
used to predict eyewitness identification accuracy. However, we found no evidence that 
metamemory assessments can improve the diagnostic value of identification confidence, one 
predictor commonly used in the criminal justice system. We also found that accuracy in 
different objective memory tests does not relate to identification of perpetrators, but 
confidence on such tests predicts confidence in the identification test. This finding 
contributes to the development of theoretical frameworks for metacognition that aim to make 
predictions sensitive to factors related to trace strength and internal heuristics. In conclusion, 
we found initial evidence that metamemory measures may provide useful information that 
could be considered in forensic practice, although further research is required to corroborate 
the reliability and generalizability of these findings. 
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Abstract 
Metamemory can be defined as the knowledge about one’s memory capabilities and 
about strategies that can aid memory. In this paper, we describe the development and 
validation of the Eyewitness Metamemory Scale (EMS), tailored specifically for use in face 
memory and eyewitness identification settings. Participants (N = 800) completed the EMS 
and other measures on general metamemory. Results from exploratory and confirmatory 
factor analysis revealed good factorial validity, internal consistency, and content validity. The 
EMS items emerged into three distinct factors: memory contentment, memory 
discontentment and memory strategies. The EMS is a brief and easily administrable 
questionnaire that might be used to assess self-ratings of face recognition capacity and use of 
strategies to encode faces. 
Keywords: Eyewitness Identification, Metamemory, Face Recognition, Scale Development, 
Factor Analysis 
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Metamemory can be defined as the knowledge about one’s memory capabilities and 
strategies that can aid memory (Shimamura, 2008). This construct has been the subject of a 
substantial amount of research, sparked by developmental studies investigating how the 
ability to evaluate one’s memory processes and mnemonic strategies improved learning 
during early childhood (Cavanaugh & Perlmutter, 1982). Metamemory research has since 
expanded to a variety of domains such as cognitive neuropsychology, educational psychology 
and cognitive psychology, motivating the development of diverse self-report measures on 
memory monitoring and control (Pannu & Kaszniak, 2005). However, current psychometric 
instruments for assessment of metamemory typically focus on broad memory domains (e.g., 
episodic memory or semantic memory), and there appears to be an absence of self-assessment 
instruments of memory capacity for faces and person recognition. In this paper, we present 
the development and initial validation evidence for a metamemory assessment scale tailored 
specifically to face memory and eyewitness identification settings. 
Metamemory research is essential for a comprehensive understanding of how people 
use and perceive their own memory, providing a theoretical framework that can generate 
testable hypotheses. For example, in research examining feeling-of-knowing judgements, 
participants decide whether they have studied some new information sufficiently for future 
recall. If the subjective memory confidence experienced indicates they have not sufficiently 
learned the material, they may employ mnemonic strategies or engage in further study to 
better learn the material (Koriat, 1993). Other important branches of metamemory research 
include investigations on the relationship between metacognitive judgment and memory 
performance (Kelemen, 2000), use of memory strategies (Guerrero Sastoque et al., 2019), 
regulation of retrieval (Goldsmith, Pansky, & Koriat, 2014), and how metamemory changes 
across the lifespan (Ghetti, Lyons, Lazzarin, & Cornoldi, 2008). 
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Interest in assessing different aspects of metamemory has stimulated the development 
of various self-report measures that differ in content and item format. The content may 
include different aspects of metamemory so that respondents are asked to indicate the 
frequency of forgetting, the vividness of remembering, contentment with one’s memory and 
perceived changes or decay in their capabilities. The item format can also vary so that some 
instruments focus on the relative frequency of memory issues in relation to others or in 
relation to one’s own performance across a specified period. For example, the Metamemory 
in Adulthood Questionnaire (Dixon, Hultsch, & Hertzog, 1988) assesses individual’s 
knowledge of general memory processes and tasks, frequency of memory strategy use, self-
rated memory ability, perceptions of memory stability over time, anxiety regarding memory, 
memory and achievement motivation, and locus of control in memory abilities. The 
Multifactorial Memory Questionnaire (MMQ; Troyer & Rich, 2002) was developed to assess 
separate dimensions of memory ratings that are applicable to clinical assessment and 
intervention. This instrument includes scales of contentment regarding one’s memory, self-
appraisal of one’s memory capabilities, and reported frequency of memory strategy use. 
Another example is the Squire Subjective Memory Questionnaire (SSMQ; Van Bergen, 
Brands, & Jelicic, 2010; Squire, Wetzel, & Slater, 1979), assessing how one’s memory trust 
has developed over time. 
Despite the existence of several self-report memory questionnaires, there seems to be 
an absence of instruments that focus specifically on self-rated memory capacity for faces and 
person recognition. Most of the current measures have a strong focus on clinical assessments 
or interventions, and typically include items concerning self-evaluation of general memory 
ability or items concerning semantic or episodic memory issues. One notable exception is the 
newly developed Stirling Face Recognition Scale (SFRS; Bobak, Mileva, & Hancock, 2018). 
The SFRS was developed to assess face recognition ability, ranging from developmental 
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prosopagnosia (i.e., a neurological disorder characterized by the inability to recognize faces) 
to super-recognition. It has two components, face processing and face memory, which 
correlated moderately with objective face matching tests (correlations between r = .28 and r = 
.34). However, this instrument has not yet been subjected to factor analysis and the reliability 
of each SFRS component is unknown. Furthermore, The SFRS does not include items related 
to other person identification elements that may be relevant in eyewitness settings.  
Self-report instruments specifically developed to measure face recognition ability and 
person identification would have important implications for research and practice. One 
important issue in the criminal justice system, for instance, is to distinguish accurate from 
inaccurate eyewitness identifications. Evidence obtained from witnesses of crimes can be 
very influential in court decisions, but inaccurate witness identifications can impair 
investigations and in more severe cases contribute to miscarriages of justice. Some 
postdictors of eyewitness identification accuracy have been identified, such as early 
statements of confidence (Brewer & Wells, 2006), decision time (Sporer, 1993) and decision 
process (i.e., absolute vs relative judgements, Dunning & Stern, 1994). However, under 
certain circumstances the predictive value of those factors is undermined, for example when 
eyewitnesses are exposed to biased lineups (Charman, Wells, & Joy, 2011) or receive 
feedback after an identification is made (Semmler, Brewer, & Wells, 2004). This limitation 
highlights the importance of investigating new factors that may be used to estimate 
eyewitness accuracy that are less undermined by external factors. One such potential 
estimator is self-efficacy in face recognition, which has shown to be predictive of eyewitness 
accuracy performance (Olsson & Juslin, 1999; Perfect, 2004). However, previous studies on 
this issue have used single items of unknown reliability and validity, limiting conclusions 
regarding the relation between self-efficacy and objective memory performance. A reliable 
and valid metamemory scale tailored specifically to eyewitness settings would improve the 
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inferences in studies investigating the relation between self-ratings of memory ability and 
objective memory accuracy. 
Another important theoretical implication of an eyewitness metamemory scale is that 
it would help elucidate the relation between self-ratings of memory ability and expressions of 
confidence. Koriat (1993) has proposed that expressions of memory confidence are partly 
based on the encoding experience (i.e., characteristics of the stimuli) and on internal cues or 
beliefs about memory capacity (i.e., “am I good at recognizing this type of stimuli?”). 
However, general theories of memory confidence have not yet been thoroughly examined in 
eyewitness contexts. In forensic settings, for example, eyewitness confidence judgments are 
commonly used for assessing the likelihood that the eyewitness memory is accurate (Wixted 
& Wells, 2017). The ability to accurately evaluate one’s own memory performance is a 
critical feature of metamemory function, but laboratory manipulations have shown that 
eyewitness confidence can be inflated by factors such as post-identification feedback 
(Douglass & Steblay, 2006) and repeated recall (Odinot & Wolters, 2006). It has been 
suggested that confidence expressed by witnesses is also influenced by internal cues (Leippe 
& Eisenstadt, 2014), but the extent to which memory accuracy and confidence for faces is 
related to self-perceived recognition skill is relatively unknown. In one of the few studies on 
the matter, Olsson and Juslin (1999) found that people who claim to be good face recognizers 
show slightly higher accuracy and better confidence-accuracy calibration in eyewitness 
identifications, but that study is limited by the use of single items of unknown reliability and 
validity. The absence of valid measures of eyewitness face recognition ability impairs the 
advancement of this theoretical line of research. With such a measure, it would be possible to 
better examine the relation between beliefs of memory capacity and expressions of 
confidence in forensic relevant contexts.  
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Despite the benefits of self-report tools, it can be argued that memory accuracy could 
be better estimated by objective tests of memory performance. In fact, it has been proposed 
that tests of face recognition performance are informative estimators of proclivity to choose 
and identification accuracy (Baldassari, Kantner, & Lindsay, 2019; Russ, Sauerland, Lee, & 
Bindemann, 2018). However, in practical terms, objective tests of face recognition are more 
difficult to implement in applied and research settings. That is because commonly used tests 
of face recognition or face match ability are computerized and include many repeated trials 
(e.g., Dowsett & Burton, 2015; Russell, Duchaine, & Nakayama, 2009). Ideally, both 
objective memory tests and self-ratings of memory performance could be deployed to 
estimate eyewitness identification accuracy, but such approach may not always be possible 
due to time and resources constraints. In this scenario, brief self-ratings of memory ability 
may be a feasible alternative to provide estimates of accuracy in practical settings and in 
empirical studies, although the relation between eyewitness self-ratings of memory capacity 
and objective performance has yet to be elucidated (Olsson & Juslin, 1999). 
In sum, a metamemory instrument tailored specifically to eyewitness settings would 
be of considerable value in several lines of research and has the potential to aid end-users in 
forensic contexts. Obtaining valid measures of metamemory for eyewitness identification is 
essential in research investigating the relation between self-efficacy, objective accuracy, and 
expressions of confidence. Depending on the results and development of this line of research, 
self-ratings of memory ability may also be employed to distinguish accurate from inaccurate 
identifications or to identify individuals with superior face recognition abilities (Russell et al., 
2009). In this article, we present the development steps and initial evidence of the 
psychometric validity of the Eyewitness Metamemory Scale (EMS), a self-report memory 
instrument tailored specifically to face recognition and eyewitness identification settings. For 
the purposes of this study, we aimed to develop the instrument and test its factorial structure, 
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while also testing for its convergent and discriminant validity through associations with other 
metamemory measures. 
Materials and Methods 
Participants and Procedure 
 A total of 1347 participants proceeded past the informed consent page, although 143 
cases were removed for failure to complete the metamemory measures. Several exclusion 
criteria were adopted to ensure the quality of the data: (a) 38 cases were removed for taking 
more than 90 minutes to complete the experiment (without outliers the study took in average 
30min to be completed); (b) 145 cases were removed for completing the experiment in under 
15 minutes (i.e., an impossible time to attentively complete the study); (c) 78 cases were 
removed for not passing all of the attention checks; and (d) 137 cases were removed due to 
suspicious bot activity (i.e., Prims & Motyl, 2018). The final sample (N = 800) comprised 
62% female participants and had a mean age of M = 29.83, ranging from 18 to 72 years (SD = 
11.89). The sample was from Amazon Mechanical Turk (48%), university students attending 
UK and Dutch institutions (32%) and participants recruited through social media (20%). 
Participants recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk received U$0.50, students received 
course credits, and participants recruited via social media were entered a prize draw for the 
prize of two £50 Amazon vouchers. 
In an online survey presented via Qualtrics, participants first completed the EMS, 
followed by other general metamemory scales. The EMS scale was always shown first, while 
the other metamemory scales were presented in a random order. 1 Demographic information 
 
 
 
1 Participants then took part in an eyewitness paradigm consisting of a mock crime video and 
two identification tasks with confidence judgements. This data was obtained as part of a 
larger research project aiming to investigate the relation between metamemory measures and 
eyewitness memory performance. Due to space and focus, we only report on those measures 
that are relevant to the development of the eyewitness metamemory scale. 
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including gender, age and level of education was also obtained and on completion of all 
tasks, participants were debriefed and thanked for their participation. 
Materials and Instruments 
Eyewitness Metamemory Scale. Two qualitative approaches were adopted to 
develop an initial pool of items for the Eyewitness Metamemory Scale (EMS). First, we 
closely examined the items of other metamemory measures and, where possible, based our 
item development on these items. Then a semi-structured interview was conducted with a 
group of legal psychologists and graduate students working in this field of research (N = 14) 
to obtain additional information regarding memory self-assessment in eyewitness contexts. 
The initial pool of items consisted of 35 items, including eyewitness specific items and items 
concerning facial recognition adapted from various metamemory questionnaires. All items 
were rated on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
We did not establish specific hypotheses concerning the factorial structure that would emerge 
from these items, but rather used an exploratory approach to establish its factorial structure. 
 General metamemory instruments. In addition to the EMS, participants also 
completed the Multifactorial Memory Questionnaire (MMQ; Troyer & Rich, 2002), and the 
Squire Subjective Memory Questionnaire (SSMQ; Van Bergen et al., 2010; Squire et al., 
1979). The MMQ has three sub-scales: Contentment, Ability, and Strategy. All items are 
measured on a 5-point Likert scale. The contentment scale has 18 items (e.g., “I am generally 
pleased with my memory ability”; α = 0.92) rated from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly 
agree), with higher scores indicating higher memory contentment. The ability scale has 20 
items related to experiences with common memory errors over the past two weeks (e.g., 
“how often do you forget an appointment?”; α = 0.92) from 1 (all the time) to 5 (never), with 
higher scores indicating better self-reported ability. The strategy scale has 19 items 
concerning the use of memory strategies during the past two weeks (e.g., “how often do you 
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use a timer or alarm to remind you when to do something?”; α = 0.88). The items are 
assessed on a scale ranging from 1 (never) to 5 (all the time), with higher scores indicating 
greater use of memory strategies. The MMQ has shown good high test-retest reliability and 
high internal consistency in the original study by Troyer and Rich (2002) and in adaptations 
to different countries (e.g., Fort, Adoul, Holl, Kaddour, & Gana, 2004; van der Werf & Vos, 
2011). The SSMQ consists of 18 items related to Memory Trust (e.g., “my ability to recall 
things when I really try is”; α = 0.94). Participants rated the items on a 9-point scale ranging 
from −4 (worse than ever) to 4 (better than ever before). This instrument has shown good 
psychometric properties in different studies and has been correlated in a meaningful way with 
age, cognitive failures, and susceptibility to misinformation (Van Bergen et al., 2010; Van 
Bergen, Horselenberg, Merckelbach, Jelicic, & Beckers, 2010). The MMQ and SSMQ differ 
mainly in response format. Although both instruments tap into self-rated memory ability, the 
MMQ focuses on present ability (i.e., “I am generally pleased with my memory ability”), 
while the SSMQ focuses on memory development over time (“my memory ability is better 
than ever before”). Those instruments were selected to test convergent and divergent validity 
of the EMS due to their good psychometric properties and high content validity in assessing 
metamemory traits such as self-ratings of memory capacity and memory trust. However, no 
specific hypotheses were established a priori concerning the specific relation between each of 
the SSMQ and MMQ factors with the factors obtained for the EMS, given that the factorial 
structure of the EMS was unknown prior to our analysis. Therefore, the convergent and 
divergent analysis in this study were exploratory, and it was generally expected that factors in 
the EMS would relate meaningfully with factors from the MMQ and SSMQ given the 
similarities between those instruments in assessing metamemory.  
Attention checks. Three attention checks were included within the metamemory 
assessment, in which participants were asked to select a specific response for that item such 
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as “for this question, please select the option 4 (better than ever before)”. The attention 
checks were included as an exclusion criterion (see Participants and Procedure section). 
Results 
To examine the validity of the EMS factorial solutions, a within-sample replication 
strategy was adopted, and the total sample was randomly split in half (Osborne & Fitzpatrick, 
2012). The first half was treated as a training dataset for obtaining an initial factorial solution 
via exploratory factor analysis (EFA). The second half was treated as a test dataset for 
examining the fit of the initial solutions obtained in the training dataset via confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA). All analyses were performed in the statistical software package R 
(2019). The dataset and data analysis script can be found in Electronic Supplemental 
Materials 1, 2 and 3 (doi: 10.1002/acp.3588). 
Exploratory Factor Analysis 
Prior to the analysis, one item was removed because of a semantic error in the survey. 
A correlation matrix of the remaining 34 items was screened to identify items that were 
poorly correlated with the others, or items that were highly correlated and generating 
multicollinearity issues. Eight items were excluded for showing weak item-total correlations 
(r < .30). Two other items were excluded for presenting high correlations (r > .65) and 
redundant content in relation to other items.  
Diagnostic tests were performed on the remaining 24 items to examine the 
assumptions for EFA. Data gathering for the metamemory measures was performed in an 
online setting with forced responses, so no missing responses were present. Graphical 
inspection and significant Shapiro Wilk tests for all the items indicated significant univariate 
non-normality, with skewness ranging from -0.87 to +0.89, and kurtosis ranging from −1.01 
to +0.32. This observation was supported by the statistically significant Mardia's test, 
indicating that the assumption of multivariate normality was violated. Therefore, a weighted 
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least squares extraction method for EFA was used, which provides standard errors and tests 
of model fit that are robust to the non-normality of the data. The items showed good 
factorability (Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test = 0.89 and significant Bartlett's test) and did not 
present multicollinearity or singularity issues (Determinant > 0.00001). 
Parallel analysis and scree plots were used as factor retention criteria and suggested 
the presence of four factors. A four-factor solution was extracted using oblimin rotation to 
allow for correlations between the factors. This solution revealed four distinguishable factors, 
but one factor had only four emerging items which appeared to be related to memory 
development over time. These items presented high cross-loadings with two of the other 
factors in the solution, indicating that a four-factor solution might not be robust. We 
proceeded with the extraction of a three-factor solution using oblimin rotation. Examining the 
pattern matrix, we decided to exclude one item from the first factor for high cross-loadings 
and a content that was dissonant with the other items (i.e., “People are generally good at 
remembering unfamiliar faces”). The same three-factor extraction was then repeated on the 
remaining 23 items (the pattern matrix for this solution is presented in Table 3.1). Items had 
high loadings on their respective factor, with no cross loadings higher than .30. We termed 
the three factors Memory Contentment (10 items explaining 19% of the total scale variance), 
Memory Discontentment (8 items explaining 15% of the variance), and Memory Strategies (5 
items explaining 10% of the variance). The Memory Contentment factor combined items 
related to positive self-perception of memory ability, including keywords such as ‘satisfied’, 
‘confident’, and ‘better’. The Memory Discontentment factor combined items related to 
negative self-perception of memory ability, including keywords such as ‘trouble’ and 
‘worse’. The Memory Strategies factor combined items related to the use of memory 
strategies in the context of person identification and could be defined as the extent to which 
an individual adopts strategies to better recognize someone in the future. Reliability of the 
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factors was examined using omega coefficients instead of alpha, given that assumptions for 
alpha are rarely met in psychometric research (Dunn, Baguley, & Brunsden, 2014). Good 
reliability scores were found for the Memory Contentment [omega = .88, 95% CI (.86, .90)], 
Memory Discontentment [omega = .86, 95% CI (.83, .88)], and Memory Strategies factors 
[omega = .82, 95% CI (.78, .85)]. A separate factorial structure with two factors was also 
extracted for comparison purposes.  
Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
 The purpose of the subsequent analysis was to confirm the factor structure for the 23-
item EMS scale on a separate subset of our sample. The results from the EFA indicated that a 
three-factor solution was the most appropriate to describe the EMS. A two-factor structure 
was also submitted for analysis as a plausible competing model for comparing fit indices. 
This two-factor solution was fitted to further examine whether the Contentment and 
Discontentment factors in the three-factor solution emerged due to phrasing method rather 
than to the constructs the factors represent (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & Podsakoff, 2012). 
Confirmatory factor analyses were conducted to test both models. Goodness of fit was 
evaluated using the robust root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) and its 90% 
confidence interval, robust comparative fit index (CFI), robust Tucker-Lewis index (TLI), 
and Expected Cross-Validation Index (ECVI). These fit indices provide different types of 
information (i.e., absolute fit, fit adjusting for model parsimony, fit relative to a null model), 
and when combined they provide a reliable and conservative evaluation of model fit 
(Schreiber, Nora, Stage, Barlow, & King, 2006). The chi-square test is reported, but not 
relied upon to evaluate model fit due to its oversensitivity to sample size and the fact that it 
tests for perfect fit. The evaluation of the models was based on (i) conventional criteria for 
good model fit (RMSEA < .08, CFI > .90, TLI > .90, smallest ECVI), and (ii) the 
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interpretability of the solution (i.e., the comprehensibility of the factors on a conceptual 
level).  
 
 
Diagnostic tests were performed on the 23 items to examine the assumptions for CFA 
and indicated that the assumption of multivariate normality was violated. Therefore, we 
estimated parameters in CFA using a maximum likelihood estimation with robust standard 
Table 3.1 
Item-total correlations, communalities and pattern matrix for the Eyewitness Metamemory Scale 
Scale items ITC h2 Factor Loadings 
   1 2 3 
Items Relating to Memory Contentment      
1. My ability to remember faces is much better than other people's ability to remember faces. .33 .67 .84 - - 
2. I am confident with my ability to remember faces in a stressful situation. .43 .57 .74 - - 
3. Compared to other people, I think I would be a much better eyewitness. .40 .60 .73 - - 
4. If I saw someone commit a crime, I am certain that I would remember his/her face. .45 .55 .70 - - 
5. If I witnessed a robbery, I would be able to recognize the perpetrator a month later. .54 .46 .65 - - 
6. As I age, I find my ability to remember faces is getting better. .58 .42 .65 - - 
7. I am generally satisfied with my ability to remember the faces of people I have only met 
once. 
.50 .50 .61 -.24 - 
8. My ability to correctly remember where and when I saw a particular face has improved over 
time. 
.62 .38 .57 - - 
9. I can give a detailed description of a friend's face to a stranger. .74 .26 .37 -.10 .20 
10. I recognize relatively unknown actors, if I have seen them in another movie/television 
show. 
.80 .20 .34 -.16 .11 
Items Relating to Memory Discontentment      
11. Sometimes I have trouble recognizing a person that I know relatively well. .44 .56 .26 .77 -.11 
12. My ability to remember faces is much worse than other people's ability to remember faces. .35 .65 -.19 .75 - 
13. It often happens that a person who seems familiar starts a conversation with me, but I have 
no idea who the person is. 
.54 .46 .11 .68 - 
14. Whenever I meet an important person, I am worried that I will not be able to recognize 
him/her a week later. 
.53 .47 - .67 - 
15. Compared to other people, I think I would be a much worse eyewitness. .49 .51 -.25 .62 - 
16. My ability to correctly remember where and when I saw a particular face has deteriorated 
over time. 
.62 .38 -.10 .57 .12 
17. When I see a person that looks familiar, I often do not know where I have seen that person 
before. 
.66 .34 -.11 .55 - 
18. As I age, I find my ability to remember faces is getting worse. .65 .35 -.12 .54 - 
Items Relating to Memory Strategies     - 
19. Compared to other people, I more often use a strategy (e.g., focus on specific facial 
features such as eyes) to remember a person's face. 
.32 .68 - - .76 
20. Compared to ten years ago, I more often use a strategy (e.g., focus on specific facial 
features such as eyes) to remember a person's face. 
.36 .64 - .14 .75 
21. In order to remember a perpetrator's face, I would definitely use a strategy (e.g., focus on 
specific facial features such as eyes) to remember the perpetrator's face. 
.56 .44 - -.10 .70 
22. I often focus on specific facial features such as nose and eyes when I am paying attention 
to a face that I have to remember. 
.53 .47 - -.10 .67 
23. I often create a visual image in my mind of a face that I want to remember. .73 .27 .18  .41 
Eigenvalues   4.36 3.55 2.41 
Percentage of Variance Explained   .19 .15 .10 
Note. ITC = Item-Total Correlations; Factor loadings higher than >.40 are presented in bold.  
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errors, which provides tests of model fit that are robust to the non-normality of the data 
(Finney & DiStefano, 2006). Figure 1 presents the model specification and goodness of fit 
indices for the three-factor model and two-factor model. The model fit indices suggested that 
the three-factor solution had a better fit compared to the two-factor solution. However, the 
three-factor solution did not fit the data particularly well (e.g., RMSEA > 0.08, CFI < 0.90, 
TLI < 0.90). In an exploratory approach, we revised the three-factor model by evaluating its 
modification indices, adopting only theoretically sound modifications to avoid over-
specification of the model. Following this approach, we included two new correlations 
between errors of items 6 and 8, and items 16 and 18. These modifications were based on the 
content of the items, which seem to be closely related to memory development over time 
(e.g., “As I age, I find my ability to remember faces is getting better”). The revised model 
resulted in an acceptable fit to data (see Figure 3.1). 
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Figure 3.1. Model specification and model fit indices for the three-factor solution (A), revised three-factor solution 
(B) and two-factor solution (C) of the Eyewitness Metamemory Scale. 
 
Convergent and Discriminant Validity 
Convergent and discriminant validity was examined by correlating the factors of the 
EMS with factors from other established metamemory measures (i.e., MMQ and SSMQ). 
This analysis was conducted on the complete dataset (N = 800) instead of the training or 
testing dataset, given that those subsets were used only to perform independent EFA and 
CFA analyses. The three-factor solution demonstrated better validity in both the EFA and 
CFA, so the three factors emerging from this solution (i.e., EMS-Contentment, EMS-
Discontentment, and EMS- Strategies) were used in the correlation analyses. Table 2 presents 
the correlation matrix of the EMS factors and other metamemory measures. A small negative 
correlation was found between EMS-Contentment and EMS-Discontentment (r = -.29). A 
moderate positive correlation was found between the EMS-Contentment and EMS-Strategies 
factors (r = .44), but no relation was found between EMS-Discontentment and EMS-
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Strategies (r = .04). The EMS-Contentment and EMS-Discontentment factors presented a 
small to moderate relation with most of the other metamemory measures, while the EMS-
Strategies factor presented a positive relation with MMQ-Ability, MMQ-Strategy and 
SSMQ-Memory Trust. 
 
Table 3.2 
 
Means, standard deviations, and correlations with confidence intervals of the EMS factors and other 
metamemory measures 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
         
1. EMS-Contentment 4.22 1.02       
          
2. EMS-Discontentment 3.53 1.09 -.29**      
    [-.35, -.23]      
          
3. EMS-Strategies 4.51 1.10 .45** .04     
    [.39, .50] [-.03, .11]     
          
4. MMQ-Contentment 3.62 0.69 .26** -.54** .07    
    [.19, .32] [-.59, -.49] [-.00, .14]    
          
5. MMQ-Ability 3.57 0.62 .31** -.34** .19** .53**   
    [.24, .37] [-.40, -.27] [.12, .25] [.48, .58]   
          
6. MMQ-Strategy 2.86 0.64 .09** .23** .20** -.29** -.40**  
    [.02, .16] [.16, .30] [.13, .26] [-.36, -.23] [-.46, -.34]  
          
7. SSMQ 5.91 1.21 .62** -.20** .38** .45** .42** .07* 
    [.57, .66] [-.26, -.13] [.32, .44] [.39, .50] [.36, .47] [.01, .14] 
Note. Values in square brackets indicate the 95% confidence interval for each correlation. * indicates p < 
.05. **indicates p < .01. 
 
 
Discussion 
In this article, we present a new self-report metamemory questionnaire developed 
specifically for face recognition and eyewitness identification settings. Overall, the analyses 
revealed good evidence of factorial validity, internal consistency and both convergent and 
discriminant validity. Exploratory factor analysis yielded three meaningful factors, each of 
which is associated with high loadings by the items on one factor but not on the other. This 
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pattern of loadings provided an initial factorial validity that was also confirmed in a subset 
sample, corroborating the instrument division into three scales representing different 
dimensions of eyewitness metamemory (i.e., Memory Contentment, Memory Discontentment 
and Memory Strategies). 
Convergent validity was demonstrated by small to large correlations between the 
EMS factors and other scales on multidimensional metamemory questionnaires. EMS-
Contentment was positively related to self-perceived contentment and ability for general 
memory capacity (MMQ) and had a large correlation with memory trust (SSMQ; r = .62). 
The EMS-Discontentment factor was negatively related to self-perceived contentment and 
ability for general memory capacity. Interestingly, some divergent pattern of results can be 
observed between EMS-Contentment and EMS-Discontentment. EMS-Contentment and 
EMS-Discontentment were not strongly related, and a model aggregating both factors in a 
single memory contentment factor presented poor fit to the data in this study. Furthermore, 
eyewitness memory contentment was positively related to the use of strategies for person 
identification (r = .45), but this relation was not observed for eyewitness memory 
discontentment (r = .04). It may be the case that individuals with higher contentment with 
their own memories seek additional strategies to maintain performance, or that adopting 
strategies to better recognize someone result in higher satisfaction with one’s memory 
capacity (Meinhardt, Persike, & Meinhardt, 2014). These findings indicate that, at least in 
part, contentment and discontentment with one’s own capacity for face and person 
recognition may represent independent constructs, rather than opposite ends of the same 
spectrum. The EMS-Strategies factor had only small to moderate correlations with self-rated 
contentment and ability for general memory capacity and memory trust. This divergent 
correlation pattern seems related to the fact that EMS-Strategies items focus specifically on 
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the use of memory strategies to encode and remember faces, which appears to be somewhat 
independent from the use of strategies and self-appraisal for general memory. 
Regarding discriminant validity, part of the non-shared variance between EMS and 
the other scales may be due to differences in content and item format. The EMS focuses 
specifically on memory for faces and person identification, while the other measures have a 
broader scope of items related to different memory domains. Contemporary memory models 
often consider that memory is comprised of relatively independent domains (Repovs & 
Baddeley, 2006), and there is some evidence that people have distinct self-perceived capacity 
for different memory domains (Tonković & Vranić, 2011). In terms of item format, most 
items in the EMS are responded in relation to present contentment with memory, while in the 
SSMQ, for example, items are responded in relation to memory development over time (e.g., 
‘better than ever before’). The SSMQ memory development focus may be especially 
appropriate in clinical contexts, where changes in memory perception can indicate the 
advancement of medical conditions (Mitchell, 2008). 
Due to space and focus, we report in the current paper the development and evidence 
for factorial, convergent and divergent validity of the EMS. In two other studies, it was 
observed that some of the EMS factors are related to eyewitness identification performance 
(Saraiva et al., 2019a; Saraiva, Van Boeijen, Hope, Horselenberg, & Van Koppen, 2019b). In 
Saraiva et al. (2019a), it was found that lineup choosers (i.e., witnesses who select someone 
from a lineup) with higher EMS-Discontentment were more likely to be inaccurate, in both 
biased (OR = 0.57, p < .001) and unbiased lineups (OR = 0.56, p < .001). In Saraiva et al 
(2019b), it was found that for each unit increase in EMS-Contentment score, the odds of 
making a correct identification increased by a factor of 1.41 (p < .001), and the odds of 
making a false identification decreased by a factor of 0.79 (p = .002). In both studies, it was 
also observed that EMS-Contentment and EMS-Discontentment were significant predictors 
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of identification confidence, suggesting that expressions of confidence are partially 
influenced by self-ratings of face recognition ability. Taken together, these studies provide 
initial evidence for the content validity and predictive validity of the EMS.  
The EMS fills an important gap in the literature on face recognition and eyewitness 
testimony that might benefit a variety of research subjects. Eyewitnesses in criminal cases, 
for example, can provide unique evidence that may help solve investigations, hint to primary 
suspects, or potentially identify a perpetrator (Benton et al., 2006). However, eyewitness 
memory is malleable and susceptible to contamination, which may impair investigations or in 
more severe cases contribute to wrongful convictions. Discriminating accurate from 
inaccurate eyewitnesses is a challenging issue, but some postdictors of eyewitness 
identification accuracy have been identified, such as decision time during identifications 
(Sauer, Brewer, & Wells, 2008), self-reported decision-making process (Sauerland & Sporer, 
2007) and early statements of confidence (Wixted & Wells, 2017). Metamemory judgements 
and individual differences in face recognition capacity may also relate to eyewitness 
performance, but this hypothesis has been relatively unexplored. Some studies have 
suggested that people have only moderate insight into their face recognition and face 
perception abilities (Bobak et al., 2019), but expressions of confidence may have a stronger 
relation to self-perceived memory ability. This is of importance because confidence 
statements are often used to discriminate accurate from inaccurate witnesses, but little is 
known about whether confidence statements are affected by individual differences (Leippe & 
Eisenstadt, 2014). Research adopting self-report instruments of face recognition capacity 
such as the EMS could help clarify the relationship between past-experiences with memory 
and confidence judgements. 
Research on prosopagnosia and super-recognizers could also benefit from the use of 
self-rated measures of face memory capacity. From a theoretical perspective, it is not clear 
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whether prosopagnosia and superior face recognition represent opposite ends of the same 
continuum of face memory ability (Bobak et al., 2019). Comparing self-reported scores of 
face recognition capacity on patients with prosopagnosia and super recognizers could help 
clarify whether objective memory capacity has a linear relation with subjective memory 
experience. From an applied perspective, super-recognizers are considered as particularly 
valuable to national security agencies and border control due to their extraordinary ability to 
match and recognize faces from video footage or line-ups (Bobak, Dowsett, & Bate, 2016). 
Valid face memory capacity self-report questionnaires could be used as screening tools 
among many participants prior to other behavioural testing, helping identifying individuals 
with remarkable face memory skill. 
The EMS is a brief, easily administrable metamemory questionnaire focusing on face 
recognition and eyewitness contexts. It has been developed on a large and relatively 
heterogeneous sample and showed good psychometric properties, although future 
amplification of its validity is desired. Self-report assessments of memory add a unique 
element to the assessment of memory performance that cannot be obtained in objective 
memory testing alone. Self-report tools allow the measurement of overarching memory issues 
and experiences rather than artificial laboratory-based memory problems, providing insights 
on an individual’s memory functioning. Consequently, such tools have an important role in 
research and theory development regarding how memory performance relates to one’s theory 
and one’s previous experiences with memory. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Eyewitness metamemory predicts identification performance in biased and 
unbiased lineups 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The research reported in this Chapter has been prepared for publication in: 
Saraiva, R. B., Van Boeijen, I. M., Hope, L., Horselenberg, R., Sauerland, M., & Van 
Koppen, P (under review). Eyewitness metamemory predicts identification performance in 
biased and unbiased lineups. 
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Eyewitnesses play a major role in the criminal justice system, especially in cases 
lacking other physical evidence. In many jurisdictions, suspects are more likely to be 
prosecuted if an eyewitness identifies them as the perpetrator of a crime. However, as with 
other types of evidence, eyewitness identifications can be in error or contaminated (Wixted, 
Mickes, & Fisher, 2018). Researchers have identified some factors that can be used to 
distinguish accurate from inaccurate witnesses, including early statements of confidence 
(Brewer & Wells, 2006; Wixted & Wells, 2017), decision time during the identification 
(Sauer, Brewer, & Wells, 2008; Sauerland & Sporer, 2009; Sporer, 1993) and self-reported 
decision process (Dunning & Stern, 1994; Smith, Lindsay, & Pryke, 2001). However, when 
eyewitnesses are exposed to biased lineups, the value of postdictors such as confidence and 
decision time is undermined (Charman, Wells, & Joy, 2011; Key et al., 2017).  
We tested whether general and eyewitness-specific self-ratings of memory ability can 
be used to discriminate identification performance, based on theoretical frameworks of 
metamemory. In particular, we aimed to investigate the efficacy of metamemory factors as 
postdictors of eyewitness identification for biased and unbiased lineups. Metamemory refers 
to the knowledge and awareness that an individual has about his or her own memory 
capabilities (Dunlosky & Bjork, 2008). This introspective knowledge is often used to monitor 
and control one’s own memory performance. Research on metacognitive judgements has 
expanded rapidly, focusing on how well people think they have learned new information (i.e., 
judgements of learning; Double, Birney, & Walker, 2018) and how well people feel they 
recognize a particular information (i.e., feeling of knowing; Koriat, 2000). One predominant 
view is that metacognitive judgments are inferential in nature, involving a variety of 
heuristics and cues that have some degree of validity in predicting objective memory 
performance (Koriat, Ma'ayan, & Nussinson, 2006). Cues that can influence metamemory 
judgements can be divided into experience-based (the subjective learning experience) or 
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information-based (people’s beliefs about their own memory capacities and limitations; 
Koriat, Nussinson, Bless, & Shaked, 2008). For example, metamemory judgements can be 
influenced by how quickly or easily an item is processed or accessed (Frank & Kuhlmann, 
2017) and by preconceived notions about one's own competence in the domain tested 
(Dunning, Johnson, Ehrlinger, & Kruger, 2003). In forensic settings, eyewitnesses may 
produce confidence statements or identification decisions that are partially based on intrinsic 
cues of self-capacity (Leippe & Eisenstadt, 2014) 
Brewer and Sampaio (2012) argue that confidence judgements result from the 
integration of two key components: information related to products and processes of the 
memory, and the individual’s metamemory beliefs. In this prediction, confidence judgements 
are based partly on the learning experience, and partly on domain-specific beliefs (e.g., “My 
memory is not so good”; Hertzog & Dixon, 1994). Studies investigating the role of domain-
specific beliefs in eyewitness confidence reports are sparse. Olsson and Juslin (1999), for 
example, found that individuals who considered themselves to be good face recognizers were 
more accurate and had a stronger confidence-accuracy relation in lineup identifications. 
Similarly, Perfect (2004) found that self-rated ability in the domain of eyewitness memory 
(i.e., face recognition and episodic details) was predictive of confidence judgements in a 
cued-recall task. These initial findings suggest that expressions of confidence in eyewitness 
settings may be influenced by witnesses’ beliefs about their own memory ability. 
Some longitudinal studies have shown a positive relation between memory self-
efficacy and memory performance in different tasks (Seeman, McAvay, Merrill, Albert, & 
Rodin, 1996; Valentijn et al., 2006). Regarding face recognition ability, different tests of 
subjective and objective performance have been proposed as postdictors of identification 
accuracy and proclivity to choose (Bindemann, Brown, Koyas, & Russ, 2012; Russ et al., 
2018). In the face matching literature, moderate to large correlations between self-reported 
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face perception ability and performance in objective face matching tests have been 
documented (Gray, Bird, & Cook, 2017; Shah, Sowden, Gaule, Catmur, & Bird, 2015; 
Ventura, Livingston, & Shah, 2018). However, studies focusing specifically on face 
recognition tasks have shown that individuals have limited insight into their ability to 
recognize unfamiliar faces (Bobak, Mileva, & Hancock, 2018). It has been argued that 
individuals tend to overgeneralize their ability to recognize familiar faces to situations in 
which unfamiliar faces need to be identified (Bindemann et al., 2014). Therefore, it might be 
expected that the association between self-ratings of memory capacity and objective memory 
functioning should be strongest when the self-rated ability is specific to the targeted memory 
task.  
Contemporary memory models propose that memory consists of relatively 
independent systems (Baddeley, 2000; Tulving, 2007). Different memory systems can share 
some basic features (e.g., the means of acquiring new information), but they differ in some 
other features (e.g., functions, operating principles, and underlying neural mechanisms; 
Schacter, Wagner, & Buckner, 2000; Tulving, 2007). Thus, it can be expected that perceived 
lack of ability in one domain (e.g., semantic memory) may not be predictive of perceived 
failure in an eyewitness-relevant domain (e.g., memory of faces or episodic memory). 
Metamemory questionnaires often assess self-perceived performance and functioning of 
general memory – for example, dimensions of memory ability in the Multifactorial 
Metamemory Questionnaire (MMQ; Troyer & Rich, 2002). An instrument more relevant for 
the current research is the Eyewitness Metamemory Scale, which measures self-rated ability 
and endorsement of strategies for face and person recognition (Saraiva et al., 2019). In the 
current study, we tested both self-ratings of general memory ability and self-ratings of 
eyewitness memory ability as predictors of lineup identification performance in both biased 
and unbiased lineups. 
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A lineup can be considered biased when the suspect differs noticeably from other 
lineup members so that the suspect ‘stands out’ among the lineup options (Wells et al., 1998). 
In such instance the lineup fillers are implausible, and do not serve as functional alternatives 
to the suspect (Tredoux, 1999). It is typically observed that biased lineups produce more 
guilty and innocent suspect identifications, and fewer filler identifications than unbiased 
lineups (Fitzgerald, Price, Oriet, & Charman, 2013). Filler selection is thus a balancing act. 
On the one hand, increasing similarity between suspect and fillers increases the diagnosticity 
of suspect identifications. On the other hand, if fillers are too similar to the suspect the lineup 
may be too difficult for witnesses to make accurate identifications (Fitzgerald et al., 2013; 
Tredoux, 2002). In practice, some guidelines recommend that in order to protect the 
potentially innocent suspect from false identification, the suspect should not stand out in the 
lineup by being physically different from the fillers (Technical Working Group for 
Eyewitness Evidence, 2003). Given the difficulties in producing fillers that are appropriately 
similar to the suspect or to a description of the suspect, many lineups in the field are not fairly 
constructed (Memon et al., 2011). 
Another issue with biased lineups is that they undermine the effectiveness of 
postdictors of accuracy such as identification confidence and decision time (Charman et al., 
2011; Key et al., 2017). That is because subjective likelihood judgments are often based on 
comparisons between the chosen option and each of the individual alternatives. If implausible 
alternatives are present, there is increased perceived support for the chosen option, 
consequently inflating confidence judgements (Windschitl & Chambers, 2004). Charman et 
al. (2011) found that the presence of highly dissimilar fillers inflates witnesses’ confidence in 
mistaken identifications. Similarly, Key et al. (2017) suggested that when the suspect stands 
out, witnesses tend to be overconfident and faster (regardless of accuracy) compared to 
witnesses exposed to unbiased lineups. Taken together, these findings suggest that confidence 
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and decision time, normally effective postdictors of identification accuracy, have little 
diagnostic value if the identification decision was made from a biased lineup. 
Our predictions about the relationship between lineup fairness and self-assessments of 
memory capacity draw from the literature on metamemory and task difficulty. In unbiased 
lineups, eyewitnesses need to rely more on their memory trace of the perpetrator to recognize 
one of the lineup members as a match of the remembered suspect's appearance. In contrast, 
biased lineups may be perceived as easier because fillers are less similar to the suspect and 
therefore are implausible options. This perceived lower difficulty in biased lineups creates a 
potentially misleading heuristic for metamemory judgements based on perceptual fluency. It 
has long been known that manipulations of perceptual fluency during retrieval can produce 
memory illusions (Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989). One example is the belief that a more easily 
perceived test item is likely to be an old item. As such, memory misattribution may occur if 
perceptual ease is mistakenly assumed to indicate the stimulus’s prior presentation (Higham 
& Vokey, 2000). In fact, under conditions of perceptual ease, metacognitive calibration tends 
to be weak, erring on the side of overconfidence (Chandler, 1994). Therefore, it might be 
expected that – if self-ratings of memory capacity are related to identification performance – 
this relation will be weaker for biased compared to unbiased lineups. 
 
The current study 
The purpose of this study was to test general and eyewitness-specific self-ratings of 
memory capacity as predictors of eyewitness identification performance, for both biased and 
unbiased lineups. We hypothesized self-ratings of memory capacity to be related to 
eyewitness identification accuracy (H1) and that this relationship would be stronger for self-
capacity in eyewitness-specific memory domains compared to self-capacity in general 
memory domains (H2). Furthermore, we predicted individuals with higher self-ratings in the 
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metamemory factors to display have a stronger confidence-accuracy calibration then 
individuals with lower ratings (Olsson & Juslin, 1999; H3). Finally, we expected the relation 
between metamemory factors and eyewitness identification performance to be weaker for 
biased than unbiased lineups (H4). 
Method 
The present study was pre-registered and approved via the Open Science Framework 
(https://osf.io/ymkz9/?view_only=49c11c762050470fbe45880af51512ee). 
 
Participants 
A total of 1103 participants completed the study. We applied several exclusion criteria 
to ensure data quality: (a) 34 cases were removed for taking more than 90 minutes to 
complete the experiment, and (b) 97 cases for completing the experiment in under 15 
minutes; (c) 95 cases were removed for not passing at least 4 out of 5 attention checks; and 
(d) 44 cases were removed due to suspicious bot activity (Prims & Motyl, 2018). The final 
sample (N = 744) had a mean age of M = 29.98, ranging from 18 to 72 years (SD = 12.63) 
and was comprised of 63% female participants. Most participants were workers from 
Amazon Mechanical Turk (54%), followed by university students (34%) and participants 
found through social media (12%). Participants recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk 
received U$1.00, students received course credits, and participants from social media were 
entered into a prize drawing for two £50 Amazon vouchers.  
Our sample size was determined based on the confidence-accuracy calibration 
analysis, given that it is the most demanding analysis in our design. There are no clear 
guidelines on sample size requirements for calibration analysis, so we evaluated previous 
studies and reasoned that 400 choosers would provide stable estimates for calibration curves 
with five confidence levels (Sauer, Brewer, Zweck, & Weber, 2010; Sauerland & Sporer, 
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2009). Each participant completed two identifications so our total amount of observations 
was 1488, of which 815 were choosers. 
 
Materials and Instruments 
Eyewitness Metamemory Scale (EMS). The EMS contains 23 items divided into 
three factors: Contentment, Discontentment, and Strategies (Saraiva et al., 2019). All items 
are rated on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The EMS-
Contentment factor comprises 10 items (e.g., “My ability to remember faces is much better 
than other people’s ability to remember faces”; α = 0.85) with higher scores indicating higher 
levels of memory contentment with respect to the ability to remember or recognise faces. The 
EMS-Discontentment factor has eight items (e.g., “Sometimes I have trouble recognizing a 
person that I know relatively well”; α = 0.89) with higher scores indicating higher memory 
discontentment with ability to remember or recognise faces. The EMS-Strategies factor 
comprises five items (e.g., “I often create a visual image in my mind of a face that I want to 
remember”; α = 0.81) with higher scores indicating higher endorsement of memory strategies 
to remember faces.  
General metamemory instruments. In addition to the EMS, participants also 
completed the Multifactorial Memory Questionnaire (Troyer & Rich, 2002), and the Squire 
Subjective Memory Questionnaire (Bergen, Brands, & Jelicic, 2010; Squire, Wetzel, & 
Slater, 1979). The MMQ consists of three factors: Contentment (α = .92), Ability (α = 0.92), 
and Strategy (α = 0.88). The contentment factor has 18 items (e.g., “I am generally pleased 
with my memory ability”) rated from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree), with higher 
scores indicating higher memory contentment. The ability factor has 20 items related to 
experiences with common memory errors over the past two weeks (e.g., “How often do you 
forget an appointment?”) from 1 (all the time) to 5 (never), with higher scores indicating 
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better self-reported ability. The strategy factor has 19 items concerning the use of memory 
strategies during the past two weeks (e.g., “How often do you use a timer or alarm to remind 
you when to do something?”). The items are assessed on a scale ranging from 1 (never) to 5 
(all the time), with higher scores indicating greater use of memory strategies. The SSMQ 
consists of 18 items related to the development of memory functioning (e.g., “My ability to 
recall things when I really try is”), rated on a 9-point scale ranging from −4 (worse than ever) 
to 4 (better than ever before). 
Stimulus event. Participants viewed a 75s film depicting a thief stealing a phone from 
a victim (adapted from Sauerland, Wolfs, Crans, & Verschuere, 2017, Experiment 4). There 
were two versions of the video counterbalancing the role of two actresses (victim and 
perpetrator) to better generalize the results to different suspects. Thus, in one version actress 
A was the perpetrator, while in the other version actress B was the perpetrator. 
Lineups. Every participant received two lineups, one for the perpetrator and one for 
the victim in the stimulus event. All lineups were presented in a simultaneous format and 
could be either target-present or target-absent. Target-present lineups consisted of five fillers 
and the target (i.e., victim or perpetrator) and target-absent lineups consisted of six fillers. 
Target-presence and the position of each member in the lineup were randomized for every 
lineup presentation. Pilot tests were conducted to construct fair and unfair lineups. In those 
tests, participants read a description of the target and were asked to select the person who best 
matched this description from a lineup of six members. Tredoux’s E was used as a measure 
of lineup fairness (Tredoux, 1998). Tredoux’s E takes a minimum value of 1 and a maximum 
value that equals the nominal lineup size (six in this case). If some lineup members are 
selected less often than expected by chance, E values decrease toward 1 depending on the 
number of lineup members falling below chance levels of choosing. Four pilot tests were 
conducted with a total of 123 participants, adapting the lineups to create sufficiently fair and 
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unfair lineups. The final four fair lineups (i.e., target present and target absent for each of the 
two targets) had Tredoux’ E values ranging from 3.81 and 4.57, while the four unfair lineups 
had Tredoux’ E values ranging from 1.54 to 2.56. 
 
Procedure  
 Participants were recruited to an online experiment presented via Qualtrics. First, 
participants completed the EMS, followed by the MMQ and SSMQ. The EMS was always 
shown first, while the MMQ and SSMQ were presented in random order. Participants then 
watched the mock crime film, followed by a 5-minute filler task. Next, the first lineup was 
presented and participants were asked to identify the target or choose a ‘not-present’ option, 
while also providing a confidence judgement on a scale that ranged from 0% (not confident at 
all) to 100% (totally confident). After a 5-minute filler task, participants received the second 
lineup. The order of lineup presentation was randomized for every participant (i.e., either 
perpetrator first or victim first). Finally, some demographic information including gender, age 
and educational level was requested. 
Results 
In our analysis we tested choosers and nonchoosers separately for two reasons. First, 
it has been documented that postdictors of identification performance have different 
associations for choosers vs nonchoosers (e.g., Sauerland & Sporer, 2007, 2019). Second, 
triers of fact are more specifically concerned with eyewitnesses who choose someone from a 
lineup, rather than eyewitnesses who reject a lineup (Mickes, 2015).  
 
Metamemory as predictors of eyewitness identification accuracy 
First, we focused on the relation between metamemory and eyewitness identification 
accuracy by fitting regression models with metamemory factors as predictors of eyewitness 
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identification accuracy for choosers and nonchoosers. Each participant made two lineup 
decisions. Thus, the data were nested in two levels, with identification trials at Level 1 and 
participants at Level 2. Accordingly, we first tested for the necessity of using mixed effects 
models in order to account for the nested components of the data. The lme4 package available 
for R was used for all multilevel modelling (Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2014). 
Global models were fitted including all metamemory factors as predictors of each outcome 
variable (Burnham & Anderson, 2002). All predictors were centred around their grand mean, 
subtracting the overall mean of that variable from each subject’s score. Across the different 
models, we found that the intraclass correlation coefficients for participants ranged from .00 
to .11 and ICC for lineups were all 0.00. We further conducted likelihood ratio tests 
comparing random-intercept models and fixed-intercept models for each outcome variable 
and found no evidence that random-intercept models fit the data significantly better than the 
fixed-intercept models for all outcomes (see Table S4.1 in Appendix 3). Taken together, these 
results do not support the use of random coefficient modelling (Burnham & Anderson, 2002). 
Therefore, we proceeded with estimating logistic regression models with no random effects. 
Table 4.1 provides descriptive statistics and correlation among all metamemory scales. 
Correlations ranged from r = -.55 to r = .61. Two out of six diagnostic tests pointed to the 
presence of multicollinearity in the model, but inspection of variance inflation factor, 
tolerance, Farrar-Glauber F-tests, and partial correlations revealed negligible 
multicollinearity, so we proceeded without adopting remedial measures. 
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Table 4.1 
 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations of the Metamemory Factors 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
         
1. EMS-
Contentment 
4.20 1.02       
2. EMS-
Discontentment 
3.53 1.09 -.32**      
3. EMS-Strategy 4.50 1.09 .41** .05     
4. MMQ-
Contentment 
3.62 0.70 .30** -.55** .07**    
5. MMQ-Ability 3.57 0.63 .31** -.38** .17** .55**   
6. MMQ-Strategy 2.86 0.64 .08** .24** .19** -.31** -.44**  
7. SSMQ 5.89 1.21 .61** -.22** .35** .47** .41** .05* 
Note. * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. M = Mean. SD = Standard deviation. EMS = Eyewitness 
Metamemory Scale. MMQ = Multifactorial Metamemory Questionnaire. SSMQ = Squire Subjective Memory 
Questionnaire. 
 
We hypothesized that self-ratings of memory capacity would be related to eyewitness 
identification accuracy (H1) and that this relationship would be stronger for self-capacity in 
eyewitness-specific memory domains compared to self-capacity in general memory domains 
(H2). Our first set of model testing focused on choosers, fitting one model for biased lineups 
and another model for unbiased lineups (see Table 4.2). Among choosers, higher scores in 
EMS-Discontentment (i.e., memory discontentment with ability to remember or recognise 
faces) were indicative of lower accuracy for both biased (OR = 0.57, p < .001) and unbiased 
lineups (OR = 0.56, p < .001; see Figure 4.1). For biased lineups, choosers were also more 
likely to be inaccurate if they claimed their memory improved over time (higher SSMQ; OR 
= 0.65, p = .005), but this effect was not observed for unbiased lineups (p = .83). None of the 
other metamemory factors were significant predictors of choosers accuracy for biased and 
unbiased lineups. We then repeated the same steps for the nonchoosers subset, fitting logistic 
regression models using metamemory factors as predictors of accuracy for biased and 
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unbiased lineups (see Table 4.3). The results showed that higher scores in general memory 
contentment (MMQ-Contentment) among nonchoosers were indicative of higher accuracy in 
biased lineups. However, this effect was very close to our stipulated alpha level of .05 and 
may be a spurious result observed by chance (OR = 1.43 p = .03). None of the other 
metamemory factors were significant predictors of nonchoosers identification accuracy for 
both biased and unbiased lineups. 
Table 4.2 
 
Logistic Regression Models of Metamemory Factors as Predictors of Identification Accuracy Among Choosers 
 Biased Lineups Unbiased Lineups 
Predictor B (SE) p OR [95% CI] B (SE) p OR [95% CI] 
EMS-Contentment 
0.05 (0.13) .69 
1.05 [0.80, 
1.37] 
-0.19 
(0.15) 
.22 
0.83 [0.61, 
1.11] 
EMS-Discontentment -0.55 
(0.14) 
<.001*** 
0.57 [0.43, 
0.75] 
-0.57 
(0.14) 
< .001*** 
0.56 [0.42, 
0.74] 
EMS-Strategies 
0.08 (0.12) .53 
1.08 [0.84, 
1.39] 
-0.17 
(0.12) 
.18 
0.84 [0.65, 
1.08] 
MMQ-Contentment 
0.23 (0.16) .14 
1.26 [0.92, 
1.72] 
-0.16 
(0.15) 
.27 
0.85 [0.63, 
1.13] 
MMQ-Ability 
0.08 (0.15) .56 
1.09 [0.81, 
1.45] 
-0.03 
(0.15) 
.83 
0.96 [0.72, 
1.30] 
MMQ-Strategy 
0.21 (0.13) .11 
1.23 [0.95, 
1.60] 
0.19 (0.13) .15 
1.21 [0.93, 
1.57] 
SSMQ -0.43 
(0.15) 
.005** 
0.65 [0.47, 
0.87] 
0.03 (0.16) .83 
1.03 [0.75, 
1.42] 
Note. * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. OR = Odds ratio. EMS = Eyewitness Metamemory Scale. MMQ = Multifactorial 
Metamemory Questionnaire. SSMQ = Squire Subjective Memory Questionnaire. 
 
Table 4.3 
 
Logistic Regression Models of Metamemory Factors as Predictors of Identification Accuracy Among Nonchoosers 
 Biased Lineups Unbiased Lineups 
Predictor B (SE) p OR [95% CI] B (SE) p OR [95% CI] 
EMS-Contentment 
-0.23 (0.18) .20 0.79 [0.55, 1.13] -0.21 (0.17) .24 0.81 [0.57, 1.14] 
EMS-Discontentment 
-0.26 (0.16) .10 0.77 [0.56, 1.05] -0.31 (0.16) .06 0.73 [0.53, 1.01] 
EMS-Strategies 0.06 (0.14) .65 1.06 [0.80, 1.41] 0.09 (0.13) .47 1.10 [0.84, 1.43] 
MMQ-Contentment 
0.36 (0.16)  .03* 1.43 [1.03, 1.99] -0.20 (0.19) .29 0.81 [0.55, 1.19] 
MMQ-Ability -0.12 (0.15) .42 0.88 [0.65, 1.20] 0.09 (0.17) .60 1.09 [0.77, 1.54] 
MMQ-Strategy 0.05 (0.14) .69 1.06 [0.79, 1.41] 0.13 (0.16) .38 1.14 [0.84, 1.56] 
SSMQ -0.09 (0.17) .60 0.91 [0.64, 1.28] 0.11 (0.18) .55 1.11 [0.78, 1.59] 
Note. * p < .05. OR = Odds ratio. EMS = Eyewitness Metamemory Scale. MMQ = Multifactorial Metamemory Questionnaire. 
SSMQ = Squire Subjective Memory Questionnaire. 
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Figure 4.1. Predicted probabilities of identification accuracy among choosers as a function of 
EMS-Discontentment for biased and unbiased lineups. The shaded polygon represents 95% 
confidence intervals. 
 
Metamemory and confidence-accuracy calibration 
Calibration analyses were carried out to examine the relation between metamemory 
measures and the confidence-accuracy relationship in identification tasks. Following Brewer 
and Wells (2006), calibration curves were created by plotting the proportion of correct 
responses against five categories of confidence (0-20%, 30-40%, 50-60%, 70-80%, and 90-
100%). We first produced calibration curves for choosers vs nonchoosers, and biased lineups 
vs unbiased lineups (see Figure 4.2). The diagonal line represents perfect calibration, such 
that each level of confidence is equivalent to the level of accuracy for decisions made with 
that level of confidence. Observations above this line indicate underconfidence, and 
observations below this line indicate overconfidence. We computed three calibration 
statistics: calibration index, over/underconfidence and resolution. Calibration (C) represents 
how far a given calibration curve is from a perfect calibration. It ranges from 0 (perfect 
calibration) to 1, and lower values represent better calibration. Over/underconfidence (O/U) 
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indicate if a curve strays more above or below the perfect calibration line, with values 
ranging from -1 (very underconfident) to 1 (very overconfident). The Normalized Resolution 
Index (NRI) represents how well confidence discriminates accurate from inaccurate 
identifications, with higher values indicating better discrimination (see Brewer & Wells, 
2006). Following Palmer, Brewer, Weber, and Nagesh (2013) we used a jackknife procedure 
to compute standard errors for each calibration statistic, which were then converted to 95% 
inferential confidence intervals (Tryon & Lewis, 2008). If the confidence intervals do not 
overlap, that represents a significant difference (see Table 4.4). For choosers, the resolution 
statistic showed a high capability to discriminate between accurate and inaccurate 
identification decisions, for both biased (NRI = 0.12) and unbiased lineups (NRI = 0.11). 
However, choosers tended to be more overconfident in unbiased lineups (O/U = 0.14) 
compared to biased lineups (O/U =0.03). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.4 
 
Calibration Statistics for Choosers and Nonchoosers Across Biased and Unbiased 
Conditions 
 C [95% CI] O/U [95% CI] NRI [95% CI] 
Biased Lineups    
Choosers 0.01 [0.01, 0.02] 0.03 [-0.01 0.07] 0.12 [0.06, 0.18] 
Nonchoosers 0.03 [0.01, 0.04] 0.04 [-0.01, 0.09] 0.02 [-0.01, 0.04] 
Unbiased Lineups    
Choosers 0.03 [0.01, 0.04] 0.14 [0.09, 0.18] 0.11 [0.05, 0.17] 
Nonchoosers 0.03 [0.01, 0.04] -0.03 [-0.08, 0.01] 0.04 [-0.01, 0.09] 
Note. C = Calibration index. O/U = Over/underconfidence index. NRI = Normalized 
resolution index. 
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igure 4.2. Confidence-accuracy calibration curves comparing choosers and nonchoosers 
(A) and biased vs unbiased lineups (B). The dotted diagonal grey line represents perfect 
calibration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Confidence-accuracy calibration curves comparing choosers and nonchoosers (A) 
and biased vs unbiased lineups (B). The dotted diagonal grey line represents perfect 
calibration. 
 
Next, we compared calibration statistics between high and low scorers on each of the 
metamemory measures. Following Olsson and Juslin (1999), individuals above the 66th 
percentile were selected as high scorers and individuals below the 33th percentile as low 
scorers. For this analysis, we focus on choosers, because triers of fact are more specifically 
concerned with eyewitnesses that choose someone from a lineup, rather than eyewitnesses 
that reject a lineup (Mickes, 2015; Wixted & Wells, 2017). Each metamemory group (low 
scorers and high scorers) had a mean sample size of n = 271. Inspection of the confidence 
intervals suggested that low scorers in the EMS-Contentment, EMS-Discontentment, EMS-
Strategies, and SSMQ were significantly less overconfident than higher scorers in those 
components (see Figure 4.3). The calibration curves for those measures reveal that lower 
scorers were generally better calibrated than high scorers, especially for higher levels of 
confidence (see Figure 4.4). A similar pattern of results was observed for both biased and 
unbiased lineups (see Appendix 3).  
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Figure 4.3. Inferential confidence intervals of calibration statistics for high and low scorers in each metamemory 
measure. 
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Figure 4.4. Calibration curves comparing low and high scorers in the EMS-Contentment, EMS-
Discontentment, EMS-Strategy and SSMQ metamemory factors.  
Discussion 
We investigated the diagnostic value of self-ratings of memory capacity on 
eyewitness identification accuracy and confidence, examining the relationship between 
memory self-capacity and identification performance for both biased and unbiased lineups. 
Our results revealed four key findings. First, higher discontentment with face recognition and 
person identification ability (EMS-Discontentment) was indicative of more inaccurate 
identifications for choosers in both biased and unbiased lineups. Second, in biased lineups, 
choosers were more likely to be inaccurate if they claimed their memory has improved over 
time (higher SSMQ). Third, among nonchoosers, higher scores in general memory 
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contentment were related to higher accuracy in biased lineups. Fourth, low scorers in EMS-
Contentment, EMS-Discontentment, EMS-Strategies, and SSMQ were less overconfident and 
were generally better calibrated than high scorers, especially for higher levels of confidence. 
These findings contribute to an ongoing debate concerning the relationship between 
behavioural and self-reported face recognition ability. While some research suggests that 
individuals have only limited insight into their own face-recognition ability (Bindemann et 
al., 2014; Bobak et al., 2018), other studies report that self-ratings of face recognition ability 
are moderately to strongly related to objective performance (Livingston & Shah, 2018; 
Ventura et al., 2018).  
Focusing specifically on eyewitness-identification paradigms, the current research 
provides initial evidence for a relation between self-reported memory discontentment and 
accuracy in lineup identification settings. Most notably, we expected the relation between 
self-ratings of memory ability and identification performance to be weaker in biased lineups 
compared to unbiased lineups, but this relation was similar for both conditions. This finding 
has important implications given that other postdictors of eyewitness identification 
performance are undermined in identifications made on biased lineups (Charman et al., 2011; 
Key et al., 2017). In other words, although confidence and decision time have reduced 
diagnostic value of accuracy in biased lineups, the same is not true for self-ratings of 
eyewitness memory ability. Charman et al. (2011) demonstrate that biased lineups reduce the 
diagnostic value of confidence because confidence is inflated when the lineup target is 
compared with implausible fillers. The authors also propose a scaling effect explanation for 
this finding, based on the fact that witnesses must generate anchor points when providing a 
similarity score between two faces on a subjective scale (such as a 1 to 7 scale). During an 
identification these anchor points may be affected by external factors, such as the 
dissimilarity between fillers and the target. In the case of self-ratings of memory ability, it is 
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less likely that broader ratings (i.e., “how good is your memory for faces?”) will be affected 
by situational factors such as filler dissimilarity. An individual that often distrusts his or her 
ability to recognize unfamiliar faces is unlikely to change this self-assessment when exposed 
to a biased or unbiased lineup. Therefore, specific self-ratings of eyewitness memory ability 
may be useful estimators of accuracy independently of lineup fairness. If replicated this 
finding may have important applied implications given the practical difficulties in producing 
unbiased lineups without computerized systems (Memon et al., 2011).  
Another goal of the current study was to further investigate the relation between self-
ratings of memory capacity and eyewitness confidence-accuracy relationship. Lower scores 
in all eyewitness metamemory factors (i.e., EMS-Contentment, EMS-Discontentment and 
EMS-Strategies) were indicative of a stronger confidence-accuracy relation among choosers, 
while higher scores in these factors were related to more overconfidence. This finding 
indicates that individuals who do not hold strong positive or negative opinions about their 
face recognition ability (low EMS-Contentment and low EMS-Discontentment) are more 
realistic when reporting their confidence, whilst individuals with a stronger opinion (i.e., 
either for low or high memory ability) tend to exaggerate their confidence assessments.  Both 
individuals with low EMS-Contentment and low EMS Discontentment tended to be 
overconfident in their identifications. In contrast, Olsson and Juslin (1999) observed that 
individuals who rated themselves as good face recognizers had a more diagnostic confidence-
accuracy relationship. However, in that study the authors acknowledge as a limitation having 
used single items of unknown validity and reliability, so inferences of memory self-efficacy 
from such a measure may be limited. The current data support the notion that individuals 
highly content with their own memories tend to exaggerate their confidence (Rickenbach, 
Agrigoroaei, & Lachman, 2015). The relation between higher discontentment and higher 
overconfidence seems less straightforward. One possible explanation for this result is that 
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choosers who are generally discontent with their own memories may overestimate their 
confidence precisely because they have selected someone from a lineup. In other words, if 
someone is discontent with their memory ability, but nevertheless select someone from a 
lineup, the selection may be followed by inflated confidence. Finally, individuals who 
claimed to endorse more memory strategies to encode faces were also more likely to be 
overconfident, possibly because those individuals feel that such strategies help them encode 
stronger memory traces (Chua, Hannula, & Ranganath, 2012). It is important to note, 
however, that score on the EMS-Strategies factor alone cannot inform whether participants 
used any strategies that they claimed to use. 
Our prediction that eyewitness-specific metamemory factors would have a stronger 
relation to identification performance compared to general metamemory factors was only 
partially supported. We come to this conclusion because EMS-Discontentment was the 
strongest predictor in the models testing metamemory factors as predictors of identification 
accuracy among choosers. However, higher self-perceived general memory development 
(SSMQ) was also associated with more incorrect identifications for biased lineups. 
Additionally, contentment with general memory ability (MMQ-Contentment) was the only 
significant predictor of correct lineup rejections among nonchoosers, although this effect was 
not very pronounced. Taken together, this differential pattern of results support the notion of 
domain-specific memory self-efficacy, defined as an individual’s appraisal of his or her usual 
ability in a given memory domain (Hertzog & Dixon, 1994). Our findings also suggest that 
assessments of self-capacity focused on eyewitness specific domains (e.g., face and person 
identification) are more valuable than assessments of general memory ability in 
distinguishing accurate from inaccurate identifications among choosers.  
 The current study has some limitations. First, although we tested two different targets 
in our eyewitness paradigm, we only used one mock-crime video. We reasoned that the 
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inclusion of multiple target events could generate noise and affect the power of our analyses, 
so it remains to be determined whether the current findings would replicate when assessing 
witness performance for different types of target events. Second, the metamemory assessment 
occurred prior to the lineup identification tasks. In planning our procedure, we reasoned that 
exposure to the identification tasks before the completion of the metamemory assessment 
would have affected self-ratings of memory ability to a greater extent than completing the 
assessments would affect eyewitness performance (Olsson & Juslin, 1999). This may have 
been appropriate for the aims in the current study, but future investigation should examine the 
robustness of self-rated memory ability as predictors of eyewitness performance when 
measures are obtained after the identification tasks. 
Taken together, our findings contribute to the ongoing challenge of distinguishing 
accurate from inaccurate eyewitness identifications in the criminal justice system. We present 
initial evidence that choosers who report higher discontentment with their face and person 
identification ability are more likely to commit a false identification. Further work is 
necessary to determine the generalizability of these results to different target events and for 
metamemory assessments obtained after the identification tasks. Furthermore, metamemory 
assessments can increase the diagnostic value of confidence, given the observation that 
individuals with stronger opinions about their face recognition ability tend to be 
overconfident. This is of importance because confidence statements are often used to 
discriminate accurate from inaccurate witnesses, but little is known about whether confidence 
statements are affected by individual differences related to self-efficacy. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Using general and eyewitness-specific metamemory assessments to estimate 
performance in multiple identifications 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The research reported in this Chapter has been prepared for publication in: 
Saraiva, R. B., Van Boeijen, I. M., Hope, L., Horselenberg, R., Sauer. J., & Van Koppen, P 
(under review). Using general and eyewitness-specific metamemory assessments to estimate 
performance in multiple identifications. 
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Abstract 
 
Identifications made by eyewitnesses are compelling evidence for prosecuting a 
suspect, but inaccurate identifications can have severe consequences including the conviction 
of innocent persons. Based on metacognitive frameworks, we aimed to distinguish accurate 
from inaccurate identification decisions by using metamemory assessments. Participants (n = 
203) first completed an assessment of general and eyewitness-specific metamemory domains, 
followed by eight successive lineup identifications. We found that self-rated ability in the 
eyewitness memory domain was predictive of correct identifications, false identifications, 
confidence and confidence-accuracy calibration. Curiously, higher self-rated ability in the 
more general memory domain was predictive of fewer correct identifications. We discuss the 
potential applied value of metamemory assessments as predictors of correct and false lineup 
identifications, as well as theoretical contributions to underlying mechanisms of confidence.  
Keywords: Eyewitness testimony; Memory; Metamemory; Face recognition; Identification; 
Lineup 
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Identifications are compelling evidence for prosecuting a suspect in criminal cases, 
but inaccurate identifications can have severe consequences including the conviction of 
innocent suspects (Wells & Olson, 2003). Distinguishing accurate from inaccurate 
eyewitnesses’ identifications is thus an important but challenging issue in the criminal justice 
system. Much research has focused on factors that can postdict eyewitness identification 
accuracy, including mainly confidence statements (Brewer & Wells, 2006; Sporer, Penrod, 
Read, & Cutler, 1995), decision-time (Sauerland, Sagana, Sporer, & Wixted, 2018) , and 
decision processes (Dunning & Stern, 1994; Sauerland & Sporer, 2007). More recently, tests 
of face recognition performance have also been proposed as informative estimators of 
identification accuracy and proclivity to choose (Baldassari, Kantner, & Lindsay, 2019; Russ, 
Sauerland, Lee, & Bindemann, 2018). However, very little work has focused on the relation 
between self-reported memory ability and eyewitness identification performance. In this 
study, we tested whether self-ratings of memory ability can be used to discriminate 
eyewitness’s identification accuracy and confidence-accuracy realism, based on theoretical 
frameworks of metamemory. 
Self-judgements about the accuracy of our memories are prevalent in many settings. 
A student taking a test with a guessing penalty must make that judgement, as must an 
interviewer relying on his or her notes, as must an eyewitness sworn to provide a truthful 
account. The study of metamemory, the knowledge about one’s memory capabilities and 
about strategies that can aid memory, has expanded rapidly over the years (Dunlosky, 
Mueller, & Thiede, 2016; Koriat, Nussinson, Bless, & Shaked, 2008). Much of that work has 
focused on how beliefs about memory ability are formed and maintained (Hertzog & Dixon, 
1994). Koriat et al. (2008) distinguish between two classes of cues that can influence 
metamemory judgments: experienced-based and information-based cues. Experience-based 
cues are intrinsic to the subjective learning experience, such as how quickly or easily an item 
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is processed or accessed (Frank & Kuhlmann, 2017). In contrast, information-based cues 
involve people’s beliefs about their own memory capacities and limitations. When students 
are asked to judge their performance on a test, for example, their judgements may be based 
on preconceived notions about their competence in the domain tested (Dunning, Johnson, 
Ehrlinger, & Kruger, 2003). Likewise, eyewitnesses providing information about a crime 
(Perfect, 2004) or identifying suspects (Olsson & Juslin, 1999) produce confidence 
statements that are partially based on intrinsic cues of self-capacity (Leippe & Eisenstadt, 
2014). 
Considerable evidence supports the notion that eyewitness confidence has a positive, 
albeit not perfect, relationship with identification accuracy (Brewer & Wells, 2006; Wixted & 
Wells, 2017). That is because confidence judgements are malleable and may be contaminated 
by many different factors such as biased lineup instructions (Leippe, Eisenstadt, & Rauch, 
2009), foil similarity (Charman, Wells, & Joy, 2011), and positive identification feedback 
(Wells & Bradfield, 1998). Intrinsic factors, such as memory self-efficacy, may also have an 
important role in eyewitness confidence statements (Leippe & Eisenstadt, 2014). Perfect 
(2004), for example, found that self-rated ability in eyewitness memory domain (i.e., face 
recognition and episodic details) was predictive of confidence judgements in a cued-recall 
task. Regarding identification tasks, Olsson and Juslin (1999), found that individuals who 
rated themselves as good face recognizers were more accurate and had a stronger confidence-
accuracy relation in lineup identifications. This initial evidence suggests that self-ratings of 
memory ability may be useful to estimate confidence realism among eyewitnesses, however 
the literature on the subject is sparse. 
Some evidence points to a positive relation between memory self-efficacy and 
memory performance in different tasks (Seeman, McAvay, Merrill, Albert, & Rodin, 1996; 
Valentijn et al., 2006). In the face matching literature, some studies show moderate to large 
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correlations between self-reported face perception ability and performance in face matching 
tests (Gray, Bird, & Cook, 2017; Ventura, Livingston, & Shah, 2018). However, studies 
focusing specifically on face recognition show that individuals have limited insight into their 
ability to recognize unfamiliar faces (Bindemann, Attard, & Johnston, 2014; Bobak, Mileva, 
& Hancock, 2018). Bindemann et al. (2014) argue that individuals tend to overgeneralize 
their ability to recognize familiar faces to situations in which unfamiliar faces need to be 
identified. It is arguable, then, that the association between memory self-efficacy and 
memory functioning is the strongest when the self-rated ability is specific to the targeted 
memory task.  
Current theoretical perspectives posit that different memory systems share some basic 
features (e.g., the means of acquiring new information), and they differ in some other features 
(e.g., their functions and underlying neural mechanisms; Schacter, Wagner, & Buckner, 
2000; Tulving, 2007). Metamemory questionnaires often assess self-perceived performance 
and functioning of general memory (Troyer & Rich, 2002). Other metamemory 
questionnaires focus on specific memory domains, such as the Self-evaluation of Memory 
Systems Questionnaire (Tonković & Vranić, 2011), which measures diverse systems such as 
episodic memory and semantic memory, and the Eyewitness Metamemory Scale, which 
measures self-rated ability and endorsement of strategies for face and person recognition 
(Saraiva et al., 2019). In the current study, we tested both self-ratings of general memory 
ability and self-ratings of eyewitness memory ability to estimate identification performance. 
Some initial evidence has been found linking self-ratings of memory ability and 
eyewitness identification performance (Olsson & Juslin, 1999; Perfect, 2004). However, 
these studies measured memory self-capacity using items of untested reliability and validity. 
In the current study, we examined the relation between validated measures of metamemory 
and eyewitness identification performance. Additionally, in Olsson and Juslin (1999), the 
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confidence-accuracy relation could only be analysed at a group level (i.e., individuals with 
high performance versus individuals with lower performance), because confidence-accuracy 
relations could not be computed for each participant. In the current study, we investigated 
how overconfident or underconfident each participant was in a series of lineup 
identifications. In this approach, it is possible to compute confidence-accuracy relation scores 
that are specific to each participant, which may be tested as an outcome of metamemory 
measures. Multiple lineup identification designs have minimal effects on eyewitness 
accuracy, choosing and confidence (Mansour, Beaudry, & Lindsay, 2017). Hence, we 
adopted a multiple lineup identification design to allow for the calculation of calibration and 
over/underconfidence statistics for each participant instead of calculating only group 
coefficients. We expected that: (H1) metamemory measures would be predictive of 
identification performance; (H2) individuals with higher metamemory scores would be better 
calibrated in their confidence-accuracy relationship; (H3) the relationship between 
metamemory measures and eyewitness identification performance would be stronger for 
metamemory measures specifically related to eyewitness identification domains.  
 
Method 
Participants 
To estimate the required sample size a power analysis was conducted on a pilot 
dataset of 56 participants. Pilot data were used instead of simulated data because it may offer 
more precise estimates of the variance and random coefficients present in nested data 
(Snijders, 2005). Simulations were conducted on multilevel models including metamemory 
factors as predictors of eyewitness performance scores (Green & MacLeod, 2016). The 
simulations showed that a sample of 200 participants would be required to detect an odds 
ratio of 1.30 with 80% power for each predictor. So, we set 200 as our target sample size. The 
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chosen effect size was not established based on previous studies due to lack of investigations 
on metamemory scores as predictors of eyewitness performance. Instead, it was chosen as a 
minimum effect size to be of practical relevance (Gelman & Carlin, 2014). 
Participants were undergraduate students at universities in the United Kingdom and 
The Netherlands, who participated in exchange for course credit. A total of 221 participants 
completed the study, but two participants were excluded for not passing at least four out of 
the five attention checks, and sixteen other participants were excluded because technical 
issues were reported (e.g., films not loading properly). The final sample (n = 203) comprised 
of 81% female participants and had a mean age of M = 20.22, ranging from 18 to 58 years 
(SD = 4.08). 
Materials and Instruments 
Stimuli event. Participants watched eight mock crime films, developed in previous 
studies by Colloff and colleagues (Colloff, Wade, & Strange, 2016; Colloff, in preparation). 
Each film was 30 seconds long and depicted a simulated crime (e.g., burglary, car theft, 
laptop theft, drink spiking). All the films showed different individuals acting as perpetrators 
and victims. Every participant watched all eight films, presented in a random order. 
Identification tasks. For each film, participants were instructed to try to identify the 
perpetrator in the mock-crime, in either a target-present or target-absent simultaneous lineup. 
In the target present lineups the target (perpetrator) was presented with five fillers, and in the 
target-absent lineups, six fillers were shown without the target. Target-presence was 
randomized for each film, but every participant saw an equal number of target-present and 
target-absent lineups (i.e. four of each presence type). None of the target or fillers had 
distinctive feature and all fillers were selected based on modal descriptions of the targets (see 
Colloff et al., 2016). Participants were instructed that the perpetrator may or may not be in 
the lineup, and they could evaluate the pictures for as long as needed to make a decision. 
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Metamemory assessment. Participants’ self-ratings of memory ability were assessed 
using two different psychometric instruments: The Multifactorial Metamemory Questionnaire 
(MMQ, Troyer and Rich 2002) and the Eyewitness Metamemory Scale (EMS; Saraiva et al., 
2019). The MMQ was developed to assess separate dimensions of subjective memory ratings, 
with 57 items divided into three sub-scales: Contentment, Ability, and Strategy. The 
contentment sub-scale comprises 18 items (e.g., “I am generally pleased with my memory 
ability”; α = 0.92) rated from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), with higher scores 
indicating higher levels of memory contentment. The ability sub-scale comprises 20 items 
concerned with experiences with common memory errors over the past two weeks (e.g., “how 
often do you forget an appointment?”; α = 0.89) from 1 (all the time) to 5 (never), with higher 
scores indicating higher levels of self-reported memory ability. The strategy sub-scale 
comprises 19 items focused on the use of memory strategies during the past two weeks (e.g., 
“how often do you use a timer or alarm to remind you when to do something?”; α = 0.82). 
The items are assessed on a scale ranging from 1 (never) to 5 (all the time), with higher 
scores indicating more frequent use of memory strategies.  
The EMS is an instrument comprising 23 items assessing three factors: Contentment, 
Discontentment and Strategies. All items are rated on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The EMS-Contentment factor comprises 10 items (e.g., “My 
ability to remember faces is much better than other people’s ability to remember faces”; α = 
0.82) with higher scores indicating higher levels memory contentment with respect to ability 
to remember or recognise faces. The EMS-Discontentment factor has eight items (e.g., 
“Sometimes I have trouble recognizing a person that I know relatively well”; α = 0.82) with 
higher scores indicating higher memory discontentment with ability to remember or 
recognise faces. The EMS-Strategies factor comprises five items (e.g., “I often create a visual 
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image in my mind of a face that I want to remember.”; α = 0.75) with higher scores indicating 
higher endorsement of memory strategies to remember faces.  
Procedure. The study was conducted online using the Qualtrics platform. Participants 
first completed the EMS and MMQ instruments, and each instrument was presented in a 
randomised order. After completing the metamemory assessment, participants were 
instructed that they would watch a series of films and answer some questions about them. A 
filler task lasting one minute was presented after each mock crime film. Participants were 
then presented with either a target-present or target-absent lineup and were asked to try to 
identify the perpetrator in the film or choose a ‘not-present’ option. For each lineup, 
participants were asked to provide a confidence statement about their choice using a scale 
ranging from 0% - not at all certain to 100% - totally certain. This procedure was repeated for 
all eight mock-crimes, with the film appearing first, followed by a two-minute filler task and 
then the lineup identification task. The order of the films was randomized for each 
participant. Demographic information was requested at the end of the experiment. 
Analysis approach. In our design, each participant made multiple lineup decisions. 
Thus, the data were nested in two levels, with identification trials at Level 1 and participants 
at Level 2. In a similar approach to that of Mansour et al. (2017), we fitted separate multilevel 
mixed-effects models to examine the metamemory measures as predictors of lineup 
decisions. The first model tested for correct identifications and included only the target-
present lineups, comparing the number of correct identifications of the target (coded as 1) 
versus all other decisions (coded as 0). The second model included only the target-absent 
data, comparing the number of correct rejections (coded as 1) versus foil identifications 
(coded as 0). For the whole data, we compared the number of false identifications (coded as 
1) versus all other decisions (coded as 0). The last multilevel model was fitted to predict 
confidence statements in the lineup decisions. All effects were estimated using maximum 
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likelihood, with logit link functions for models including categorical outcomes (e.g., 
accuracy) and link functions for models including continuous outcomes (i.e., confidence). 
The lme4 package available for R was used for all multilevel modelling (Bates, Mächler, 
Bolker, & Walker, 2014). Global models were fitted including all metamemory factors as 
predictors of each outcome variable (Burnham & Anderson, 2002). All predictors were 
centred around their grand mean, meaning that we subtracted the overall mean of that 
variable from each subject’s score.  
Calibration analysis was used to test our hypothesis that metamemory measures 
would be predictive of participants over/underconfidence. In the calibration approach, the 
aim is to verify if an eyewitness is more accurate about the information for which they show 
the greatest confidence. The confidence-accuracy relationship is computed across every level 
of confidence, typically in 10% increments (e.g., a scale that ranges from 0% - “not at all 
certain”, to 100% - “totally certain”). A perfect calibration occurs when the groups 
confidence level equals the percentage of accurate answers for that group (e.g., witnesses 
who express 80% confidence are accurate in 80% of their identifications). Typically, a 
calibration index is computed, comprising the average squared discrepancy for each decision 
in a given confidence level and actual proportion of correct decisions in the same confidence 
group. A calibration index of 0 indicates perfect calibration, and, as such, values closer to 0 
indicate a stronger confidence-accuracy relationship. Another related statistic is 
over/underconfidence (OU), which is computed by subtracting the mean accuracy from mean 
confidence for the entire witness sample, with scores that range from -1 (underconfidence) to 
+1 (overconfidence; see Brewer & Wells, 2006 for details on calculations of calibration 
scores). In this study, we computed calibration and OU scores for each participant using their 
multiple identifications and associated confidence ratings. This way, each participant had 
calibration scores that could be included as outcomes in regression models. Multilevel 
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models were not used for those analysis because the calibration scores are computed by 
aggregating values from all identification decisions made by the same participant. Thus, 
multiple regression models were used to analyse the metamemory measures as predictors of 
participants calibration and over/underconfidence. The Benjamini-Hochberg correction was 
applied to all p values from the regression models to account for multiple testing and false 
discovery rates (FDR; Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995). Emphasis is given to results with both 
raw p-values and FDR lower than .05, but results with significant raw p-values and FDR 
lower than .10 are also presented. 
Results 
Table 5.1 provides the means and standard deviations for all relevant lineup 
identification variables. Before testing our hypotheses, we calculated Intraclass Correlation 
Coefficients (ICC) to determine the extent to which our dependent variables varied among 
participants and lineup trials. Across the different models, we found that the ICC for 
participants ranged from .01 to .18 and ICC for lineups ranged from to .06 to .12. We further 
conducted likelihood ratio tests comparing random-intercept models and fixed-intercept 
models for each outcome variable and found that random-intercept models fit the data 
significantly better than the equal-intercept models for all outcomes (see Table S5.1 in 
Appendix 4). Taken as a whole, these results support our use of random coefficient modelling 
(Burnham & Anderson, 2002). Table 5.2 provides descriptive statistics and correlation among 
all metamemory scales. Correlations ranged from r = -.41 to r = .60, and no indication of 
multicollinearity was observed (all VIF < 1.83). 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 
 
104 
 
 
 
The raw p-values and adjusted p-values using Benjamini-Hochberg correction for all 
regression models are presented in Table 5.3. The odds ratio, 95% confidence intervals, and 
random parameter estimates for the models including metamemory scales as predictors of 
eyewitness categorical outcomes are presented in Table 5.4. As shown in Table 5.4 EMS-
Contentment was the main predictor of eyewitness identification outcomes. For each unit 
increase in EMS-Contentment score, the odds of making a correct identification increased by 
a factor of 1.41, and the odds of making a false identification decreased by a factor of 0.79. 
Considering raw p-values lower than .05, EMS-Contentment was also an indicator of correct 
rejections (OR = 1.21, p = .02), but this effect was not significant after applying a correction 
for false detection rates (adjusted p = .08). Figure 5.1 presents the predictive probabilities for 
Table 5.2 
 
Means, standard deviations, and correlations of the metamemory measures 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 
        
1. EMS-Contentment 3.96 0.86      
         
2. EMS-Discontentment 2.96 1.05 -.27**     
    [-.39, -.14]     
         
3. EMS-Strategy 4.40 1.10 .23** .04    
    [.10, .36] [-.10, .18]    
         
4. MMQ-Contentment 3.69 0.69 .30** -.22** .01   
    [.17, .42] [-.35, -.08] [-.13, .15]   
         
5. MMQ-Ability 3.50 0.56 .30** -.20** .10 .60**  
    [.17, .42] [-.33, -.07] [-.04, .24] [.50, .68]  
         
6. MMQ-Strategy 2.91 0.54 .01 .15* .26** -.29** -.41** 
    [-.13, .15] [.01, .28] [.13, .39] [-.41, -.16] [-.52, -.29] 
Note. * indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01. *** indicates p < .001. Values in brackets are 95% confidence intervals 
Table 5.1 
 
Main descriptive statistics for identification performance scores 
 All Lineups Lineup 1 Lineup 2 Lineup 3 Lineup 4 Lineup 5 Lineup 6 Lineup 7 Lineup 8 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Correct identifications 581 36 72 35 66 32 57 28 92 45 73 36 74 36 59 29 88 43 
Correct rejections 521 32 49 24 70 34 69 34 43 21 46 23 77 38 74 36 93 46 
False Identifications 386 24 74 36 43 21 37 18 57 28 81 40 31 15 47 23 16 08 
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correct identifications, correct rejections, and false identifications as a function of EMS-
Contentment, holding all other variables in the model at their mean value. MMQ-
Contentment was also a significant predictor of correct identifications, but each unit increase  
in its score decreased the odds of correct identifications (OR = 0.74).  
 
Table 5.3 
 
Raw p-values and adjusted p-values using Benjamini-Hochberg correction for all regression models  
 Correct 
identifications 
Correct 
rejections 
False 
Identifications 
Confidence Calibration Over/underconfidence 
 
Raw 
p 
BH 
correction 
Raw 
p 
BH 
correction 
Raw 
p 
BH 
correction 
Raw 
p 
BH 
correction 
Raw 
p 
BH 
correction 
Raw p 
BH 
correction 
EMS-
Contentment 
<.001 .005 .02 .08 .002 .02 <.001 .005 .003 .03 .25 .50 
EMS-
Discontentment 
.33 .57 .87 .94 .52 .72 .90 .94 .55 .73 .68 .86 
EMS-Strategies .42 .61 .03 .10 .02 .09 .02 .08 .76 .91 .03 .11 
MMQ-
Contentment 
.005 .03 .38 .57 .11 .24 .004 .03 .08 .21 .69 .86 
MMQ-Ability .05 .16 .37 .57 .85 .94 .33 .57 .96 .96 .15 .32 
MMQ-Strategy .10 .25 .35 .57 .87 .94 .29 .56 .04 .11 .91 .94 
Table 5.4 
 
Logistic multilevel models testing metamemory scores as predictors of eyewitness identification performance 
 Correct identifications Correct rejections False Identifications Confidence 
Fixed coefficients OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI β 95% CI 
EMS-Contentment 1.41 1.17, 1.21 1.02, 0.79 0.68, 0.34 0.15, 
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Figure 5.1. Multilevel regression plots of predicted probabilities for model outcomes as a function of EMS-
Contentment. Regression lines are predicted relationships and shaded polygons represent 95% confidence intervals.  
 
Considering non-adjusted p-values < .05, we found that EMS-Strategies was 
predictive of correct rejections and false identifications, with each unit increase in its score 
decreasing the odds of correct rejections by a factor of 0.82, and increasing the odds of false 
identifications by a factor of 1.19. To better examine this result, we explored a multilevel 
model including the metamemory scales as predictors of proclivity to choose in the lineup 
tasks. For this outcome, every target or filler identification was coded as ‘chooser’ and every 
lineup rejection was coded as ‘non-chooser’. The coefficients in the model revealed that 
1.70** 1.44 0.91* 0.51** 
EMS-Discontentment 0.91 0.77, 1.09 0.99 
0.84, 
1.16 
1.05 0.88, 1.22 -0.01 -0.18, 0.16 
EMS-Strategies 1.04 0.87, 1.25 0.82 
0.69, 
0.97 
1.19 1.03, 1.38 0.20 0.03, 0.38 
MMQ-Contentment 0.74 0.59, 0.91* 0.91 
0.75, 
1.10 
1.15 0.97, 1.36 -0.30 
-0.50, -
0.09* 
MMQ-Ability 0.81 0.64, 1.01 1.12 
0.91, 
1.38 
0.97 0.81, 1.16 0.13 -0.10 0.32 
MMQ-Strategy 
0.87 0.72, 1.06 1.10 
0.92, 
1.31 
0.97 0.83, 1.14 -0.10 -0.29, 0.09 
Random parameters Variance SD Variance SD Variance SD Variance SD 
Level 2: Participants 0.05 0.23 0.02 0.13 0.19 0.44 0.93 0.96 
Level 1: Lineup 0.29 0.54 0.45 0.67 0.37 0.61 0.30 0.55 
Note. * indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01. *** indicates p < .001. All p-values in the regression models were adjusted using 
Benjamini-Hochberg false discovery rate 
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EMS-Strategies was the only significant predictor of choosing (see Table S5.2 in Appendix 
4). With each unit increase in EMS-Strategies, the odds of selecting someone from a lineup 
(i.e., target or filler) increased by a factor of 1.16 (95% CI = 1.04, 1.30, p = .005).  
The multilevel model including metamemory scores as predictors of confidence 
revealed that EMS-Contentment, EMS-Strategy, and MMQ-Contentment were predictive of 
confidence statements (see Table 5.3). Higher scores in EMS-Contentment (β = 0.34, 
adjusted p = .005) were indicative of higher confidence, and higher scores in MMQ-
Contentment were indicative of lower confidence (β = -0.30, adjusted p = .03). Results from 
the multiple regression models including metamemory scores as predictors of participants 
confidence-accuracy calibration and overconfidence are presented in Table 5.5. Higher scores 
in EMS-Contentment were indicative of better calibration (β = -0.02).  
 
Discussion 
We tested the effectiveness of general and domain-specific metamemory as predictors 
of eyewitness identification performance. The findings indicated that self-rated memory 
ability for face and person identification, as measured by the EMS, was predictive of 
eyewitness identification performance. Specifically, higher EMS-Contentment scores were 
associated with more correct identifications and fewer false identifications. These findings 
are consistent with previous studies showing a relation between self-perceived memory 
Table 5.5 
 
Multiple regressions testing metamemory scores as predictors of calibration and over/underconfidence 
 Calibration Over/underconfidence 
Fixed coefficients β 95% CI β 95% CI 
EMS-Contentment -0.022 -0.038, -0.007* -0.020 -0.055, 0.014 
EMS-Discontentment 0.003 -0.008, 0.015 0.005 -0.021, 0.032 
EMS-Strategies -0.001 -0.013, 0.009 0.031 0.004, 0.057 
MMQ-Contentment 0.019 -0.002, 0.040 0.009 -0.039, 0.059 
MMQ-Ability 0.001 -0.027, 0.028 0.047 -0.018, 0.112 
MMQ-Strategy 0.025 0.001, 0.052 0.003 -0.055, 0.061 
Note. * indicates p < .05. All p-values in the regression models were adjusted using Benjamini-Hochberg false 
discovery rate 
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efficacy and memory performance (Kliegel & Jager, 2006; Valentijn et al., 2006). In contrast, 
Perfect (2004) observed that self-rated ability in the domains of eyewitness memory was not 
a useful predictor of eyewitness performance in identification and cued-recall tests. However, 
the self-efficacy measure used in that study was one single-item, so inferences of memory 
self-efficacy from such a measure may be limited. The current data support the notion that 
self-perceived memory ability for face and person identification contribute to the estimation 
of objective identification performance. This initial finding signals that assessments of self-
memory ability may allow for more accurate predictions of correct and false lineup 
identifications, although replication and further research is necessary before further 
application is considered. 
Surprisingly, we observed that higher scores on self-rated general memory capacity, 
as measured by the MMQ, was indicative of fewer correct identifications in target-present 
lineups. That seems to be the reverse of what was observed with the EMS-Contentment 
factor, which showed a positive relationship with correct identifications. It may be the case 
that individuals with higher scores on MMQ-Contentment are overestimating their general 
memory ability, which may lead to more false identifications and fewer correct 
identifications. This finding is in line with Rickenbach, Agrigoroaei, and Lachman (2015), 
who observed that self-assessments of episodic memory ability are often inaccurate relative 
to actual performance. These results suggest that while higher self-ratings of face memory 
capacity are indicative of more correct identifications, higher self-ratings of general memory 
ability are indicative of fewer correct identifications. In other words, individuals who claim to 
have a strong general memory ability, but weak face memory ability, may be at a higher risk 
of committing false identifications. 
Self-rated ability for face memory and person identification was also related to 
confidence statements in identification tasks, with higher scores in EMS-Contentment being 
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associated to higher confidence. Koriat et al. (2008) argue that confidence judgements may 
be based partly on the learning experience, and partly on domain-specific beliefs (e.g., “My 
memory is not so good”). In our data, confidence judgements were predicted by self-rated 
ability for face memory and person identification tasks, lending support to the notion that 
confidence statements stem in part from self-rated ability in a domain of knowledge (Brewer 
& Sampaio, 2012). Furthermore, we found that individuals with higher scores in EMS-
Contentment may be generally more effective at regulating their confidence judgments to 
reflect the likely accuracy of their identification decisions. This finding is consistent with 
those of Olsson and Juslin (1999), who initially found that individuals reporting higher self-
rated recognition skill show a more diagnostic confidence-accuracy relation. Interestingly, 
confidence in lineup identifications was predicted only by self-rated ability for face and 
person identification, but not by factors on general memory ability. This finding supports the 
notion of domain-specific memory self-efficacy, defined as an individual’s appraisal of his or 
her usual ability in a given memory domain (Hertzog & Dixon, 1994). 
Endorsement of memory strategies for face and person identification, as measured by 
the EMS-Strategies factor, was related to more false identifications and fewer correct 
rejections. These specific findings had a higher risk of false discovery after correcting for 
multiple testing, which means they may represent spurious effects found by chance. 
Nevertheless, we decided to discuss these results given the existence of some theoretical 
support for the observed pattern of results. Exploring this result, we found that EMS-
Strategies was the only significant predictor of eyewitness choice, with higher scores in 
EMS-Strategies indicating a higher probability of choosing someone from a lineup. This 
finding contributes to the literature on individual differences and eyewitness’s proclivity to 
choose. Baldassari and colleagues (2019), for example, found that individual differences in 
proclivity to choose in a face recognition task was predictive of false identifications in 
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culprit-absent lineups. In fact, a growing literature suggests that individual differences related 
to performance on standardized tests may offer reliable indicators of eyewitness identification 
performance (Bindemann, Avetisyan, & Rakow, 2012; Russ et al., 2018). We expand on 
those findings by suggesting that individuals who endorse more strategies to better remember 
faces may have a higher proclivity to choose in lineup identifications, contributing to more 
false identifications and fewer correct rejections. It may be the case that individuals who 
claim to endorse more strategies may choose someone from a lineup more frequently because 
they feel that such strategies help them encode stronger memory traces (Chua, Hannula, & 
Ranganath, 2012). It is important to note, however, that score on the EMS-Strategies factor 
alone cannot inform whether participants used any strategies that they claimed to use. 
There are some limitations associated with current study. First, the metamemory 
assessment occurred prior to the lineup identification tasks. In determining our procedure, we 
reasoned that exposure to the identification tasks before the completion of the metamemory 
assessment would have affected witnesses’ self-ratings of their memory ability to a greater 
degree than completing the measures would affect eyewitness performance (Olsson & Juslin, 
1999). This may have been appropriate for the aims in the current study, but future 
investigation should examine the robustness of self-rated memory ability as predictors of 
eyewitness performance when measures are obtained after the identification tasks. We also 
implemented an eyewitness paradigm with a short delay between exposure to the crime and 
the identification tasks. In naturalistic contexts, the delay between witnessing a crime and 
completing an identification task can take much longer (Valentine, Pickering, & Darling, 
2003). It may be the case that self-ratings of memory ability are stable (Lane & Zelinski, 
2003) and could still be predictive of identification accuracy in situations involving longer 
delays between encoding and recognition. However, it remains to be determined whether the 
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current findings would replicate when assessing witness performance for identifications made 
after longer delays. 
Identifying factors that can distinguish accurate from inaccurate witnesses is an 
important challenge for the criminal justice system. In this paper we present initial evidence 
that self-rated memory ability for face and person identification may be a useful predictor of 
identification performance. Participants who reported higher contentment with their 
eyewitness memory ability had more correct identification, fewer false identifications, and 
were also better calibrated in their confidence-accuracy relation. If corroborated by further 
evidence, this finding could offer the basis for an assessment tool specifically tailored for 
eyewitness identification decisions. Such an assessment could be used in addition to other 
known predictors of identification accuracy, such as confidence statements, decision time, 
and decision processes, in order to better inform decisions regarding eyewitness identification 
evidence. 
Data Availability Statement 
All data and R data analysis script files can be found at: 
https://osf.io/vu3ab/?view_only=26d1108258c8413e995320c7e0b0b084 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
Using metamemory measures and memory tests to estimate eyewitness free 
recall performance  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The research reported in this Chapter has been prepared for publication in: 
Saraiva, R. B., Hope, L., Horselenberg, R., Ost, J., Sauer. J., & Van Koppen, P (under 
review). Using metamemory measures and memory tests to estimate eyewitness free recall 
performance 
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Abstract 
 
 Using a mock witness methodology, we investigated the predictive value of 
metamemory measures and objective memory tests as indicators of eyewitness free recall 
performance. Participants (n = 208) first completed a metamemory assessment that included 
assessments of self-rated memory capacity, memory development and use of strategies. In a 
separate session, participants watched a mock crime video and provided a free recall account, 
followed by one out of four independent memory tests (i.e., free recall, cued recall, general 
knowledge or face recognition). Accuracy, completeness, confidence and 
over/underconfidence in the eyewitness free recall were the main dependent variables. 
Results indicated three main findings: (1) subjective assessments of memory capacity were 
not related to eyewitness free recall performance; (2) individuals with higher self-rated 
memory capacity had a slightly stronger confidence-accuracy relation in free recall; and, (3) 
although individual confidence and over/underconfidence was somewhat stable across 
different memory tests, accuracy was less stable. These results are discussed with respect to 
metamemory assessments and performance stability across memory tests of different 
domains. 
Keywords: Eyewitness testimony; metamemory; free recall; confidence; memory  
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Eyewitness statements are often critical in criminal investigations and may be the only 
available source of information about a crime when physical evidence is absent. Correct 
information provided by eyewitnesses can help investigators identify and trace suspects, but 
incorrect information can impede the investigative process, wasting valuable time and 
resources. Therefore, the ability to distinguish between accurate and inaccurate information is 
critical when evaluating witness’s statements. Psychological research has identified some 
factors that can help discriminate eyewitness identification accuracy, such as confidence 
(Sauer, Brewer, Zweck, & Weber, 2010; Sporer, Penrod, Read, & Cutler, 1995; Wixted & 
Wells, 2017), decision time (Weber, Brewer, Wells, Semmler, & Keast, 2004), and decision 
processes (Sauerland & Sporer, 2007; Weber et al., 2004). However, only a small number of 
studies have investigated factors that may assist with the estimation of accuracy in free 
reports (Dahl, Allwood, Scimone, & Rennemark, 2015; Odinot, Wolters, & van Giezen, 
2013; Sauer & Hope, 2016; Weber & Brewer, 2008). In the current research, we aimed to 
further investigate the relationship between accuracy and confidence in eyewitness free 
recall. We tested whether metamemory instruments and distinct memory tests can be used to 
estimate eyewitness accuracy, completeness, confidence and over/underconfidence in a free 
recall task pertaining to the witnessed event. 
 
The Eyewitness Confidence-Accuracy Relationship 
Confidence assessments may be present in many instances of criminal investigations, 
occurring whenever a police officer, lawyer or another law practitioner asks a witness if they 
are sure about a given account or identification. Lay people and practitioners in the criminal 
justice system often regard eyewitness confidence as a strong indicator of eyewitness 
credibility (Brewer & Burke, 2002; Penrod & Cutler, 1995). Many studies have shown that 
confidence can be a valid indicator of eyewitness identification performance, especially when 
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confidence statements are collected soon after identification decisions (Brewer, Keast, & 
Rishworth, 2002; Brewer & Wells, 2006; Sauer et al., 2010; Wixted, Mickes, Clark, 
Gronlund, & Roediger, 2015; Wixted & Wells, 2017). However, eyewitnesses may 
exaggerate or inflate their confidence in an identification, particularly if encoding conditions 
are bad or if biased lineup procedures are used, making confidence statements in such 
circumstances less reliable estimates of accuracy (Douglass & Jones, 2013; Leippe, 
Eisenstadt, & Rauch, 2009; Lindsay, Read, & Sharma, 1998; Penrod & Cutler, 1995) 
Most research on eyewitness confidence-accuracy (CA) relationship has focused on 
suspect identifications, but witnesses’ freely recalled memories are also highly relevant in 
forensic contexts, since most of the information provided by eyewitnesses comprise 
descriptions of the perpetrator and the event (Van Koppen & Lochun, 1997). Free recall 
paradigms usually generate a stronger CA relation when compared to forced-response or 
recognition memory paradigms (Robinson, Johnson, & Herndon, 1997; Robinson, Johnson, 
& Robertson, 2000; Robinson & Johnson, 1996). Studies focusing on free recall of staged 
crimes, for example, commonly find CA correlations of around .60 (Odinot & Wolters, 2006; 
Odinot et al., 2013; Robinson & Johnson, 1996). This stronger CA relation may be accounted 
for by the “free” component of recall tasks, because in such procedures witnesses tend to 
choose which information to report based on their confidence, consequently increasing 
metamemory realism (Allwood & Jonsson, 2005). In fact, theoretical frameworks of memory 
reporting suggest that people balance the demands for informativeness and accuracy during 
cued-recall, withholding details that fall below a pre-set criterion of probable accuracy 
(Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996; Robinson et al., 2000; Robinson & Johnson, 1996). However, 
important aspects of the CA relation in eyewitness free recall remain to be examined, 
particularly those related to individual differences in self-perceived memory capacity and 
memory functioning. 
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Metamemory And The CA Relationship 
Metamemory refers to an individual’s knowledge and awareness of his or her own 
memory capabilities, based on previous experiences and beliefs (Dunlosky & Bjork, 2008). 
This introspective knowledge is used to monitor and control encoding, retrieval, reporting 
processes, and to provide information about memory confidence (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996; 
Nelson & Narens, 1994). During confidence assessments individuals may rely mostly on 
memory trace strength, typically providing higher confidence ratings to stronger memory 
traces (Koriat, Goldsmith, & Pansky, 2000). Notwithstanding, some authors argue that 
memory confidence may not only be related to memory strength, but also to intrinsic, 
heuristic and self-credibility cues (Jonsson & Allwood, 2003; Leippe & Eisenstadt, 2014). 
Intrinsic cues have been found to influence other types of metamemory judgements such as 
judgements of learning (Koriat, Bjork, Sheffer, & Bar, 2004) and feeling of knowing (Koriat, 
2000). In legal settings, eyewitnesses might use the difficulty of the task as a cue to report 
confidence, showing less confidence for correct answers to hard questions when compared to 
correct answers to easy questions (Howie & Roebers, 2007; Stankov, 2000). Heuristic cues 
comprise one's beliefs about external factors that can help or impair memory encoding and 
retrieval, for example when eyewitnesses put more effort on recall tasks, even if it does not 
lead to changes in accuracy (Shaw & Zerr, 2003). These self-credibility cues can also be 
derived from people’s beliefs about their overall memory performance. Some could 
overestimate their ability to recall events and show overconfidence, others may underestimate 
their memory ability and show underconfidence (Leippe, Eisenstadt, Rauch, & Stambush, 
2006; Olsson & Juslin, 1999).  
Memory self-credibility cues may have important implications not only on how 
individuals report confidence during free recall accounts, but also on the quantity and quality 
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of information disclosed. Evans and Fisher (2011) argue that eyewitness free recall reporting 
is, in its essence, a metacognitive control process in which individuals strategically withhold 
uncertain responses, or provide imprecise, but likely accurate responses (Koriat & Goldsmith, 
1996). The trade-off between accuracy, quantity and precision of information poses the 
question of whether self-assessments of memory capacity relate to the completeness or 
accuracy of free recall reports. 
 
Eyewitness Recall And Performance On Objective Memory Tests  
Subjective self-ratings of memory capacity may be useful predictors of memory 
performance, but performance in objective memory tests might be more informative with 
respect to eyewitness accuracy, confidence and over/underconfidence. Some studies, for 
example, show that accuracy in different face memory tests are predictive of eyewitness 
identification accuracy (Bindemann, Brown, Koyas, & Russ, 2012; Morgan et al., 2007). 
However, to our knowledge, no research has examined the relation between eyewitness free 
recall performance and performance in unrelated memory tests, such as free-recall and cued-
recall for a non-criminal event, or face recognition and general knowledge tests. On one 
hand, some evidence shows that different memory systems are rather independent (Melby-
Lervåg & Hulme, 2013; Simons et al., 2016), suggesting that performance in one memory 
test may not be predictive of performance in other tests. On the other hand, a few studies 
indicate some stability in performance for different memory tests due to individual 
differences (Jaschinski & Wentura, 2002; Zhu et al., 2010). It may be expected that tasks 
more closely related to an eyewitness free recall paradigm (e.g., unrelated free recall or cued 
recall tests) are more predictive of eyewitness free recall performance than more distantly 
related tasks (e.g., face recognition and general knowledge). In the present experiment, we 
investigated the predictive utility of different objective memory tests (i.e., free recall, cued 
Metamemory and Eyewitness Free Recall 
 
118 
 
recall, general knowledge and face recognition) for eyewitness free recall performance, in 
order to examine stability in accuracy, confidence, and over/underconfidence across different 
memory domains. A recognition test for unrelated faces was included as a test more distantly 
related to the eyewitness free recall, in order to better examine the extent to which memory 
performance stability may change depending on similarities between memory domains. 
 
Current Research 
The idea that confidence measures are affected not only by the availability of memory 
traces, but also by different intrinsic, heuristic and self-credibility cues is critical to the 
understanding and practical utility of confidence in forensic contexts. Previous studies have 
shown that self-assessments of memory capacity improve the diagnostic value of confidence 
in eyewitness identification tasks (Olsson & Juslin, 1999; Searcy, Bartlett, & Memon, 2000). 
In this study, we tested the use of metamemory self-assessment instruments, and objective 
memory tests as predictors of eyewitness accuracy, completeness, confidence and 
over/underconfidence in a free recall task. We hypothesized that self-reported metamemory 
measures would be predictive of eyewitness accuracy (H1), completeness (H2), confidence 
(H3); and over/underconfidence (H4). These predictions are based on some initial evidence 
that metamemory self-assessments are related to identification confidence, although mixed 
results can be found regarding the relation between metamemory and identification accuracy 
(Olsson & Juslin, 1999; Searcy et al., 2000).  
Estimating eyewitness confidence using metamemory components relates to an 
important theoretical question, concerning the role of intrinsic cues on reports of confidence 
during free recall tasks. It was expected that individuals with higher metamemory scores 
would have a stronger confidence-accuracy relation than individuals with lower metamemory 
scores (H5). Finally, it was hypothesized that performance in different objective memory 
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tests would be predictive of eyewitness free recall performance (H6), and tests more closely 
related to the free recall test would be more predictive than tasks distantly related to this 
paradigm (H7). 
 
Method 
Participants And Design 
A sample of 208 participants was recruited from local and student community (81% 
female; age between 18 and 70 years old, M age = 23.25, SD = 9.33). The required sample 
size was estimated using power analysis conducted for a Multivariate Regression Analysis 
with f = 0.05, alpha = .05 and power = 0.95. The projected sample size needed for this effect 
size was approximately N = 205. Participants either received course credits or a £5 
compensation for their time. 
All participants completed a metamemory assessment and a free recall test of a mock-
crime video. In a between-subjects design, participants were assigned to one of four possible 
objective memory test conditions: free recall, cued recall, face recognition, and general 
knowledge. The dependent variables were accuracy, completeness, confidence and 
over/underconfidence in the eyewitness free recall task.  
 
Materials 
Multifactorial Metamemory Questionnaire (MMQ; Troyer & Rich, 2002). The 
MMQ is an instrument with 57 items comprising three distinct factors: Contentment (i.e., 
affect related to memory abilities, α = 0.91), Ability (i.e., frequency of memory problems in 
different situations, α = 0.89), and Strategy (i.e., use of memory strategies in everyday life, α 
= 0.84). The factor Contentment consists of 18 items (e.g., ‘my memory is worse than most 
other people my age’) rated on a scale from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree), with 
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higher scores indicating higher memory contentment. The factor Ability has 20 items which 
requires respondents to indicate how often they experienced memory mistakes over the last 
two weeks (e.g., ‘how often do you forget an appointment?’), on a scale ranging from 1 (all 
the time) to 5 (never). Higher scores in Ability indicate fewer (self-reported) memory 
problems in daily situations. The factor Strategy has 19 items related to the use of different 
memory strategies (e.g., ‘how often do you create a story to link together information you 
want to remember?’) and respondents indicate the frequency with which each strategy was 
used over the last 2 weeks using a scale that ranges from 1 (never) to 5 (all the time). Higher 
scores in Strategy indicate a more frequent use of memory strategies. 
Squire Subjective Memory Questionnaire (SSMQ; Van Bergen, Brands, & 
Jelicic, 2010; Squire, Wetzel, & Slater, 1979). The SSMQ is an instrument that assesses 
subjective memory functioning and consists of one single factor reflecting people’s beliefs 
about their own memory functioning (α = 0.93). The instrument includes 18 items (e.g., ‘My 
ability to reach back in my memory and recall what happened a few minutes ago is’), rated on 
nine-point scales that range from -4 (worse than ever before) to 4 (better than ever before). 
Higher scores in SSMQ indicate a higher self-perceived memory functioning. 
Facial recognition and general memory skill assessment (Olsson & Juslin, 1999). 
Developed by Olsson and Juslin (1999), this instrument includes two items that assess self-
reported general memory skill (e.g., ‘give an estimate of your general memory ability, 
compared to other people’s general memory ability’) and two items that assess self-reported 
facial recognition skill (e.g., ‘give an estimate of your ability to remember faces as compared 
to other people’s ability to remember faces’). Participants indicate their ability in comparison 
to the normal population on a 11-point scale that ranges from -5 (much worse) to 5 (much 
better). 
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Mock crime stimulus. The stimulus event for the eyewitness free recall task was a 
short film (2:30min) depicting a theft. In the film, two perpetrators (a man and a woman) 
follow a young man into his house. One of the perpetrators pretends to be lost and asks the 
victim for directions, and while the victim is distracted the other perpetrator steals his laptop, 
phone and keys. 
Objective Memory Tests 
Free-recall test. In the free-recall condition participants completed a second free-
recall test for a stimulus which was not associated with the eyewitness paradigm. In this 
condition, participants watched a short film depicting a cleaning routine in a house (2.5min), 
then completed an unrelated filler task (5min) before completing a free-recall test concerning 
this cleaning stimulus film (see Appendix 5). 
Cued-recall test. In the cued-recall condition, participants watched the same film of 
the free-recall test condition depicting a cleaning routine in a house and then completed an 
unrelated filler task (5min). Next participants completed 17 cued-recall questions about the 
video (e.g., what did the woman do in the TV room? See Appendix 1). Each question was 
followed by a confidence scale ranging from 0% (‘not at all certain’) to 100% (‘totally 
certain’). 
Face recognition test. Forty-five adult male faces with no unusual identifying 
features were selected from a database of faces (Thomaz & Giraldi, 2010). Faces were 
standardized in size, resolution, and background colour. During the training phase, 30 faces 
were displayed to participants in random order on a computer screen. Each face was 
presented for three seconds, with a three second inter-stimulus interval. After completing a 
5min filler task participants took part in the testing phase, in which a second set of 30 faces 
was presented, including 15 faces from the training phase and 15 new faces. Each face was 
shown individually participants were instructed to indicate whether or not the face had been 
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seen before and give a confidence judgement using a scale that goes from 0% (‘not at all 
certain’) to 100% (‘totally certain’). Participants had unlimited time to make their decision 
and proceed to the next face. 
General knowledge memory test. A pool of 38 general knowledge questions (e.g., 
‘What country is known as the Land of Rising Sun?’) was generated and pilot tested. Eight 
questions were considered too easy or too difficult and were removed from the final pool. 
Participants in the General Knowledge condition were asked to answer each one of the 30 
questions (see Appendix 2) and rate their confidence in a scale that ranges from 0% (‘not at 
all certain’) to 100% (‘totally certain’). 
 
Procedure 
First, using the online platform Qualtrics, participants completed the full set of 
metamemory measures (MMQ, SSMQ, and Facial recognition and general memory skill 
assessment, Olsson & Juslin, 1999). Twenty-four hours after completing the metamemory 
measures, participants took part in a lab session. In this session, participants first watched the 
mock crime stimulus film and then completed an unrelated filler task (5min). Immediately 
after participants received the free recall test about the mock crime. The instructions were as 
follows: “In the space provided, report all details that you can remember about the video, 
including the sequence of actions and events, and the people that were involved. If you recall 
information or specific details out of the order in which they happened, report these details as 
they come to mind (i.e., do not leave out any details.) Do not guess about details that you 
cannot remember. Feel free to use full sentences or bullet points – but please make sure your 
report is as complete and accurate as possible”. When participants finished the task, the 
researcher read through the report and marked each detail for which participants should now 
report a confidence judgement (e.g., A caucasian (1) man (1) in a burgundy (1) hoody (1) 
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stole (1) the bike (1) = 6 details). Participants were then asked to read through the statement 
and indicate their degree of confidence for each detail, using a scale that ranged from 0% 
(‘not at all certain’) and then 10, 20, 30, … to 100% (‘totally certain’). After completing 
their confidence assessment, participants took part in the objective memory test 
corresponding to their randomly allocated experimental condition (i.e. free recall, cued recall, 
face recognition or general knowledge tests). Ten per cent of all eyewitness recall transcripts 
were coded independently by two raters and Intraclass Correlation Coefficients were 
calculated for number of details = .97 (95% CI = .93, .99), and correctness = .96 (95% CI = 
.92, .98) 
 
Results 
Our analysis focused on four dependent measures in the eyewitness free recall task: 
accuracy, completeness, confidence and over/underconfidence. Accuracy was defined as the 
proportion of accurate responses reported, completeness as the total amount of accurate 
details, and confidence as the mean of all confidence statements provided for each detail. In 
calibration research, over/underconfidence can be computed as a statistic that relates to how 
well calibrated participants are in their confidence-accuracy relationship, ranging from −1 
(very underconfident) to 1 (very overconfident; see Brewer & Wells, 2006 for calculation 
details). Similar scores were computed for all objective memory tests (i.e., free recall, cued 
recall, general knowledge and face recognition). Scores on the objective memory tests served 
as predictors of eyewitness free recall performance, instead of being treated as dependent 
variables (see Table 6.1). 
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Table 6.1 
 
Means and standard deviations of the main memory performance variables 
 Proportion 
Accuracy 
M (SD) 
Completeness 
M (SD) 
Confidence 
M (SD) 
Over/underconfidence 
M (SD) 
Eyewitness free 
recall 
(n = 208) 
0.97 (0.04) 40.7 (11.4) 0.92 (0.58) -0.04 (0.06) 
Free recall 
(n = 55) 
0.95 (0.05) 30.2 (13.2) 0.93 (0.52) -0.02 (0.06) 
Cued recall  
(n = 50) 
0.69 (0.11) - 0.64 (0.14) -0.05 (0.13) 
Face recognition  
(n = 50) 
0.45 (0.08) - 0.43 (0.92) -0.01 (0.15) 
General Knowledge  
(n = 55) 
0.41 (0.15) - 0.39 (0.18) -0.02 (0.14) 
 
Metamemory Scale Scores And Eyewitness Free Recall Performance 
 First, we fitted a multivariate regression model including the scale scores on the 
metamemory assessments as predictors of free recall accuracy, completeness, confidence and 
over/underconfidence. One outlier in the completeness variable was highly influential in the 
test parameters (Cook's Distance = 0.13) and was capped to the upper limit to avoid biased 
results. QQ-plots revealed that the errors distribution in the accuracy and confidence models 
were not normally distributed. Therefore, we fitted these models using gamma distributions 
in order to obtain more robust estimates (Manning, Basu, & Mullahy, 2005). None of the 
metamemory scales were predictive of accuracy, completeness, confidence or 
over/underconfidence in the eyewitness free recall test (smallest p value = .17). Results from 
four different multivariate tests (Pillai, Wilks, Hotelling-Lawley, and Roy) suggest that the 
coefficients for MMQ-Contentment, MMQ-Strategy, MMQ-Ability, SSMQ, and the 
cognitive self-assessment by Olsson and Juslin (1999) do not seem to be statistically different 
from 0 for any of the dependant measures (see Table S6.1 in Appendix 6). Bayesian multiple 
regression models were fitted to further examine evidence for the null model, using a 
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standard Jeffreys–Zellner–Siow prior (see Table 6.2). Results revealed that marginal 
inclusion probabilities for all coefficients in the accuracy, completeness, confidence and 
over/underconfidence models were negligible (highest inclusion probability = .07; Kruschke, 
2015).   
 
Table 6.2 
 
Bayesian Multiple linear regression models including metamemory scales as predictors of 
eyewitness free recall performance 
    95% Credible Interval 
Coefficient M SD BFinclusion Lower Upper 
Free recall accuracy      
MMQ-Contentment -1.033e -4  9.148e -4  0.049 0.000  0.000 
MMQ-Ability 7.298e -5  9.946e -4  0.045  0.000  0.000  
MMQ-Strategies -1.113e -4  9.914e -4  0.049  0.000  0.000  
SSMQ -5.650e -7  4.521e -4  0.042  0.000  0.000  
General Memory Ability 4.057e -6  3.028e -4  0.042  0.000  0.000  
Face Memory Ability -1.961e -5  2.760e -4  0.044  0.000  0.000  
Free recall accuracy      
MMQ-Contentment -0.018  0.273  0.047  0.000  0.000  
MMQ-Ability -0.043  0.383  0.052  -0.110  0.000  
MMQ-Strategies 0.071  0.423  0.065  0.000  0.611  
SSMQ 0.016  0.177  0.049  0.000  0.000  
General Memory Ability -0.002  0.105  0.045  0.000  0.000  
Face Memory Ability 0.012  0.105  0.052  -0.085  0.000  
Free recall confidence      
MMQ-Contentment -0.003  0.033  0.186  -0.100  0.068  
MMQ-Ability 0.055  0.088  0.596  0.000  0.261  
MMQ-Strategies -0.007  0.035  0.193  -0.135  0.021  
SSMQ 0.012  0.032  0.302  -0.011  0.090  
General Memory Ability 0.012  0.026  0.418  -0.007  0.090  
Face Memory Ability 0.018  0.027  0.678  -0.002  0.077  
Free recall over/underconfidence      
MMQ-Contentment 2.426e -4  0.002  0.064  -8.178e -4  3.309e -4  
MMQ-Ability -0.002  0.005  0.132  -0.017  0.000  
MMQ-Strategies 1.985e -4  0.002  0.061  -8.374e -5  0.002  
SSMQ 1.333e -4  0.001  0.059  -3.329e -4  5.241e -4  
General Memory Ability 5.799e -5  8.374e -4  0.057  -1.340e -4  5.694e -4  
Face Memory Ability -4.606e -5  6.504e -4  0.056  -2.721e -4  2.763e -4 
 
Objective Memory Tests And Eyewitness Free Recall Performance 
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 We used simple regressions to test the relationship between eyewitness free recall 
performance and performance on the four different memory tests (see Table 6.3). Eyewitness 
free recall accuracy was predicted by cued recall accuracy (β = 0.38), but not by accuracy in 
the other memory tests. Confidence in the eyewitness free recall was predicted by confidence 
expressed in the free recall (β = 0.75), cued recall (β = 0.54) and general knowledge memory 
tests (β = 0.30). A similar pattern of results was observed for over/underconfidence in the free 
recall test, which was predicted by over/underconfidence in the free recall (β = 0.63), cued  
recall (β = 0.56) and general knowledge (β = 0.49) tests. Performance in the face recognition  
test did not relate to any of the performance variables in the eyewitness free recall.  
 
 
Metamemory And Confidence-Accuracy Calibration Analysis 
Table 6.3 
 
Regression models using performance in the different memory tests as predictors of eyewitness free recall 
performance 
 B (SE) B CI β t p 
Eyewitness recall completeness      
Free recall completeness 0.57 (0.07) [0.41, 0.72] 0.71 7.44 <.001 
Eyewitness recall accuracy      
Free recall accuracy 0.12 (0.10) [-0.08, 0.34] 0.16 1.23 .22 
Cued recall accuracy 0.14 (0.05) [0.04, 0.25] 0.38 2.92 <.01 
General Knowledge accuracy -0.04 (0.02) [-0.07, 0.01] -0.21 -1.59 .12 
Face recognition accuracy -0.04 (0.04) [-.12, 0.05] -0.12 -0.84 .40 
Eyewitness recall confidence      
Free recall confidence 0.83 (0.09) [0.63,1.03] 0.75 8.34 <.001 
Cued recall confidence 0.25 (0.05) [0.13, 0.36] 0.54 4.49 <.001 
General knowledge confidence 0.09 (0.04) [0.01, 0.17] 0.30 2.27 .02 
Face recognition confidence -0.05 (0.08) [-0.23, 0.12] -0.08 -0.60 .54 
Eyewitness recall OU      
Free recall OU 0.70 (0.11) [0.46, 0.94] 0.63 5.84 <.001 
Cued recall OU 0.29 (0.06) [0.17, 0.42] 0.56 4.71 <.001 
General knowledge OU 0.24 (0.06) [0.12, 0.36] 0.49 4.03 <.001 
Face recognition OU 0.08 (0.06) [-0.04, 0.21] 0.17 1.26 .21 
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 Calibration analysis were conducted to test the relation between the metamemory 
scale scores and eyewitness confidence-accuracy relationship in the free recall test. We first 
produced calibration curves for all the memory tests (see Figure 6.1). The diagonal line 
represents perfect calibration, such that each level of confidence is equivalent to the level of 
accuracy for decisions made with that level of confidence. Observations above this line 
indicate underconfidence, and observations below this line indicate overconfidence. Three 
calibration statistics were computed: calibration index, over/underconfidence and resolution. 
Calibration (C) represents how far a given calibration curve is from a perfect calibration. It 
ranges from 0 (perfect calibration) to 1, and lower values indicate better calibration. 
Over/underconfidence (O/U) indicates if a curve strays more above or below the perfect 
calibration line, with values ranging from -1 (very underconfident) to 1 (very overconfident). 
The Adjusted Normalized Resolution Index (ANRI) represents how well confidence 
discriminates accurate from inaccurate identifications, with higher values indicating better 
discrimination (see Brewer and Wells (2006). Following Palmer, Brewer, Weber and Nagesh 
(2013), we used a jackknife procedure to compute standard errors for each calibration 
statistic, which were then converted to 95% inferential confidence intervals (Tryon, 2008). If 
the confidence intervals do not overlap, that indicates a significant difference (see Table 6.4). 
The C statistic pointed to a reasonably strong calibration for the eyewitness free recall test (C 
= .02). However, examining the calibration curves it can be observed that most information 
disclosed was accurate, even those reported with low levels of confidence, so that confidence 
and accuracy in the eyewitness free recall did not co-vary systematically (see Figure 6.1). 
Performance in the face recognition was the most distant from perfect calibration, presenting 
underconfidence for lower levels of confidence and overconfidence for higher levels of 
confidence.  
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Figure 6.1. Calibration curves of eyewitness free recall and all memory tests. Error bars are 
95% confidence intervals. 
 
Table 6.4 
 
Calibration statistics for each memory test with inferential confidence intervals (ICI) 
 C [ICI] OU [ICI] ANRI [ICI] 
Eyewitness recall 0.02 [0.01,0.02] -0.05 [-0.05, -0.04] 0.04 [0.02, 0.06] 
Free recall 0.01 [0.01,0.01] -0.02 [-0.03, -0.01] 0.09 [0.02, 0.15] 
Cued recall 0.02 [0.01, 0.03] -0.05 [-0.08, -0.02] 0.25 [0.19, 0.31] 
General Knowledge 0.01 [0.01, 0.02] -0.01 [-0.03, 0.01] 0.35 [0.30, 0.40] 
Face recognition 0.07 [0.06, 0.09] -0.03 [-0.06, 0.00] 0.01[-0.01,0.01] 
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Next, we compared calibration statistics between high and low scorers on each of the 
metamemory measures. Following a procedure similar to the one used by Olsson and Juslin 
(1999), individuals above the 66th percentile were selected as high scorers and individuals 
below the 33th percentile were selected as low scorers (see Figure 6.2). Inspection of the 
confidence intervals suggest that high scorers in the MMQ-Contentment, MMQ-Ability, 
SSMQ, and General Memory Skill were less underconfident and slightly better calibrated 
than low scorers in those components. There were no observable differences between the 
resolution scores of high and low metamemory scorers.  
 
 
Figure 6.2. Inferential confidence intervals of calibration statistics for high and low scorers in each metamemory 
measure. 
 
Discussion 
 Recently there has been great interest in the predictive utility of subjective and 
objective memory assessments for eyewitness performance (e.g., Baldassari, Kantner, & 
Lindsay, 2019; Russ, Sauerland, Lee, & Bindemann, 2018). In the current study testing the 
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use of metamemory measures and memory tests as predictors of eyewitness free recall 
performance, we contribute three key findings: (1) Contrary to some of our hypotheses, the 
metamemory scales examined had no relation with accuracy, completeness, confidence or 
over/underconfidence in eyewitness free recall; (2) Individuals with high metamemory scores 
presented a slightly stronger confidence-accuracy calibration in eyewitness free recall; and, 
(3) Eyewitness free recall confidence and over/underconfidence was predicted by 
performance in objective memory tests. These findings extend our understanding of how 
eyewitness performance relates to subjective self-assessments of memory ability (Bornstein 
& Zickafoose, 1999; Evans & Fisher, 2011) and objective memory performance in different 
tasks (Bindemann et al., 2012; Morgan et al., 2007).  
We predicted that self-assessments of memory capacity and other metamemory 
components would be related to eyewitness accuracy, completeness, confidence and 
over/underconfidence. Previous studies have found positive associations between eyewitness 
free recall performance and individual differences such as working memory capacity, 
intelligence, and temperament (Chae & Ceci, 2005; Jaschinski & Wentura, 2002; Zhu et al., 
2010). In the current study, we adopted diverse measures assessing different components of 
metamemory, such as memory ability, endorsement of memory strategies, and memory 
development over time. Surprisingly, there is no evidence that the metamemory scales used 
related to eyewitness free recall performance, suggesting that intrinsic cues of general 
memory capacity may have no relation with the completeness or quality of eyewitness 
memory reports. The metamemory scales are also unrelated to the confidence or 
over/underconfidence in the eyewitness free recall, suggesting that confidence expressed for 
freely recalled information may originate mostly from memory trace strength, rather than 
self-credibility cues. Some theoretical frameworks propose that individuals freely recalling a 
witnessed event monitor their memories and control what they report in order to achieve an 
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acceptable accuracy (Evans & Fisher, 2011; Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). Koriat, Nussinson, 
Bless, and Shaked (2008) argue that monitoring process may be based on domain-specific 
beliefs (e.g., “I do not have a very good memory”) or on the learning experience (i.e., the 
experience of processing and remembering the learning material). Our findings demonstrate 
that learning experience may be more influential than domain-specific beliefs when 
eyewitnesses are monitoring which and how much information to disclose during free recall.  
Apart from the finding that metamemory measures are not predictive of free recall 
over/underconfidence on the individual level, we observed that individuals who score high on 
some metamemory components have a stronger confidence-accuracy relationship than low 
scorers in the group level. Specifically, individuals who claim to have higher memory 
contentment, self-rated memory ability, and memory development over time are slightly less 
underconfident than those individuals with lower scores in the same components. So, at least 
at the group level, individuals with higher levels of contentment with their own general 
memory ability may present confidence statements that better reflect their probable accuracy 
in an eyewitness free recall task. In other words, individuals who are not content with their 
own memories may present lower confidence statements even if they are probably accurate. 
That finding is consistent with previous results by Olsson and Juslin (1999), who observed 
that individuals who rated themselves as good face recognizers demonstrated a more 
diagnostic confidence-accuracy relation. It is important to note, however, that in the current 
research, this effect was mostly associated to lower level of confidence, given that responses 
with high levels of confidence were almost invariantly correct. That is, high levels of 
confidence in the free recall tasks were almost always associated with correct information. 
Furthermore, the associations between those metamemory measures (i.e., memory 
contentment, self-rated memory ability, and memory development) and eyewitness 
over/underconfidence were only observed on the group level (i.e., low raters vs high raters), 
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and no direct relation was observed when testing the same measures as predictors 
over/underconfidence. 
In contrast to subjective self-ratings of memory ability, stable individual differences 
in objective memory performance may be a better indicator of eyewitness free recall 
performance. In fact, in some studies it was found that performance in face recognition tests 
is somewhat predictive of eyewitness lineup performance (e.g., Baldassari et al., 2019; Russ 
et al., 2018). In the current study, we predicted that performance in different memory tests 
would be related to performance in an eyewitness free recall task. The results show that 
completeness in an eyewitness free recall was closely related to the completeness of an 
unrelated free recall. This finding seems to indicate some stability in the reporting of accurate 
information across different testing situations, which may be explained by individual 
differences related to attentional and cognitive resources, engagement with the task, or a 
combination of both (Aslan & Bäuml, 2011; Melby-Lervåg, Redick, & Hulme, 2016).  
We also observed that confidence and over/underconfidence in the free recall, cued 
recall and general knowledge tests were predictors of confidence and over/underconfidence 
in the eyewitness free recall test. This finding corroborates previous findings showing that 
individuals express confidence in a somewhat stable manner across different testing 
conditions, including eyewitness memory domain (Bornstein & Zickafoose, 1999; Jonsson & 
Allwood, 2003; Mengelkamp & Bannert, 2010). Jonsson and Allwood (2003), for example, 
found some individual stability in confidence judgements for word knowledge and 
logical/spatial ability tasks, while Bornstein and Zickafoose (1999) found that 
overconfidence, calibration, and resolution in a general knowledge and cued recall test were 
positively correlated. We expand on those findings by presenting evidence of individual 
stability not only for confidence, but also for over/underconfidence in eyewitness free recall 
and unrelated tests (i.e., free recall, cued recall and general knowledge). Interestingly, this 
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association was stronger for memory tests more closely related to the eyewitness free recall 
task (e.g., free recall, followed by cued recall and general knowledge). Complementarily, 
there was no stability between the eyewitness free recall and face recognition task, a finding 
in line with models outlining independent systems for face, episodic and semantic memory 
(Yovel & Kanwisher, 2004). Such consistency in individual’s confidence and overconfidence 
for similar memory domains may be explained by stable metacognitive cues (e.g., previous 
experience in that memory domain (Koriat et al., 2008). Taken together, our results support 
frameworks that propose domain-specific memory self-efficacy, defined as an individual’s 
appraisal of his or her usual ability in a given memory domain (Beaudoin & Desrichard, 
2011; Hertzog & Dixon, 1994). 
 Eyewitness statements are commonly sought to aid investigations or to obtain 
incriminatory or exculpatory evidence. We found no indication for a relation between 
eyewitness free recall performance and metamemory self-assessments, including self-rated 
memory ability, endorsement of memory strategies and memory development over time. This 
finding may contribute to two theoretical predictions requiring further research: (1) 
individuals may have limited insight on their own general memory ability (Beaudoin & 
Desrichard, 2011; Perfect, 2004); or (2) individuals may have accurate insight on their 
general memory ability, but such intrinsic cues have little influence on the disclosure of 
witnessed events (Evans & Fisher, 2011; Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). From a practical 
perspective, it is problematic to question the credibility of eyewitness reports based on 
general self-assessments of memory capacity. As argued by Evans and Fisher (2011), 
contrary to common belief eyewitnesses who say ‘I don’t know’ more often may be more 
accurate than other witnesses, given that they are better monitoring their reporting to provide 
accurate information. Additionally, we observed that on the group level individuals who 
distrust their own memories have a weaker confidence-accuracy relationship, presenting 
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lower confidence statements even if they are likely accurate. If replicated, this finding could 
offer a basis for metamemory assessments to better discriminate overconfident and 
underconfident eyewitnesses. Finally, we found some stability between eyewitness free recall 
performance and performance in related memory tasks (i.e., unrelated free recall, cued recall 
and general knowledge). This result lends some support to the concept of an objective test 
designed to estimate eyewitness free recall performance, an approach that has been tested for 
eyewitness identification settings (Baldassari et al., 2019; Bindemann et al., 2012; Morgan et 
al., 2007). 
There are a number of limitations that should be taken into consideration. First, the 
mock crime video was seen in the same session as the eyewitness free recall test. This 
procedure was adopted to guarantee the feasibility of the study, but in more naturalistic 
contexts eyewitnesses commonly report what they have seen after a longer period. 
Importantly, previous studies have found differential effects of self-capacity measures and 
stability in memory tests that were dependant on task difficulty (Howie & Roebers, 2007; 
Mengelkamp & Bannert, 2010; Stankov, 2000). It may be the case, for example, that the 
relation between objective memory tests and eyewitness free recall performance is weaker if 
there is significant memory decay for information about the crime. Furthermore, we observed 
high accuracy and high confidence in the eyewitness free recall reports, which may have been 
due to the nature of the task or because the interval between encoding and retrieval was short 
making the task easy. We highlight the need for research that investigates associations 
between measures of self-efficacy, performance in objective memory tests, and eyewitness 
free recall performance under varying levels of difficulty (e.g., longer retention intervals; 
Sauer et al., 2010). A second limitation is that the metamemory assessment always occurred 
24 hours before the eyewitness paradigm. In naturalistic contexts, such metamemory 
assessment would realistically occur after an eyewitness account was obtained. In 
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determining our procedure, we reasoned that exposure to the eyewitness paradigm and other 
memory tests before the completion of the metamemory measures would have affected 
witnesses’ self-assessments of their memory abilities to a greater degree than completing the 
assessments would affect eyewitness performance. While this was perhaps appropriate for an 
initial test of relationships between the tasks, future studies should examine the use of 
metamemory measures after the eyewitness task. 
 
Conclusions 
In sum, our results allow for three main inferences. First, metamemory assessments 
appear to have little value in estimating individual performance in eyewitness free recall 
settings. With reference to utility in the applied context, this finding suggests that dismissing 
or questioning the credibility of eyewitness reports based on self-assessments of memory 
capacity may be unwarranted. Second, at the group level individuals with higher self-ratings 
of memory capacity had a slightly stronger confidence-accuracy calibration. This is initial 
evidence that free recall confidence is a better predictor of accuracy among individuals that 
are not very doubtful about their own memory performance. Third, we find stability in 
confidence and over/underconfidence measures across eyewitness free recall and other 
memory tests of similar domain. If this relationship is replicated in future research it may 
indicate that individual differences or intrinsic metamemory cues (e.g., experience with 
memory issues) partly explain levels of realism for confidence judgements in memory tasks. 
 
Data Availability Statement 
 All datasets and R analysis scripts for this study can be found at: 
https://osf.io/cywtk/?view_only=aa652cf2bc7f4fdd88a6b96053192bb7 
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Summary of the Findings 
The overarching aim of the current thesis was to examine the relationship between 
metamemory self-assessments and different aspects of eyewitness testimony performance. Of 
particular interest was whether metamemory assessments might be used to distinguish 
accurate from inaccurate eyewitness evidence. Eyewitness evidence plays a major role in the 
criminal justice system, but inaccurate witnesses can impair investigative processes and even 
contribute to miscarriages of justice. Theories of metamemory provide a framework for 
understanding how individuals formulate an informative account of a past event and regulate 
the reporting of information (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996; Koriat, Goldsmith, & Pansky, 
2000). However, to date, the intersection between metamemory research and eyewitness 
testimony has not been systematically explored. To address this gap, all experiments in the 
current thesis focused on how eyewitness metamemory traits relate to accuracy, confidence, 
and confidence-accuracy calibration in identification tasks and free recall paradigms.  
In the first two experiments (Experiments 1 and 2, Chapter 2), we examined the 
predictive value of metamemory assessments and objective memory tests as estimators of 
eyewitness identification accuracy, confidence, and confidence-accuracy calibration. Results 
suggested that found that general memory contentment (MMQ-Contentment, e.g., “I am 
generally pleased with my memory ability”) was positively related to eyewitness 
identification accuracy among choosers, with no relation for nonchoosers. Additionally, it 
was observed that confidence expressed in identification tasks was stable across memory 
tasks of similar domain (i.e., face recognition). That is, confidence expressed in different 
memory tests was related to the confidence expressed in eyewitness identifications. In 
Experiment 3 (Chapter 3), we sought to expand validity of our metamemory assessment by 
developing the Eyewitness Metamemory Scale, a psychometric instrument measuring self-
rated ability and endorsement of strategies for face recognition and person identification. In 
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Experiment 4 (Chapter 4), we examined eyewitness-specific and general metamemory 
assessments as predictors of eyewitness identification performance for biased and unbiased 
lineups. We found that EMS-Discontentment (e.g., “Sometimes I have trouble recognizing a 
person that I know relatively well”) was predictive of identification accuracy for both biased 
and unbiased lineups, and individuals who scored lower in eyewitness metamemory factors 
display a stronger confidence-accuracy calibration than those who had higher scores. In 
Experiment 5 (Chapter 5), we aimed to extend these findings by adopting a repeated-trial 
eyewitness identification paradigm, in order to compute confidence-accuracy calibration 
scores for each participant in the experiment. In this study, we found that EMS-Contentment 
(e.g., “My ability to remember faces is much better than other people’s ability to remember 
faces”) was predictive of identification accuracy, confidence, and confidence-accuracy 
calibration. Finally, in Experiment 6 (Chapter 6) we examined the relationship between 
metamemory assessments and the reporting of information in eyewitness free recall. Results 
from this experiment showed that individuals with higher self-rated memory capacity had a 
slightly stronger confidence-accuracy relation in free recall, although subjective assessments 
of memory capacity were not related to the amount or accuracy of reported information. 
Taken together, these experiments provide some converging evidence that metamemory traits 
are associated with eyewitness memory performance in terms of accuracy, confidence, and 
confidence-accuracy relation.  
We now briefly summarize and integrate the main findings of each chapter in terms of 
the overarching goal of this thesis: to elucidate the relationship between metamemory and 
eyewitness testimony performance. Several aspects of eyewitness performance were 
examined across the different experiments in this thesis. We first discuss the relationship 
between metamemory assessments and eyewitness memory accuracy. Next, we discuss the 
relationship between metamemory traits and expressions of confidence, linking our results to 
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current theories concerning how confidence judgements are formed and reported. We then 
focus on the relationship between metamemory traits and the confidence-accuracy 
relationship in eyewitness settings. We also consider the relation between metamemory traits 
and reporting of information in eyewitness free recall. Finally, we discuss the results on how 
different objective memory tests (i.e., general knowledge, cued-recall, free-recall and face 
recognition) relate to eyewitness performance in identification and free recall tasks. The 
limitations of the current research and emerging findings will then be considered. Finally, we 
elaborate on future directions and the practical implications for this line of research. 
 
Metamemory and Identification Accuracy 
One of the main goals in the current thesis was to determine whether metamemory 
self-assessments might be used to effectively distinguish accurate from inaccurate eyewitness 
identifications. Although witness evidence can help solve crimes, inaccurate identifications 
can jeopardize investigations and place innocent suspects at risk of prosecution. In what we 
believe to be among the first set of experiments investigating the role of metamemory in 
identification performance, we found that self-ratings of memory ability are useful estimators 
of eyewitness identification accuracy (Experiments 1, 2, 4, and 5). That is, in our two initial 
experiments (Experiments 1 and 2), we found that an individual’s memory contentment with 
their general memory ability (MMQ-Contentment) was predictive of identification accuracy 
among choosers. In later experiments we expanded on this finding and observed that self-
ratings of memory contentment that are specific to face recognition and person identification 
are better predictors of identification accuracy compared to general metamemory assessments 
(Experiments 3 and 4). 
These findings are consistent with research demonstrating a linkage between memory 
self-efficacy (MSE) and objective memory performance (Seeman, Rodin, & Albert, 1993; 
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Seeman, McAvay, Merrill, Albert, & Rodin, 1996; Valentijn et al., 2006). Olsson and Juslin 
(1999), for example, found that individuals who considered themselves to be better face 
recognizers were more accurate in identification tasks. Other research has found that 
individuals have an accurate, albeit limited insight into their own ability to recognize faces 
(Bindemann, Attard, & Johnston, 2014; Bobak, Mileva, & Hancock, 2018). The data from the 
current programme of work suggest that memory self-efficacy (MSE) assessed by 
metamemory tools may be reliable indicators of identification performance, especially when 
the assessed MSE is specific to face recognition and person identification.  
The pattern of results observed in Experiments 1 to 5 are consistent with a domain-
specific explanation of the relation between memory function for a specific memory domain 
(e.g., face recognition) and an individuals’ self-perceived capacity to perform a memory task 
on that same domain. A domain-specific MSE can be defined as an individual’s appraisal of 
his or her usual ability to memorize and retrieve one particular kind of information (e.g., “I 
am good at remembering faces”; Hertzog & Dixon, 1994). The Contentment factor in the 
Eyewitness Metamemory Scale, for example, is used to assess individuals’ perceptions of 
their face recognition and person identification ability. In contrast, global MSE refers to self-
assessments of memory capacity across many different memory domains and tasks (e.g., 
remembering proper nouns, telephone numbers, appointments), without reference to any 
specific context (Berry, 1999; Cavanaugh & Green, 1990). The Contentment factor of the 
Multifactorial Metamemory Questionnaire is one example of a factor-analytical scale used to 
assess individuals’ general perceptions of their memory abilities. It requires respondents to 
indicate their level of agreement (from strongly disagree to strongly agree) with 18 judgments 
such as “I am generally pleased with my memory ability” or “I have confidence in my ability 
to remember things”.  
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According to MSE theory, both global and domain-specific memory self-efficacy are 
aggregates of individuals’ appraisals of their usual memory abilities over diverse memory 
tasks (Hertzog, Dixon, & Hultsch, 1990). The same theory predicts that perceived ability is 
likely to vary from one memory task to another, depending on individual differences and on 
the particular features of each task. Because perceived ability varies from one memory 
domain to another, global MSE scores tend to be less predictive than domain MSE scores of 
performance on a given task (Beaudoin & Desrichard, 2011; Crook & Larrabee, 1990; 
Christopher Hertzog, 2002). Our findings across Experiments 1 to 5 corroborate this 
prediction, showing evidence that general MSE has little predictive value for eyewitness 
identification performance compared to domain MSE specific to face recognition and person 
identification, as measured by the Eyewitness Metamemory Scale. Specifically, we only 
observed a significant relation between global MSE (i.e., MMQ-Contentment) and 
eyewitness identification accuracy in Experiments 1 and 2, and this finding was not replicated 
in  Experiments 4 and 5. Instead, in those later experiments we found evidence that 
discontentment (Experiment 4) and contentment (Experiment 5) with face recognition and 
person identification ability was predictive of eyewitness identification accuracy.  
This pattern of results reveals important theoretical and practical implications 
concerning the relation between MSE and performance in memory-demanding tasks in 
forensic settings. From a theoretical perspective, these findings highlight the importance of 
clearly defining separate systems of MSE taking into account specific memory domains. 
Theoretical models of MSE that account for specific memory domains allow for more precise 
predictions of the relation between MSE and memory performance (Beaudoin & Desrichard, 
2011; Christopher Hertzog, 2002). From a practical perspective, our findings suggest that 
MSE assessments that are specific to face recognition and person identification are useful 
indicators of eyewitness identification accuracy. Importantly, in Experiment 4 we find that 
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self-ratings of face recognition ability are indicative of identification accuracy for both biased 
and unbiased lineups. This finding reinforces the potential diagnostic value of MSE 
assessments given that other postdictors of identification accuracy (e.g., eyewitness 
confidence and decision time) tend to have lower diagnostic value in situations involving 
biased lineups (Charman, Wells, & Joy, 2011; Key et al., 2017). Although the current 
findings require further replication before any potential application in the field is considered, 
these observations highlight the potential applied value of domain-specific MSE assessments 
to distinguishing accurate from inaccurate identifications.  
 
Metamemory and Identification Confidence-Accuracy Relationship 
The level of confidence expressed by an eyewitness affects how investigators and 
triers of fact perceive the likely accuracy of the eyewitness account or identification. 
Eyewitnesses who confidently indicate a suspect as the perpetrator of a crime are perceived 
as more reliable than those that appear uncertain about what they remember (Brewer & 
Burke, 2002; Wells, Olson, & Charman, 2002). In many circumstances, confidence is indeed 
a reliable indicator of witness accuracy, but confidence can also be contaminated by several 
external factors, undermining its diagnostic value (Palmer, Brewer, Weber, & Nagesh, 2013; 
Sauer, Brewer, Zweck, & Weber, 2010; Wixted & Wells, 2017). In the experiments 
conducted for this thesis, we found that confidence judgements expressed in identification 
tasks are also partially influenced by internal cues related to self-assessments of memory 
efficacy. More specifically, we observed that assessments of MSE that are specific to face 
recognition are better predictors of identification confidence compared to general assessments 
of MSE.  
In Experiments 1 and 2 (Chapter 2), we found no evidence that general assessments 
of MSE were related to confidence expressed by witnesses in identification tasks. However, 
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in Experiment 5 (Chapter 5), we found that MSE that is specific to eyewitness identification 
settings (as measured by the Contentment and Discontentment factors of the Eyewitness 
Metamemory Scale developed in Experiment 3, Chapter 3) was predictive of witnesses’ 
identification confidence. That is, witnesses with higher MSE for face recognition and person 
identification tended to be more confident in their identification decisions, while individuals 
with lower MSE for face and person identification tended to be less confident.  
This pattern of results aligns with current theories of metamemory judgments which 
postulate that memory confidence in a given task is based on both external and internal cues. 
One influential theoretical framework, for example, predicts that metacognitive judgements 
are based on cues related to information (e.g., perceived difficulty of the task) and experience 
(e.g., previous memory performance in similar tasks; Koriat, 2000). In fact, a common 
assumption across different theories of metamemory judgements is that confidence originates 
not only from memory vividness or completeness but also from domain knowledge and 
beliefs about one’s own memory efficacy (Dunlosky & Bjork, 2008; Metcalfe, 2009; 
Metcalfe, Schwartz, & Joaquim, 1993). Various studies have demonstrated a relationship 
between internal cues such as MSE and expressions of confidence (e.g., Mueller, Tauber, & 
Dunlosky, 2013), but investigations on the relationship between MSE and confidence 
judgements in eyewitness identification settings are sparse.  
In eyewitness testimony research it has, however, been demonstrated that witnesses’ 
identification confidence can be contaminated by external factors. For example, an 
eyewitness who receives positive identification feedback after an identification decision tends 
to be more confident when asked later about the identification decision (Bradfield, Wells, & 
Olson, 2002; Palmer, Brewer, & Weber, 2010; Wells & Bradfield, 1999). Moreover, 
eyewitnesses tend to be more overconfident if implausible lineup fillers are used (Charman et 
al., 2011) or if repeated identifications are conducted (Granhag, 1997; Steblay & Dysart, 
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2016). In the experiments comprising the current thesis, we present some of the first evidence 
that confidence judgements in eyewitness identification tasks are not only influenced by 
external factors, but also by intrinsic cues related to one’s own perception of their memory 
performance.  
This finding has important implications for theory and practice because it 
demonstrates that some witnesses may tend to be overconfident or underconfident depending 
on their memory self-efficacy. Overconfident witnesses who make false identifications can 
put innocent suspects at higher risk of prosecution, while underconfident witnesses, despite 
making correct identifications, may mislead investigators to overlook correct lines of 
investigation. It has been suggested that confidence is a reliable indicator of identification 
accuracy, but only if external factors that may contaminate confidence are not present in the 
case at hand (Wixted, Mickes, & Fisher, 2018; Wixted & Wells, 2017). We expand on this 
discussion by showing that witnesses confidence statements are not only affected by external 
factors but also by internal cues related to individual differences. That is, we find that 
confidence statements in eyewitness identifications are partially based on assessments of 
memory self-efficacy. A question that arises from this observation is whether assessments of 
memory self-efficacy may be used to distinguish overconfident from underconfident 
witnesses during identification tasks.  
Olsson and Juslin (1999) found that witnesses who claimed to have good face 
recognition ability also had better confidence-accuracy calibration than those claiming to 
have a poor memory for faces. However, that particular piece of research used a two-item 
scale of self-rated face recognition ability of unknown validity and reliability. In our 
experiments we aimed to adopt more valid measures of both general memory self-efficacy 
and face recognition self-efficacy to estimate its relationship with eyewitness’s confidence-
accuracy relation in identification tasks.  Overall, we found little evidence that general 
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assessments of MSE can distinguish individuals with strong or weak confidence-accuracy 
relation. Specifically, in Experiments 1 and 2 (Chapter 2) only the Strategies factor of the 
Multifactorial Metamemory Questionnaire (a measure of general metamemory) was related to 
eyewitness confidence-accuracy relation, so that individuals with higher endorsement of 
general memory strategies (e.g., “How often do you write down in a notebook things that you 
want to remember?) were better calibrated than individuals with lower scores in the same 
factor. In the other experiments, there was som evidence that eyewitness-specific ratings of 
MSE may be more strongly related to confidence-accuracy relation in identification tasks. In 
Experiment 4 (Chapter 4), lower scores in the EMS-Contentment factor were predictive of 
better confidence-accuracy relationship among choosers for both biased and unbiased 
lineups. However, this same result was not consistent in Experiment 5 (Chapter 5), where 
higher scores in EMS-Contentment were indicative of better confidence-accuracy calibration. 
This discrepancy may be explained by the fact that analysis in Experiment 4 (Chapter 4) was 
separated by choosers and nonchoosers, while analysis in Experiment 5 (Chapter 5) 
consisted of an aggregate model including performance for both choosers and nonchoosers. 
This different analytical approach was used because in Experiment 5 participants completed 
multiple lineup identifications, and in this case separation by choosers and nonchoosers 
would result in duplicate participants in each group (see Chapter 5). 
Although the exact relationship between MSE and the confidence-accuracy 
relationship remains to be determined, the experiments in the current thesis provide initial 
evidence that individual differences in face memory self-efficacy are related to witnesses 
confidence-accuracy relation in identification tasks. This contribution adds to an emerging 
literature on individual differences as postdictors of eyewitness identification performance 
(Baldassari, Kantner, & Lindsay, 2019; Bindemann, Brown, Koyas, & Russ, 2012; Bobak et 
al., 2018). Some studies, for example, have found a moderate relationship between objective 
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memory performance in standardized face recognition tests and eyewitness identification 
accuracy (Bindemann et al., 2012; Morgan et al., 2007). With the current thesis, we provide a 
foundation for further investigations regarding the use of MSE assessments to estimate how 
confident or underconfident an eyewitness is likely to be in an identification task. One 
advantage of self-assessments of memory capacity over standardized tests of memory 
performance is that they can be more easily applied in a variety of contexts, given that 
standardized tests may be more time consuming and not readily available. Further research 
examining the potential of MSE assessments to distinguish overconfident from 
underconfident witnesses is specifically warranted given that witness confidence is both 
malleable and highly influential in court decisions (Brewer & Burke, 2002; Wells et al., 
2002). Importantly, in many circumstances it is difficult to estimate how many external 
factors may have negatively influenced an eyewitness confidence in a given case (e.g., 
occurence of positive identification feedback or biased lineups; Charman et al., 2011; Wells 
& Bradfield, 1999). If MSE assessments can reliably predict an eyewitness susceptibility to 
overconfidence or underconfidence, it may be used at any point in the evaluation of an 
eyewitness identification to better decide on the diagnosticity of this evidence. 
 
Metamemory and Reporting of Information 
 Most research on the postdictors of eyewitness accuracy and on the eyewitness 
confidence-accuracy relation have focused mainly on identification settings, without 
reference to situations where eyewitness recall information about a crime. Witnesses’ 
recollections of an event of interest can be critical in investigative processes and court 
decisions, including, for example, providing descriptions of a perpetrator or clarifying the 
facts of a crime incident. Situations in which an eyewitness is required to report information 
they remember are fundamentally different from situations in which an eyewitness is required 
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to recognize one specific target information (e.g., lineup identifications). In recognition tests, 
individuals are exposed to a stimulus and are required to judge whether they have previously 
perceived that stimulus or not. In free recall tests, individuals are required to freely report 
information they can remember about a target stimulus. Witnesses who recall information 
about an event can regulate their output in order to balance informativeness and accuracy, 
withholding details that fall below a pre-set criterion of probable accuracy (Koriat & 
Goldsmith, 1996; Sauer & Hope, 2016). This regulation process present in free recall often 
results in a stronger confidence-accuracy relation when compared to situations involving 
forced-responses or recognition paradigms (Allwood, Ask, & Granhag, 2005; Robinson, 
Johnson, & Herndon, 1997; Robinson, Johnson, & Robertson, 2000; Robinson & Johnson, 
1996). However, at present it is unknown whether witnesses regulate their reporting of 
information (and associated confidence) based on internal cues related to memory self-
efficacy.  
 In Experiment 6 (Chapter 6), we investigated this issue, expecting that witnesses 
would take into account their self-assessments of memory capacity to regulate the reporting 
of information in a free recall setting (Evans & Fisher, 2011). However, in this experiment 
we provide some of the first evidence that assessments of general memory self-efficacy are in 
fact unrelated to witnesses free recall completeness, accuracy and confidence. These results 
differ from those obtained in previous studies (Olsson & Juslin, 1999; Searcy, Bartlett, & 
Memon, 2000) and in other experiments in the current programme of work regarding the 
relation between memory self-efficacy and eyewitness identification performance (Chapters 
2 to 5). Taken together, these observations seem to highlight important distinctions between 
recall and recognition tasks. Some theoretical frameworks propose that memory monitoring 
processes may be based on general beliefs of memory capacity (e.g., “I do not have a very 
good memory”) or on the learning experience (i.e., the experience of remembering the 
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learning material (Koriat, Nussinson, Bless, & Shaked, 2008). It may be the case that learning 
experience is more influential in free recall settings than general beliefs of memory capacity, 
so that witnesses prioritize their memory traces over feelings of memory capacity when 
disclosing information during free recall. In other words, two witnesses with very different 
opinions about their own memory self-efficacy may report the same amount and quality of 
information depending on their available memory traces. This finding further highlights that 
individuals can monitor their memories and control what they report in order to achieve an 
acceptable accuracy, regardless of internal cues and beliefs related to memory capacity. 
 Although we find no evidence that memory self-efficacy relates to eyewitness free 
recall performance, this relationship needs to be examined under more diverse or challenging 
conditions. We conducted one experiment (Experiment 6) in which participants completed a 
relatively easy free recall task, involving a short retention interval (5 minutes) between the 
event to be recalled and the recall test. It might be argued that in this situation participants 
were very likely to have strong memory traces of the to-be-remembered event at the time of 
the free recall test. Consequently, the presence of strong memory traces may have been the 
most important factor underlying recall accuracy, completeness and confidence, while the 
contribution of other factors such as memory self-efficacy may have been diminished. Future 
research should examine performance and associated relationships with recall tasks of varied 
difficulty by manipulating encoding and retrieval conditions, including the use of different 
stimuli or varied retention intervals. Further examination of the relationship between 
metamemory and free recall performance seems especially relevant given that previous 
studies have found an association between eyewitness accounts and other individual 
differences such as working memory capacity, intelligence and temperament (Chae & Ceci, 
2005; Jaschinski & Wentura, 2002; Zhu et al., 2010). If more evidence is obtained confirming 
the absence of a relationship between MSE and eyewitness free recall, then it may be 
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unwarranted to discount an eyewitness account based on evaluations of memory self-efficacy. 
That is, an eyewitness may still provide an accurate and complete account even if it has been 
previously shown that the eyewitness distrusts their general memory ability. 
 
Objective Tests of Memory Performance 
 Despite the potential contributions of memory self-efficacy as estimators of 
eyewitness performance, it might be argued that objective memory tests may be more 
informative with respect to eyewitness accuracy, confidence and confidence-accuracy 
relation. In fact, some studies have found that accuracy in different types of face memory 
tests are predictive of eyewitness identification accuracy (Bindemann et al., 2012; Morgan et 
al., 2007). In Experiments 1, 2 and 6, we examined the relationship between memory tests of 
different domains (i.e., free recall, cued recall, face recognition and general knowledge) and 
performance in identification tasks (Experiments 1 and 2, Chapter 2) and free recall tasks 
(Experiment 6, Chapter 6). By testing those relationships, we sought to elucidate whether or 
not individuals present similar memory accuracy and confidence across tests of different 
domains. In these experiments, it was expected that memory tests that were more similar in 
content and format to the eyewitness memory task (i.e., lineup identification or free recall) 
would be more predictive of eyewitness performance.  
 In Experiments 1 and 2 (Chapter 2), we found no evidence that performance on any 
of the objective memory tests used (i.e., general knowledge, cued recall, and face 
recognition) was related to performance on the eyewitness identification task and specifically, 
accuracy on that task. That is, it was not possible to infer an eyewitness’s identification 
accuracy from his or her performance in other memory tests, even if the test was somewhat 
close in content and format to an eyewitness identification task (i.e., a face recognition test). 
In contrast, we found that eyewitness confidence on the identification test could be predicted 
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by the confidence expressed in different memory tests. This effect was also stronger for 
memory tests with more proximal domains, so that the strongest relationship observed was 
between the identification confidence and face recognition confidence, followed by cued 
recall confidence and general knowledge confidence. This pattern of results was observed in 
both Experiments 1 and 2 in Chapter 2. Similarly, in Experiment 6 (Chapter 6) we find that 
eyewitness free recall accuracy could only be predicted by accuracy in a cued recall test, 
while eyewitness free recall confidence could be predicted by confidence in free recall, cued 
recall and general knowledge tests.  
In sum, these findings suggest that there is some stability in how individuals report 
confidence across different memory tests, with a closer correspondence for tests of similar 
domain. Some theoretical models of memory propose that memory consists of relatively 
independent systems (Baddeley, 2000; Tulving, 2007). These distinct systems can share basic 
features (e.g., the means of acquiring new information), but differ in other features (e.g., 
functions and underlying neural mechanisms (Schacter, Wagner, & Buckner, 2000; Squire, 
2004). Some evidence suggests that an individual performance in a memory system may not 
necessarily transfer to performance in a different memory system (Conway et al., 2005; 
Redick et al., 2013). Overall our findings seem to reinforce this premise, given that in our 
experiments almost no stability was observed in accuracy across different memory tests. 
Interestingly, we do observe that confidence judgements are somewhat stable across different 
memory tasks. So, although individuals may have poorer or better performance depending on 
the memory task at hand, their confidence tends to remain similar across the different tasks 
(Bornstein & Zickafoose, 1999). This finding may be explained by theoretical frameworks 
proposing that confidence judgments are not only based on memory traces, but also on 
intrinsic cues related to memory capacity (Koriat, 2000). That is, individuals may present 
stable confidence judgements across different memory tasks because they hold stable 
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opinions and beliefs about their general memory performance. If this hypothesis is further 
corroborated, it may represent a foundation for assessments of confidence in objective 
memory tests to estimate witness’s confidence in identification or free recall settings 
(Bornstein & Zickafoose, 1999). 
 
Methodological Limitations  
In order to best interpret the findings and implications of the current programme of 
work it is important to consider a number of methodological limitations in this set of 
experiments. First, it is important to note that across our experiments examining the 
relationship between metamemory and eyewitness memory performance there was a short 
retention interval between the event of interest (e.g., mock crime) and the memory test (e.g., 
lineup identification or free recall task). In most of the experiments (Experiments 1, 2, 4, 5 
and 6) participants first watched the event of interest, then took part in a short distractor task 
(approximately 5 to 10 minutes) and then completed the memory task. Our main rationale for 
using a short retention interval was almost entirely pragmatic. We reasoned that a long 
retention interval between the target event and the memory task would greatly increase the 
practical difficulties in recruiting the sample sizes needed for each experiment. We also 
reasoned that the cleanest relational effects would be observed in the context of a short 
interval before much forgetting had taken place. However, eyewitnesses accounts in real 
world cases are often obtained after a longer retention interval reaching weeks or months in 
some cases (Behrman & Davey, 2001; Horry, Halford, Brewer, Milne, & Bull, 2014). Future 
studies examining the relation between self-assessments of metamemory and eyewitness 
memory performance may benefit from testing longer retention intervals. Indeed, it may be 
expected, for example, that internal cues related to memory self-efficacy may be more 
predictive of how witness’s express confidence in identification tasks after a delay. The 
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rationale for this prediction is that memory traces associated to the perpetrators identity tend 
to fade as retention intervals increases (Palmer et al., 2013; Sauer et al., 2010), so witnesses 
may rely more on stable internal cues (e.g., memory self-efficacy for face recognition) to 
estimate their identification accuracy. It is also important to further examine the diagnostic 
value of metamemory assessments as estimators of eyewitness identification accuracy and 
longer periods of retention interval. 
Another important limitation concerns the order of metamemory assessments and the 
eyewitness paradigms. In our experiments, we decided to conduct the metamemory 
assessments prior to the eyewitness paradigm, in either separate sessions (Experiments 1 and 
2, Chapter 2) or in the same session (Experiments 4 and 5, Chapters 4 and 5). However, 
this order does not replicate what would occur in real case scenarios, given that metamemory 
assessments would most likely be obtained after an identification decision or an eyewitness 
account has already been obtained. In our experiments, we were mostly concerned with 
possible confounding variables affecting the metamemory assessments rather than any 
possible effects that conducting the metamemory assessments might have on eyewitness 
memory performance. With this reasoning we expected that completing an eyewitness 
paradigm would affect the assessments of memory self-efficacy to a greater extent than the 
assessments would affect eyewitness performance. Although this approach may be adequate 
for our current goals, it is still important to examine whether the findings obtained in our 
experiments can be replicated when obtaining metamemory assessments after the eyewitness 
paradigm has occurred. 
It is also important to note that our materials had some degree of artificiality 
compared to what occurs in a real eyewitness context. For example, in our experiments we 
adopted mock-crime videos as the main to-be-remembered stimuli, instead of live simulations 
of a target event. Although some evidence suggests that eyewitness performance does not 
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differ between video and live interactions (Pozzulo, Crescini, & Panton, 2008), it is still 
important to examine if our findings can be replicated in more naturalistic contexts. We chose 
to use videos in our experiments due to pragmatic reasons, given that the use of live scenarios 
would be very resource intensive in order to achieve our desired sample sizes. With this 
approach, we were also able to use more diverse stimuli containing different targets and types 
of mock crime, which may allow us to better generalize our findings. Finally, by using mock-
crime videos we were able to conduct our experiments on online settings, allowing us to 
reach a more diverse sample other than college students. 
 
Implications of this Research 
 The criminal justice system relies heavily on eyewitness accounts and identifications, 
especially when other types of physical evidence are lacking. A notable issue involving 
eyewitness evidence is that retrieved memories may not always be accurate, and witnesses 
can misinterpret the facts of a crime or wrongly identify an innocent suspect, even if the 
witness provides an honest testimony. Psychological research has greatly advanced our 
understanding of factors that can contaminate witnesses memories, so that it is now possible 
to better evaluate the diagnostic value of this type of evidence in a case-by-base manner 
(Lindsay, Ross, Don Read, & Toglia, 2013; Wixted et al., 2018). However, confidently 
distinguishing accurate from inaccurate eyewitness evidence remains a major challenge 
because only a few effective postdictors of eyewitness performance have been identified so 
far. It has been extensively demonstrated, for example, that eyewitnesses confidence have a 
positive albeit not perfect relationship with identification accuracy (Palmer et al., 2013; Sauer 
et al., 2010; Wixted & Wells, 2017), and witnesses who are faster in their identifications tend 
to be more accurate than those who take a longer time to decide whether the perpetrator is 
present or not in a lineup (Sauerland & Sporer, 2007; Weber, Brewer, Wells, Semmler, & 
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Keast, 2004). The current thesis makes a unique contribution to this line of research by 
presenting evidence that some metamemory assessments can be useful in estimating 
identification accuracy and on elucidating how witnesses express their confidence. 
 Perhaps of most applied value, we present initial evidence that metamemory 
assessments specific to face recognition and person identification are predictive of eyewitness 
identification performance. Importantly, we find that metamemory assessments are predictive 
of identification performance even when biased lineups are presented to witnesses, a situation 
which often diminishes the diagnostic value of other postdictors of identification accuracy. 
Considering the limitations inherent in our experiments, it is too early to recommend the use 
of metamemory assessments to distinguish accurate from inaccurate identifications. Before 
applied use is warranted, it will be important to establish whether our findings can be 
replicated in more naturalistic settings, including metamemory assessments after the 
identification task has been completed. Nevertheless, our findings lay the foundation for 
further research examining this issue. Given the results obtained across our experiments, we 
highlight the importance of adopting valid metamemory assessments that are specifically 
related to the memory demands present in identification settings. This line of research would 
also greatly benefit from studies examining the predictive value of metamemory assessments 
obtained after the identification task has occurred. Additionally, it is important to consider the 
practical challenges of adopting such measures in practice, by possibly refining the 
assessments so that the same constructs can be measured with more concise scales. With 
further replication of these findings, metamemory assessments could be used in addition to 
other predictors of identification accuracy, such as confidence judgements, decision time and 
decision processes, in order to better inform decisions regarding eyewitness identification 
evidence.  
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 One clear positive benefit of using valid metamemory assessments in practice is that it 
may assist the evaluation of eyewitness evidence accuracy. This in-depth evaluation of the 
diagnosticity of eyewitness evidence is important for investigators and triers of fact, resulting 
in better decisions regarding lines of investigation and the likely guilty of a suspect. 
However, it must also be noted that metamemory assessments may also have negative effects 
in practice. That is because psychometric assessments may be constructed in numerous ways 
with varying degrees of validity. Therefore, it is crucial to consider adequate methodological 
approaches and standards of validity to build a solid foundation for the use of metamemory 
assessments in practice. In the current programme of work, we aimed to adopt the highest 
standards in scientific practice, including preregistrations of experiments in open science 
platforms and estimation of required sample sizes via power analysis. Although further 
replication of our findings is required, we provide a basis for future studies examining the 
utility of metamemory assessments in field work.  
In addition to practical implications, the current thesis has important contributions to 
theory. We consistently observed some stability in confidence judgements across tests of 
different domains, supporting predictions that metamemory judgements are based partially on 
stable internal cues related to memory capacity (Nelson, 1990). In fact, we also obtained 
extensive evidence of a direct relation between valid measures of memory self-efficacy and 
confidence judgements in eyewitness identification and free recall tasks. These findings 
support the importance of dispositional factors in how one approaches memory confidence 
judgements. That is, individuals do seem to use a variety of external and internal cues when 
assessing how likely a specific information is recalled or recognized (Koriat, 2000; Leippe & 
Eisenstadt, 2014). We further contribute to theoretical developments on metamnemonic 
judgements by demonstrating that domain specific memory self-efficacy is more strongly 
related to confidence judgements, compared to general assessments of memory self-efficacy. 
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Therefore, it is important that theoretical models of confidence judgements take into account 
that individuals have distinct self-efficacy for different memory domains, and confidence 
judgements will be mostly related to the memory self-efficacy representing the task at hand. 
 
Future Research Directions 
 There are several interesting routes to further extend the work described in this thesis. 
In order to address the limitations in our experiments, future studies could: i) adopt varied 
degrees of retention interval in their paradigms; ii) test metamemory assessments after 
exposure to the target event; and iii) adopt naturalistic target events such as staged mock-
crimes or real interactions (e.g., Valentine & Mesout, 2009). One important line of research 
to be explored is how metamemory relates to different types or categories of witness, in 
particular the performance of older witnesses. Senior citizens are increasingly active in 
society, which in turn means they are more likely to become involved in the Criminal Justice 
System by being victims or witnesses of accidents and crimes (Rothman, Dunlop, & Pamela, 
2004). It is important to examine whether our findings replicate or differ when assessing 
elder witnesses, given that both memory and meta-mnemonic mechanisms are age related 
(Grady & Craik, 2000). There is a general agreement that not only memory, but also 
metamemory processes declines from early to late adulthood (Henkel, Toglia, Ross, Pozzulu, 
& Pica, 2014). Therefore, it remains to be examined whether the results obtained in the 
current programme of research would replicate in the elderly population. 
Another line of research yet to be explored is the relationship between metamemory 
and susceptibility to memory misinformation. Several studies point to a relation between 
eyewitness susceptibility to misinformation and individual differences such as working 
memory capacity, intelligence and temperament (Chae & Ceci, 2005; Jaschinski & Wentura, 
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2002; Zhu et al., 2010). Therefore, it remains to be examined whether self-ratings of memory 
capacity are related to resistance or susceptibility to misinformation.  
Finally, it would appear that there are pervasive gaps in our knowledge regarding the 
structure and dimensionality of metamemory constructs. Metamemory instruments and 
paradigms have shown predictive value for a variety of cognitive processes, but the 
conceptualization and dimensionality of metamemory is a critical point of debate that 
requires further investigation (Dunlosky & Bjork 2008). It is still unclear, for example, how 
many distinguishable dimensions are associated to metamemory (e.g., contentment, ability, 
strategies), and how those dimensions relate to each other. We recommend the examination 
of the multidimensional structure of metamemory by conducting exploratory and 
confirmatory factor analysis on diverse metamemory self-assessment tools (i.e., Troyer and 
Rich 2002; Squire et al. 1979; Bergen et al. 2010). A better understanding on the dimensions 
of metamemory may results in more complete and accurate theories that can generate precise 
testable hypotheses.  
Conclusion 
In the current programme of work, our efforts were focused towards elucidating the 
relation between metamemory and eyewitness identification accuracy, confidence and 
confidence-accuracy relation. With this set of experiments, we advance the thesis that in 
order to improve or better estimate eyewitness memory accuracy, it is crucial to understand 
how people monitor and evaluate their own memory cognitive processes. Specifically, we 
contribute to our understanding of the relation between self-assessments of memory-efficacy 
and eyewitnesses’ performance. With this new knowledge, we provide a solid foundation for 
research investigating the relation between metamemory assessments and eyewitness 
memory accuracy and confidence in the future. Although still in its infancy, this line of 
research has important implications for the understanding and application of postdictors of 
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eyewitness accuracy, ultimately contributing to a better evaluation of eyewitness evidence in 
the criminal justice system.
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APPENDIX 1 
Chapters 2 and 6 
 
Cued-Recall questions about the video 
 
Now we would like to ask you some questions about the video you just watched. To answer the 
questions, consider that the name of the woman in the video is Lisa. We will also ask you to give a 
confidence rating for each one of your answers, in a scale that ranges from 0% (‘not at all certain’) 
and then 10, 20, 30, … to 100% (‘totally certain’). If you do not know the answer for a question 
write something and assign your confidence rating as 0. 
1. What did Lisa do in the room with the sofa? _______________________________________ 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
2. What was the colour of the sofa? ________________________________________________ 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
3. What was the colour of Lisa’s hoodie/sweatshirt? ___________________________________ 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
4. What was the first vegetable Lisa chops in the kitchen? ______________________________ 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
5. What brand or make is Lisa’s hoodie/sweatshirt? ___________________________________ 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
6. What did Lisa do in the room with a view of the garden? _____________________________ 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
7. How many pans did Lisa use to cook her food? _____________________________________ 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
8. What room was the washing machine in? _________________________________________ 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
9. What kind of footwear was Lisa wearing? _________________________________________ 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
10. How many cushions were there on the sofa? _______________________________________ 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
11. What did Lisa do in the kitchen before cooking? ____________________________________ 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
12. What colour was Lisa’s trousers? ________________________________________________ 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
13. One of the cushions on the sofa was a different shape to the others; which shape was it? _____ 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
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14. What did Lisa do in the TV room? ________________________________________________ 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
15. How would you describe Lisa’s hairstyle? __________________________________________ 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
16. What colour was the phone in the room with the sofa? ________________________________ 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
17. In the room with a view into the garden, what object was hanging on a chair? ____________ 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
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APPENDIX 2 
Chapters 2 and 6 
General Knowledge Questions 
Now we will ask you to answer some general knowledge questions. Please, try to complete 
this task in the best way you can. There is no problem if you do not know all the answers, but try your 
best. We will also ask you to give a confidence rating for each one of your answers, in a scale that 
ranges from 0% (‘not at all certain’) and then 10, 20, 30, … to 100% (‘totally certain’). If you do 
not know the answer for a question write something and assign your confidence rating as 0. 
1. What kind of celestial body is the moon?   __________________________________ 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
2. Who discovered the magnetic field of electric current?  ________________________ 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
3. In what country is the Yellow Stone National Park? __________________________ 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
4. What was the first metal used by the man? __________________________________ 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
5. What is the world largest desert? __________________________________________ 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
6. In what country is the mount Everest located? ________________________________ 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
7. What is the device used for measuring altitudes? _____________________________ 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
8. What country is known as the Land of Rising Sun? ___________________________ 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
9. Deficiency of Iron in the blood leads to…? __________________________________ 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
10. Which is the hottest planet in the solar system? _______________________________ 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
11. Which gas is used for the preparation of Soda water? __________________________ 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
12. Which country lost the largest number of people in the 2nd world war? ___________ 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
13. What type of animal is Bambi? ___________________________________________ 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
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14. What part of the body produces insulin? ____________________________________ 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
15. Who was the Greek or Roman God of War? _________________________________ 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
16. What is the religion of the Dalai Lama? _____________________________________ 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
17. What is the name of the poker hand containing three of a kind and a pair? _________ 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
18. Tony Awards are presented in which field of the arts? _________________________ 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
19. How many legs does an ant have? _________________________________________ 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
20. Which gas in our atmosphere protects Earth from ultra violet radiation? ___________ 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
21. In which country were the 2008 Olympic Games held? ________________________ 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
22. What type of music did Louis Armstrong play? ______________________________ 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
23. What do we call the study of birds? ________________________________________ 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
24. Who was the only person to win a Nobel Prize in two different sciences? __________ 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
25. Who killed Goliath? ____________________________________________________ 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
26. Which is the longest river on the earth? _____________________________________ 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
27. Who was the first person to walk on the moon? ______________________________ 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
28. What is the most populous country in the world? _____________________________ 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
29. What was the name of the town which was the birthplace of Jesus Christ? _________ 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
30. Cirrus or cumulus are examples of…? ______________________________________ 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
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APPENDIX 3 
Chapter 4 
 
 
 
 
  
Table S4.1 
 
Model Fit Indices for Fixed Intercept Models (Model 1) and Random Intercept Models (Model 2) for Each Condition 
 Biased Unbiased 
 Choosers Nonchoosers Choosers Nonchoosers 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Log likelihood -248.54 -247.92 -196.96 -196.96 -265.86 -265.40 -196.06 -196.06 
AIC 513.08 515.84 409.92 413.92 547.72 550.80 408.11 412.11 
BIC 545.29 556.09 440.46 452.09 579.67 590.74 438.67 450.31 
ICC Participant - 0.11 - 0.01 - 0.08 - 0.00 
ICC Lineup - .00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 
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APPENDIX 4 
Chapter 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table S5.1 
 
Model fit indices for fixed intercept models (Model 1) and random intercept models (Model 2) for each outcome 
variable 
 Correct 
Identifications 
Correct rejections False identifications Confidence 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Log likelihood -469.69 -457.92 -527.47 -500.66 -882.83 -845.77 -3602.0 -3504.7 
AIC 953.38 933.83 1068.9 1019.3 1779.7 1709.5 7219.9 7029.3 
BIC 986.28 976.13 1101.8 1061.6 1817.4 1758.1 7263.1 7083.2 
ICC Participant 
- .015 - .005 - .050 - 
.185 
.185 
ICC Lineup - .081 - .119 - .097 - .060 
Table S5.2 
Logistic multilevel models testing metamemory scores as predictors of choosing (0 = non-chooser, 1 = chooser) 
  
Fixed coefficients OR 95% CI p 
EMS-Contentment 0.98 0.87, 1.09 .73 
EMS-Discontentment 1.00 0.90, 1.12 .88 
EMS-Strategies 1.16 1.04, 1.30 .005** 
MMQ-Contentment 0.98 0.86, 1.12 .80 
MMQ-Ability 0.89 0.78, 1.02 .12 
MMQ-Strategy 0.92 0.82, 1.04 .20 
Random parameters Variance  SD 
Level 1: Lineup .22 .47 
Note. ** indicates p < .01. 
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APPENDIX 5 
Chapter 6 
Free Recall Test 
In the space provided, report all the details that you can remember about the video, including 
the sequence of actions and events, and the people that were involved. If 
you recall information or specific details out of the order in which they happened, report 
these details as they come to mind (i.e., do not leave out any details.) Do not guess about 
details that you cannot remember. Feel free to use full sentences or bullet points – but please 
make sure your report is as complete and accurate as possible. 
Please write your report using only the white boxes (do not write in the grey lines), the grey 
lines will be used later. 
1.  
2.  
3.  
4.  
5.  
6.  
7.  
8.  
9.  
10.  
11.  
12.  
13.  
14.  
15.  
16.  
17.  
18.  
19.  
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20.  
21.  
22.  
23.  
24.  
25.  
26.  
27.  
28.  
29.  
30.  
31.  
32.  
33.  
34.  
35.  
36.  
37.  
38.  
39.  
40.  
41.  
42.  
43.  
44.  
45.  
46.  
47.  
48.  
49.  
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APPENDIX 6 
Chapter 6 
 
50.  
Table S6.1 
 
Multiple linear regression models including metamemory scales as predictors of eyewitness free recall 
performance 
Predictors B (SE) B CI β t p 
Free recall accuracy      
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APPENDIX 7 
Ethics approval (Chapters 2 to 6) 
 
Each of the experiments presented in this thesis received ethical approval from the 
University of Portsmouth’s Science Faculty Ethics Committee (SFEC). Below, the letter of 
favourable opinion is attached for each of the experiments reported in this thesis. 
MMQ-Contentment 1.04 (<0.001) [-0.003, 0.003] <0.01 -0.05 .96 
MMQ-Ability <0.001 (<0.001) [-0.005, 0.002] -0.08 -0.82 .82 
MMQ-Strategies <0.001 (<0.001) [-0.002, 0.003] 0.02 0.22 .41 
SSMQ <0.001 (<0.001) [-0.002, 0.001] -0.08 -0.85 .39 
General Memory Ability <0.001 (<0.001) [-0.001, 0.001] 0.01 0.11 .21 
Face Memory Ability <0.001 (<0.001) [-0.001, 0,001] 0.12 1.27 .91 
Free recall completeness      
MMQ-Contentment 0.66 (1.69) [-2.68, 4.01] 0.04 0.39 .69 
MMQ-Ability -0.78 (2.06) [-1.94, 4.26] -0.04 -0.37 .70 
MMQ-Strategies 1.15 (1.57) [-4.85, 3.28] 0.06 0.73 .46 
SSMQ 0.23 (0.97) [-1.68, 2.14] 0.02 0.24 .81 
General Memory Ability -0.12 (0.70) [-0.89, 1.23] -0.02 -0.17 .86 
Face Memory Ability 0.16 (0.54) [-1.50, 1.26] 0.03 0.31 .76 
Free recall confidence      
MMQ-Contentment -0.04 (0.55) [-0.21, 0.12] -0.04 -0.49 .62 
MMQ-Ability 0.13 (0.10) [-0.07, 0.34] 0.12 1.25 .21 
MMQ-Strategies -0.02 (0.08) [-0.18, 0.13] -0.02 -0.31 .76 
SSMQ 0.01 (0.05) [-0.08, 0.11] 0.03 0.36 .72 
General Memory Ability 0.02 (0.03) [-0.05, 0.09] 0.05 0.54 .59 
Face Memory Ability 0.04 (0.03) [-0.01, 0.09] 0.12 1.31 .19 
Free recall 
over/underconfidence 
     
MMQ-Contentment -0.008 (0.064) [-0.024, 0.017] -0.033 -0.34 .72 
MMQ-Ability -0.003 (0.010) [-0.042, 0.007] -0.140 -1.36 .17 
MMQ-Strategies -0.001 (0.009) [-0.019, 0.018] -0.003 -0.35 .72 
SSMQ 0.004 (0.012) [-0.007, 0.016] 0.069 0.75 .45 
General Memory Ability 0.003 (0.004) [-0.005, 0.011] 0.075 0.72 .47 
Face Memory Ability -0.002 (0.003) [-0.008, 0.004] -0.056 -0.62 .53 
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